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ECOWAS: COMBINING SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The study utilizes regional integration theories like neo-functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and new regionalism to analyse the formation, structure 
and transformation of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).  It examines the role of ECOWAS as a sub-regional economic 
body and its transformation to a political and security body dealing with sub-
regional conflict resolution. Though neo-functionalism is generally analysed 
in reference to European regional integration, the study attempts to draw some 
lessons from this theory. Also, new regionalism theory is utilized to examine 
the transformation of ECOWAS from a mere economic body to a security and 
political entity. 
 
Regionalism in West Africa was initially geared towards mere economic 
cooperation; however, the emergence of ECOWAS on the scene and its 
subsequent transformation witnessed several changes towards the path of 
security cooperation. Despite its involvement with the gigantic political and 
security related activities, a general evaluation of economic integration in 
West Africa depicts a low level of progress. The poor state of sub-regional 
economic integration shows that ECOWAS did not complete its regional 
economic integration agenda before diverting to other sectors of integration.  
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ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-
regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict 
resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have 
been severally utilized. Also, in some of the cases, peacekeeping operations 
have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS 
peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and 
mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories. 
 
ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been a subject of debate by 
proponents of the principle of non-interference and those of the responsibility 
to protect. The expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons 
as well as the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of 
lives has questioned the principle of non-interference and validated the 
principle of responsibility to protect.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
1.0 Background of the study 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a sub-
regional organization of fifteen countries, created on May 28, 1975 following 
the signing of the Treaty of Lagos; to promote economic integration in West 
Africa. Its fundamental objective was to facilitate the integration of the West 
African economies. The steps projected to achieve this objective included the 
establishment of a single monetary zone, harmonization of economic policies, 
removal of customs duties and taxes as well as the establishment of a common 
external tariff.   
 
However, an empirical examination of the state of regional integration in West 
Africa indicates only meagre progress.  This postulation tallies with the views 
of the various people interviewed during the study. During the interview, Dr. 
Adeboye Adeyemo (March 2010) of the African Capacity Building 
Foundation, Harare, Zimbabwe, affirmed that regional integration in West 
Africa has been generally feeble. Also, Dr. P. Nyityo (June 2011); Senior 
Lecturer in International Relations,  Benue State University, Nigeria,  stated 
that West African integration has been sluggish. Similar response was 
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obtained during an interview with Major Kator Bur (August 2012);  former 
Secretary of the African Union Ceasefire Commission, Sudan, who stated that 
West African integration is deficient in comparism to the pace and level of the 
European Union.  A related position was obtained during the interview with 
Dr. Marcel K. Tchaou (February 2010) of UNESCO, Dakar, Senegal, Mr. 
Joseph Ilozulu (March 2012) of Global Business Management Consultancy 
Services, Lagos, Nigeria and Dr. Macerline Hepie (May 2010), Country 
Representative, UNHCR, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
An evaluation of regionalism in the epoch of new regionalism pictures a 
renewed interest in the formation of regional and sub-regional schemes. This 
is partly due to the fact that comparative examination of regional integration 
processes indicates that such initiatives provide mutual benefits to the 
countries involved. For instance, Herenkson (1996) finds that belonging to the 
EU is growth enhancing through efficiency effect. Also, in his examination of 
the viability of the EU as an example of the relevance of regional integration, 
Coe and Moghadam (1993) indicates that about 0.3 percentage point of the 
growth experienced in France during the 1980s could be ascribed to its 
membership of the EU.   
 
However, unlike the European Union (EU), the integration of the West 
African economies has not attained much success, however, the poor level of 
economic integration has not hindered ECOWAS from towering the same 
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path with the EU and other regional bodies in a neoteric phase of regionalism 
by adding to its economic integration agenda, the gigantic task of sub-regional 
conflict resolution. This has generated divergent arguments as to whether 
ECOWAS should concentrate and improve its economic integration mission 
rather than becoming involved in such complex activities. However, this 
development is more comprehensible when analysed in comparison to 
changes noted also in other regional organizations during this new trend of 
regionalism, referred to as ‘new regionalism’, which  has been effectually 
dissected by different  scholars (Söderbaum 2003:1-2; Kim 2007:4-5). 
  
The European integration process provides a good example of this 
phenomenon: Western European integration witnessed a transformation from 
economic integration (under the European Economic Community, EEC) to 
political and security integration (under the European Union, EU).  It may be 
hypothesized that the European trend provided the prototype for regionalism 
in other parts of the world. To this extent, the theoretical tools utilized for the 
study of European integration remained relevant for the study of regional 
integration in West Africa and other parts of the world.  Apart from new 
regionalism, classical theories of regional integration, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism provides a theoretical instrument for an analysis of the 
process and dynamics of regional integration in West Africa.   
 
14 
 
In the view of Aning (2000: 50-63), the transformation of ECOWAS from an 
economic to a political integrative arrangement commenced with the 
promulgation of the non-recourse to aggression treaty (1976). This 
development culminated into the signing of the non-aggression protocol 
(1978) and the protocol on mutual assistance on defence (1981). However, 
scholars have argued that the ECOWAS conflict management system was not 
necessarily based on the signing of these protocols but were established due to 
the ECOWAS’s experimental involvement in the Liberian conflict. 
 
ECOWAS’s gradual transformation to a sub-regional security body dealing 
with intrastate conflict was immediately faced with some challenges arising 
from the debate by proponents of the principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs and those of the responsibility to protect or peace enforcement. 
However, the expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons as 
well as for the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of 
lives have questioned the principle of non-interference and seem to have 
validated the principle of responsibility to protect.  
 
Lessons learnt from the failures of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
necessitated a major change in the position of the African Union (AU) on the 
question of non-interference and the responsibility to protect. The Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (2000) proactively enacted a responsibility to protect 
in the document granting the AU Peace and Security Council the mandate to 
15 
 
assess a crisis situation, send fact-finding missions to a potential crisis area 
and authorize intervention in intra state conflicts (Murithi, 2007: 16).  
Specifically, Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act states that  
‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity’ (AU 2000, article 4. h). In 2003 it was 
amended to include the fourth situation of a serious threat to the legal order in 
a state.  However, it should be interpreted cognizant that Article 4(g) still 
embraces the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. 
 
This provides a major distinguishing stand between the OAU and the AU: the 
adoption of these legal provisions meant that African countries are 
empowered with the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations by 
intervening in internal affairs of its member state to prevent atrocities against 
minority groups or communities at risk but only under very specific 
prescribed conditions (Murithi, 2007: 16-17).  Also, under this mandate, 
member states are required to request for the intervention of the Union to 
restore peace and security (AU 2000, article 4(j)). 
 
However, the preference of UN peacekeeping operations over ECOWAS’s is 
traceable to the old perception of multilateral and regional relationship in 
security matters, which assumed a position of a dominant UN that delegates 
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responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS in 
accordance with UN Charter Chapter VIII.  This puts the regional body as a 
mere intermediate actor that undertakes tasks following decisions of a 
multilateral organization like the UN.  
 
This school of thought supposes that regional organizations only contribute to 
a multilateral system led by the UN Security Council. Hettne and Söderbaum 
(2006:227) said this approach ignores the fact that a UN led approach and 
regional security governance have the tendency to follow divergent logics. 
Consequently, they are potentially competing structures especially as the UN 
model is based on a Westphalian nation state logic, while an African regional 
approach tends more to a post-Westphalia world order.  
  
The erroneous assumption that the UN has monopoly over peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution is not tenable in the epoch of new regionalism.  Regional 
bodies have facilitated multilateralism with new ideas and have been able to 
fill some of the gaps left by the UN. Also, regional integration contributes to 
conflict amelioration and global security. The need for the avoidance of 
another major war in Europe was one of the major contributing factors to the 
formation and growth of the West European integration (Thakur 2006:80). 
 
17 
 
Therefore, the UN should not see these organizations as merely depending on 
it for guidance and direction, but as new entrants capable of dealing with 
issues the UN may have failed to deal with or delayed to tackle.  Also, Hettne 
and Söderbaum (2006:227) have rejected the orthodox approach, arguing that 
contemporary realities of world politics do not have room for this idealized 
hierarchical order, where the regional level is merely an intermediary that 
links a global space which is occupied by the UN.  
 
The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as 
facilitation of global security and not a confrontation with multilateralism. 
Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and 
even when available, the deployment takes a long time. Therefore, the 
regional bodies are more readily available to deal with conflicts in their 
regions: ECOWAS’s initiative in the sub-region is a clear evidence of this 
fact.   
 
The emergence of ECOWAS as a major peacekeeper in West Africa was 
necessitated by several factors, including the over stretched effort of the UN 
in Africa. Nascent UN operations in Africa have intensified due to the vast 
number of cases of intrastate conflicts in Africa with countries like Somalia, 
Rwanda, Namibia, Western Sahara, Angola and Mozambique experiencing 
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some form of UN peacekeeping presence.  Also, peacekeeping in Africa saw a 
new trend where peacekeepers were no longer seen as neutral but additional 
parties to the existing conflicts. One example is that UN peacekeepers were 
forced to withdraw from Somalia following the killing of 18 U.S soldiers as 
well as 1,000 Somalis in October 1993. The UN became reluctant about 
additional UN military intervention in Africa in the 1990s.  For example, the 
UN Security Council did not respond with the urgently required military 
intervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  
 
ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-
regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict 
resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have 
been severally utilized. Also, in some of the cases, peacekeeping operations 
have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS 
peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and 
mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The study will employ appropriate theories and concepts to analyse the 
formation as well as the institutional changes in ECOWAS and its 
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transformation from a primarily economic integration community to a 
community that also includes political and security integration.  
 
The study will analyse the theories of regional integration like Neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism and new regionalism to see how they 
explain the formation, changes and transformation of ECOWAS. Also, it will 
examine the impact of Pan-Africanism on regionalism in West Africa. 
 
Examination of new regionalism and related theories will provide the 
framework for the analysis of the transformation of ECOWAS, especially as 
cases of transformation of regional economic organizations to economic, 
political and security organizations have been seen in other regional and sub-
regional bodies.   
 
Analysing the relevant theories will enable an effective examination of 
ECOWAS’s transformation from an economic body focused on removing 
barriers to free trade and increasing the free movement of people and capital 
across national borders, to an organization also involved with sub-regional 
political affairs, security and conflict resolution.   
 
The study’s purpose is to examine the relationship between the promotion of 
sub-regional economic growth and sub-regional conflict resolution.  The study 
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will therefore examine the impact of ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict 
resolution on its core objective of sub-regional economic integration. 
 
The study’s purpose is also to examine how ECOWAS interventions in intra-
state conflicts have spurred the re-examination of the policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states.  
 
The study will examine the assertion that intervention in an intra-state conflict 
amounts to interference in the internal affairs of the state concerned. Also, it 
will look at the opposing view, which states that security, stability and the 
development of every state is inseparably linked with those of other states in 
the region. Consequently, the instability in one state reduces the stability of all 
other countries in the region. The study will evaluate the contention that a 
regional or multilateral intervention to manage an intrastate conflict from 
escalating or to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe is acceptable; based on the 
responsibility to protect principle. Therefore, the study will critically analyse 
ECOWAS intervention in intra-state conflicts in the light of the principle of 
non-intervention and the responsibility to protect principle.  
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
In line with the study’s purpose, its objectives are to: 
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a) Examine how relevant theories help in the explanation of the 
transformation of ECOWAS and its involvement in sub-regional 
conflict resolution. 
b) Assess the relationship between regional economic integration and 
conflict resolution: by critically analysing the experience of ECOWAS 
in regional integration and conflict resolution. 
c) Evaluate the institutional changes in ECOWAS: to ascertain its 
achievements, failures, challenges and future prospects.    
d) Examine the principles of “non-intervention in domestic affairs” and 
that of the “responsibility to protect” in relation to ECOWAS’s 
involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution. 
 
1.3 Scope and limitation of study 
 
Changes within ECOWAS may be observed right from its formation in 1975. 
Though the study will refer to such changes, the area of focus will be the post-
Cold War changes, especially, ECOWAS’s transformation from  sub-regional 
economic integration to its involvement also in political affairs and conflict 
resolution.   
Generally, this phenomenon is not peculiar to ECOWAS; several regional and 
sub-regional economic organizations have also transformed to political and 
security organizations. Therefore, the study will utilize neo-functionalism, 
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intergovernmentalism and new regionalism theories to examine the formation 
and changes in ECOWAS. 
 
Conflict arises in any situation where there is actual or perceived opposition of 
needs, values and interests. A conflict may occur even within an individual, 
but usually between individuals, communities, states, organizations etc. The 
study will not deal with all forms of conflicts (intra party conflicts, labour 
related conflicts etc). It will focus only on ECOWAS’s involvement in the 
resolution of intrastate conflicts in West Africa from 1990 to 2000. The 
emphasis will be on the utilization of peacekeeping forces as a tool for 
conflict resolution in West Africa. 
 
The West African sub-region is plagued by divergent conflicts with different 
methodologies employed by cultural leadership, and governmental or non-
governmental bodies to resolve these conflicts. However, the study cannot 
boast of dealing with all conflicts in the sub-region, neither will it deal with all 
forms of methods of resolution embarked upon by individuals, communities, 
states and inter-state organizations. The study only focuses on the methods 
adopted by ECOWAS in sub-regional conflict resolution.  
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The study will evaluate the state of sub-regional economic integration in West 
Africa and will examine how ECOWAS has combined its traditional role of 
sub-regional economic integration with conflict resolution. It will examine 
ECOWAS’s achievements and failures in both regional integration and 
conflict resolution. The role played by non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and other organizations in conflict resolution and economic integration 
in West Africa is commendable, but it is not the focus of this study.  
 
It is quite clear that the African Union, the UN and other organizations have 
played significant roles in some of the conflicts in the West African sub-
region. However, this study concentrates on the role of ECOWAS in West 
Africa; without prejudice to the efforts of these organizations. 
Though the study will mention most of the conflicts in the sub-region, 
emphasis will be only on examples drawn from the ECOMOG intervention in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The research for this study was 
completed before the collective intervention against former President Gbagbo 
in Côte d’Ivoire and the latest events in Mali in 2013; therefore it will not be 
discussed. 
 
1.4 Theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework 
 
The study will analyse a number of regional integration theories (neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism and new regionalism) that are arguably 
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most suitable for the focus of this study in order to investigate the formation, 
structure and transformation of ECOWAS. This will provide insight into the 
basis of the organs and structures of ECOWAS and the role of the 
organization in the economic and political integration of West Africa. Though 
neo-functionalism is generally analysed in reference to European regional 
integration by Haas (1958) and others, the study will attempt to draw some 
lessons from this theory, insofar as it can be applicable to regional integration 
in West Africa.  
 
The study analyses the theory of intergovernmentalism to examine the role of 
ECOWAS member states in the integration process.  Emphasis will be laid on 
Andrew Moravcsik’s (2009) concept of liberal intergovernmentalism. Also, it 
examines the difference between regionalism and new regionalism. 
 
The study will analyse conflict resolution theories (peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and peace-making theories) in an attempt to investigate 
ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution. In this regard, the study will 
examine the theory and concept of conflict, conflict resolution theory, 
preventive diplomacy as well as peace-making, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. 
 
In its effort to analyse nascent changes in ECOWAS, the study examines new 
regionalism theory as articled by Hettne, Söderbaum and others to interpret 
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the changes. It looks at the transformation of ECOWAS from a sub-regional 
economic integration to its involvement in sub-regional conflict resolution. 
New regionalism theory provides the framework for analysing these changes.  
Chapter Two will concentrate in more detail on the theoretical aspects used in 
this study. 
 
1.5  Methodology 
The methodology followed in this study is a combination of a review or 
analysis of literature, documents and other sources, a case study of ECOWAS 
and qualitative methods of research. It utilises existing theories on regionalism 
and conflict resolution and will not engage in theory-development. 
 
An important part of the study is based on primary sources in the form of 
documents or speeches Though several key individuals were interviewed 
during the study and the information obtained from them enhanced the study, 
the comments of the persons interviewed were neither quoted nor directly 
used in the chapters of this study. Primary sources as the original sources 
drafted by the parties involved are more authentic than other sources but are 
not yet interpreted or analysed and therefore the onus is more on the 
researcher to understand them correctly, to keep the context of their origin 
more in mind, to understand the significance of who the text’s author is and 
what the possible sub-text of the text is. Secondary sources are often used as 
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supporting devices for understanding primary sources. In this study both 
primary and secondary sources are used. 
 
1.5.1 Primary Sources 
The importance of primary sources in this research cannot be over 
emphasized. The major objective for the use of this source is to obtain 
original, undiluted, unexaggerated materials that will provide insight into 
ECOWAS’s role in both sub-regional regional integration and conflict 
resolution. 
The study will collate the following primary sources, which will be analysed 
to obtain vital data for this research: 
a) Speeches of key professionals and leaders will be examined. Internet 
primary sources regarding ECOWAS programs and conferences are  
examined and relevant information collated to assist in the 
investigation of ECOWAS’s role in sub-regional security. 
b) Proceedings of ECOWAS Meetings, conferences and symposia were  
collated and analysed. 
c) ECOWAS policy documents and other resources will be examined.  
In order to effectively use the obtained primary sources for this study, this 
archival / original information will be categorized and analysed in accordance 
with the principle of the five ‘W’s (who, what, when, where and why).  What 
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is the tone of the document or material obtained?  Who is the intended 
audience; is it directed to ECOWAS member governments or to others?  What 
is the purpose of the publication? What assumption is the speaker / writer 
intending to make? What are the bases of the conclusions listed in the 
document / statement? Does the document agree or disagree with other 
available documents relating to the similar matter? What is the location where 
the statement was written or made? 
 
1.5.2 Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources are relative - what is classified as a secondary source by 
some may be classified as a primary source by others. The distinction between 
primary and secondary sources is not a sharp one. Since a source is only a 
source in a specific context, the same source object can be both a primary and 
secondary source according to what it is used for (Kragh, 1989:121). Also, 
there is a third classification usually called tertiary source but it is difficult to 
differentiate between secondary sources and tertiary sources. For this study, 
items that may be described as tertiary sources will be included into the same 
category as the secondary source. The following secondary resources will be 
utilized in the study: 
Published materials on the subject of study: however, it has been observed 
that the various secondary sources have dealt with the matter from divergent 
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backgrounds and different points of view. Therefore, available literature will 
be critically analysed to effectively investigate this matter. Relevant published 
books and encyclopaedia will be comparatively examined. 
 
Also, there are a series of journals, newspapers, internet publications and 
magazines, which have examined various issues relevant to this study. These 
materials will be critically analysed to amass sufficient data for the study. This 
will enable the study to provide vital findings, which may be relevant to 
scholars, ECOWAS leadership, West African leaders, regional and 
multilateral organizations and future research. 
 
1.6 Chapter Outline. 
Chapter one introduced the subject of study: it indicated that ECOWAS is a 
sub-regional body created in 1975 by West African heads of state initially to 
facilitate economic integration in the West African sub-region. Also, it 
introduced the need for the utilization of relevant theoretical tools, including 
regional integration theories as well as conflict resolution theories in the 
study. The chapter proceeded to state the purpose of study as well as the 
objectives of the study. It indicated the scope and limitation of study in order 
to provide clarity regarding the focus of the study. Also, the chapter indicated 
the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework of the study. 
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Chapter two deals with the theoretical framework: it looks at the theoretical 
framework for regional integration. It examines classical theories of regional 
integration, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. It does analyses of 
regionalism and new regionalism.  Also, the chapter examines the concept of 
conflict before it proceeds to analyze conflict resolution, including a 
theoretical analysis of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
 
Chapter three analyzes regional integration in West Africa. It does a 
background examination of the impact of Pan-Africanism on regionalism in 
Africa and then concludes with an appraisal of the integration process in West 
Africa as well as the formation of sub-regional bodies. 
 
Chapter four deals with the formation, structure and growth of ECOWAS; it 
examines the formation and structure of ECOWAS and provides a detailed 
illustration of the various institutions in ECOWAS as well as its specialized 
agencies.  The chapter looks at economic and political developments in 
ECOWAS. Also, it looks at ECOWAS’s initiative in regional integration. 
 
Chapter five looks at ECOWAS’s approach to conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution; it examines the justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in intra- 
state conflicts. Also, it looks at multilateralism and regionalism in the light of 
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ECOWAS - UN relationship in conflict resolution. The chapter looks at the 
role of ECOWAS in conflict prevention, including its early warning system, 
preventive diplomacy and its strategy for conflict prevention. Also, the 
chapter analyses peacekeeping and peace enforcement in West Africa with a 
focus on the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It outlines 
the Command Structure of ECOMOG and its mission in Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Guinea Bissau.  
 
Chapter six examines the transformation of ECOWAS to a political and 
security community. It looks at the sub-regional security situation, the level of 
economic development and ECOWAS’s initiative in conflict resolution.  Also, 
the study looks at both schools of thought that support and oppose 
ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict resolution. It lists the arguments of the 
proponents of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and that of 
the responsibility to protect. 
 
Chapter seven is a conclusion of the study; it appraises the various theoretical 
tools that have provided an insight into the study of ECOWAS’ activities in 
the areas of regional economic integration as well as conflict resolution. 
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Chapter Two 
The Theoretical Framework 
2.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical context within which 
ECOWAS can be investigated and analyzed. It therefore means that this 
chapter is selective in the theories discussed here, because it is ultimately 
directed at ECOWAS as a study object. This study’s topic combines two focus 
areas: regional integration and conflict resolution. A combination of theories 
for both areas is therefore required. 
 
The chapter examines classical theories of regional integration, neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism before proceeding to examine 
regionalism and new regionalism theories. Also, it looks at the concept of 
conflict and proceeds to analyze conflict resolution; including forms of 
conflict resolution and a theoretical appraisal of peace making, peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. 
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2.1 Theoretical framework for regional integration 
The current theoretical approaches to the study of regional integration provide a 
description of either integration success or failure. Current extant of the 
theorization of regional integration does not account for both. As far as 
neorealists are concerned, cooperation is puzzling due to their assumption that 
the prevalence of anarchy in the international system makes conflictual relations 
among states unavoidable. Therefore, in the eyes of the neorealists, an integration 
process is purely an unsuccessful endeavour. They assume that cooperation may 
only exist if advanced countries are able to effectively address the relative-gains 
worries of disadvantaged partners or if it is required by specific features of the 
system of interaction among states (Grieco 1990:105; Schneider et al 1995:1). In 
an attempt to appraise the subject of regional integration, Hooghe and Marks 
(2009: Website) affirmed that regional integration creates political tensions by 
shaking up relative capabilities and it creates new inequalities, alters preferences 
and causes politicization.  
 
The assumption projected by structural realism that integration is impossible is a 
major deviation from the optimism of liberalism. Milner (1992:67) observed that 
for liberal scholars who believe the state system is composed of a network of 
social links, integration is almost taken for granted, although coordination 
problems continue to frustrate attempts to cooperate. Liberal thinking has 
contributed more than neorealism in the explanation of the process of political 
integration (Schneider et al, 1995:2) 
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Regional integration theories like neo-functionalism are essential to explain 
the importance of strengthening international organizations. However, 
“Functionalist thought was based on the conviction that changing social and 
economic needs induce the flexible creation and adaptation of institutions to 
social and economic needs. As a "functional" need arises, changes, or 
diminishes, organizations developed to solve the problems will be created, 
changed or diminished as well.  Integration proceeds through "spillovers" into 
other functionally related spheres” (Mitrany 1966, cited in Schneider et al 
1995:2). Neo-functionalists generally challenged the assumption that 
integration is only a consequence of technical demands. Haas (1964) observed 
that social and political goals of participants must be taken into consideration 
before cooperation can be attained. He argued that when this is in place, 
domestic loyalties would progressively shift to the supranational organizations 
created to perform the necessary functions.  
 
2.1.1 Classical theories of regional integration 
No single theory is effective in explaining adequately the critical dynamics of 
the processes of international change that are the key to regional integration.   
It is generally accepted by contemporary contributors to this theoretical 
discussion . “Theoretical revisionism has gained considerable impetus during 
recent years, as the [European] Community was transformed into a Union and 
new challenges were confronted, with the potential for both confirming and 
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challenging the members’ sense of common purpose. At the same time, the 
momentum for integration provided by the 1992 project also revived interest 
in the pre-existing paradigms” (O’Neill 1996:123).  Scholars have 
continuously re-examined and revisited various theories of European 
integration, including federalism and neo-functionalism.  
 
Some of the classical theories of European integration that seemed to have 
been anachronistic for a while suddenly became important and interest is 
suddenly rekindled among scholars and political actors. There are two levels 
of revision regarding most of these theories. There is firstly, a re-visit in the 
continuous study of nascent developments in European integration and 
secondly, the application of these theories to regional integration processes in 
other parts of the world. Theories of European integration have been 
continuously applied in the study of integration in third world countries; 
including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
 
However, scepticism of the pervasive realist tradition continues to influence 
theoretical accounts of the European process, which is rooted in the state 
centric paradigm. Therefore Michael O’Neill (1996:122) postulates that we 
are still confronted with old theoretical wine in new bottles and marketed 
under different labels. He said the resilience of the old paradigms partially 
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denotes academic interests, not necessarily the continuing relevance of these 
ideas and concepts.  It is also a case of an excusable persistence. Though the 
political landscape seems to change, the same issues continue to occupy the 
scholars of European integration.  O’Neill (1996:122) affirms that this is not 
surprising because the prospects for supranational integration are the two sides 
of a theoretical coin that has been the principal currency, in one form or 
another, of European political theory since the Enlightenment.   
 
Theoretical approaches to the analysis of regional integration seem to provide 
either an explanation for integration success or integration failure. Therefore, 
Schneider (1995:1) has argued that regional integration theory cannot account 
for both. He opined that neorealist cooperation is puzzling, given their 
assumption that the anarchy prevailing in the international system makes 
conflict in the relationship among states unavoidable. They see the integration 
process as a largely unsuccessful endeavour. Therefore, cooperation seems 
possible only if advanced countries are able to effectively address the relative 
gains concerns of disadvantaged partners or if specific features of the system 
of interaction among states require it. 
 
Despite the clear limitations in the European integration process, it seems 
almost impossible to analyze a regional integration process without reference 
to the European integration. Therefore, European integration is better 
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described as the archetype of regional integration. “Most of the analyses 
undertaken to date deal with the EEC; it is almost the only important example 
to have been studied over a long period” (Devos, 1995:5).  Wallace (1994:1) 
has postulated that West European integration is the only experiment in 
formal, institutionalized integration above the level of the nation-state to have 
survived and strengthened from the optimistic days of the early 1960s to the 
present. He added that even in the 1960s it was the model that others 
attempted to follow, around which theories of regional integration were 
formed; intended for universal application.  
 
Students of regional integration have largely depended on the European 
experiment for effective analysis of the process of regional integration in other 
parts of the world.   Changes in European Union have provided a picture of 
expectations in new regional organizations. Though these changes are of 
interest to both scholars and political actors, they are not totally surprising. 
European integration has both economic and political objectives. Most 
scholars agree European economic integration was one of the approaches 
towards political objectives.  
 
In the 1990s Moravcsik developed the theory of ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism’ to analyse the process of integration in Europe. He 
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analysed national preference formation  by the the application of liberal theory 
and  substantive outcomes  was expounded by him  using intergovernmental 
theory of interstate bargaining. (Laursen 2008:3, Moravcsik 1998:431). Also, 
in the 1990s, there were arguments about the need for a social constructivist 
approach to fully comprehend European integration. This was a follow up to 
the debate concerning rationalist approaches over social constructivist 
approaches. Early studies of integration raised the question of whether 
integration is a process or a final result.  
 
However subsequent changes in Europe and the rebirth of nationalism 
affected the early thoughts and concepts regarding European integration. The 
belief that early theory had thought the process to be automated resulted in 
nascent efforts to re-examine and reformulate integration theory. Integration 
theories began to study the European system as a political one, where inputs in 
the form of demands, support and leadership are transformed into outputs in 
the form of policies and decisions.  
 
Attempts have been made in the application of the so called Eurocentric 
theories to the analysis of integration in other parts of the world, including 
attempts at comparative studies. Haas (1961: 366-392) was one of the first 
scholars to attempt a study of comparative regional integration. He suggested 
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the study of the environment where the integration processes takes place in 
order to identify the distinguished points. Also, there has been an attempt at 
comparative regional integration by a scholar like Laursen (2003). However, 
due to the unequalled advanced stage of European integration, several 
challenges have been observed in most of these comparative regional 
integration studies. According to Laursen (2003:6) “…if we want to conduct 
comparative studies, clearly, the process of European integration has gone 
further than integration in other regional setting”. 
 
2.1.2 Neo-Functionalism 
According to Laursen (2008:3), theories of regional integration, such as 
functionalism and neo-functionalism were originally developed to explain 
European integration. This is due to the fact that regional integration started in 
Europe in the early 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. “Ernest Haas theorized this experience in 
The Uniting of Europe (1958). The main theoretical contribution was the 
concept of spill-over. Later Lindberg used this concept to study the early years 
of the European Economic Community (EEC), which started its existence in 
1958” (Laursen, 2008:3). 
 
The theory of neo-functionalism stresses the role of non-state actors like the 
secretariat of the regional organization and related actors in directing the pace 
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for further integration. It asserts that states merely set the terms of the initial 
agreement of the regional integration, but they are not the only determinants 
of the course and extent of subsequent transformation. “Rather, regional 
bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized interests and 
passions seek to exploit the inevitable spill-overs and unintended 
consequences” (Schmitter 2003:3). State actors are not credited with the 
resultant level of integration as they merely agreed to give some degree of  
“supra-national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task and then 
discover that satisfying that function has external effects upon other of their 
interdependent activities” (Schmitter 2002:3). 
 
Schmitter and Niemann (2003:51) posited that neo-functionalism is the most 
criticized theory of regional integration.   However, he stated that not all the 
critisms are justified;  some of these opposing arguments misrepresent its 
claim, distorts its arguments or interpret the theory selectively (Schmitter and 
Niemann, 2003:51). Also, some of these critisms emanates from some of the 
proponents of the theory. Haas (1976:175) for example, who is one of the 
architects of neo-functionalism, said that neo-functionalism is now obsolete. 
This made Schmitter wonder why we should bother beating a dead horse 
instead of celebrating its death and focusing on a more contemporary 
approach.  
 
40 
 
The search for alternative theorization and conceptualization should not be a 
complex task and so scholars wonder why the chapter of neo-functionalism 
has remained opened despite its reported obsolesce. The search for alternative 
theorization and conceptualization should not be a complex task and so 
scholars wonder why the chapter of neo-functionalism has remained opened 
despite its reported obsolesce. Throughout the history of regional integration, 
there has been no dearth of nascent theories; proponents of new concepts have 
become a routine phenomenon. “The list is end-less; ‘International regime 
analysis,’ ‘the regulatory approach,’ ‘liberal inter-governmentalism,’ ‘the 
policy- network approach,’ ‘the Fusion-Thesis,’ ‘multi-lateral governance,’ 
‘institutionalism’, ‘rationalism,’ ‘constructivism,’ ‘reflectivism’ and ‘post-
modernism’ ” (Schmitter 2002:3). 
 
 
 
Despite these criticisms as well as some of its deficiencies, neo-functionalism 
remains a vital approach for conceptualizing and analyzing the dynamics of 
European integration and a reference to integration studies in other parts of the 
world. Neo-functionalism also possesses a vital toolkit for analyzing and 
explaining issues of regional integration (Schmitter and Niemann, 2003:64). 
 
The relevance of neo-functionalism in the study of regional integration cannot 
be totally denied. Hooghe and Marks (2009:205) have attested to the fact that 
nearly fifty years of neo-functionalism have taught something about regional 
integration. They said neo-functionalism identifies basic building blocks for 
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any valid theory of regional integration. Nevertheless, they observed neo-
functionalism postulates that regional integration is molded by its functional 
consequences. Therefore, they asserted that functional needs alone are 
inadequate to explain integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009:206). 
 
Neo-functionalist proponents assert that regional integration is essentially an 
irregular and conflictual process. However, under a democratic situation, 
states will discover they are progressively entangled in regional pressures, 
necessitating the resolution of their conflicts by yielding to a wider scope and 
transferring more power to the created regional organization.  Therefore, 
citizens of these states will gradually start looking up to the regional 
organization for their expectations and satisfying them will enhance the 
possibility that economic integration will spill-over into political integration. 
 
Neo-functionalism attempts to analyse the process of regional integration 
based on empirical data. Under neo-functionalist thought, integration is 
considered a process which is inevitable and not necessarily a desirable state 
of affairs which may be advanced by leaders of the states involved.  
Therefore, neo-functionalism postulates that supranational institutions are a 
major reason for regional integration. The theory of neo-functionalism is 
imperative in the analysis of the thoughts of early advocates of the European 
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Union who believed that European integration is a fundamental herald to a 
peaceful socio-economic relationship in Europe. 
 
According to Hooghe and Marks, neo-functionalists believed that executive 
power and interest groups within states are pursuing a welfarist objective; 
however, this objective will be best satisfied by regional integration. Neo-
functionalism postulates three major processes which will facilitate 
integration, namely positive spillover, the transfer of domestic allegiances and 
technocratic automaticity.   
 
Positive spillover  indicates that integration between states in an economic 
sector will facilitate the creation of incentives for integration in other sectors 
to enhance the benefits of integration in the initial sector. Secondly, transfer in 
domestic allegiances will be better comprehended by the assumption within 
neo-functionalist thinking regarding the concept of a pluralistic society within 
relevant nation states. Neo-functionalists state that, in furtherance of the 
process of integration, interest groups and organizations within the pluralistic 
societies of the states, will assign their loyalty to the supranational 
organization. This is due to the realization that the new institutions are a 
preferred channel through which to pursue their objectives and interests. 
Thirdly, technocratic automaticity illustrates how supranational institutions 
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which are set up to direct the integration process will motivate further 
integration as they become continuously influential and more independent of 
the member states. Neo-functionalists believed that the supranational 
institutions shouldered with the responsibility to oversee the integration 
eventually becomes autonomous and influential in facilitating the integration 
process (Hooghe and Marks, 2009:207). 
 
2.1.3  Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism is currently a commonly used concept in international 
organizations.  In terms of intergovernmentalism, member governments 
possess authority in international organizations and decisions are made by 
general agreement.  Unlike  neo-functionalism, the theory asserts that the pace 
of integration is controlled by the governments.  The major proponents of 
intergovernmentalism refute the neo-functionalist idea of the spillover effect. 
Also, they reject the argument that supranational organizations have the same  
political influence as the national governments. 
 
Some of the proponents of intergovernmentalism state that its major 
advantage is that states work together to achieve targeted objectives, while 
retaining their sovereignty. This makes intergovernmentalism a more 
acceptable concept to governments; when compared other concepts, which 
delegates power to intergovernmental organizations.  
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Intergovernmentalism theory surfaced in the mid-1960s based on realist 
concepts, which asserted the convergence of national interests and the will of 
governments to work together as essential to the analysis of regional 
integration. Most scholars found Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998), a vital tool in the study of 
regional integration.  Also, Moravcsik’s reference to  ‘grand bargains’ and his 
analysis of the the national preference formation, interstate bargaining and 
institutional choice’ has been of much interest to contemporary regional 
integration studies (Moravcsik 1998:20-79; Laursen 2008:6). uuu 
 
According to Moravcsik (1998:47-49), the first stage relates to national 
preference formation. The major question raised by Moravcsik relates to which 
of these interests (economic or geopolitical) is paramount to the member 
governments. In the case of the European integration, economic interest was the 
superseding interest. He said the second stage which is interstate bargaining 
attempts to analyse the efficiency and distributional outcomes of the 
negotiations. The two probable explanations of the consent on substance are 
diverged: asymmetrical interdependence or supranational entrepreneurship. 
Moravcsik concluded that asymmetrical interdependence provides a better 
explanation because some countries have more at stake than others. Such 
countries will put more effort to influence outcomes and are more likely to give 
concessions. 
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The result of interstate bargaining is dependent on the worth of unilateral policy 
options  in respect of  the status quo, which underlies plausible threats to veto as 
well as the worth of varied coalitions that underlies plausible threats to exclude 
and the prospects of issue linkage or side-payments (Moravcsik, 1998:63-64). 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009:67) stated that liberal 
intergovernmentalism is grounded in general social science theory. They 
assert that liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to modernize integration 
theory by drawing on general political science theory. According to them, it is 
an application of ‘rationalist institutionalism, which is a general approach 
used to study interstate cooperation in global politics:  
 
Although Liberal Intergovernmentalism draws on insights from 
traditional schools in European integration studies that treat the EU (or 
regional integration) as a unique  activity, particularly  neo-
functionalism but also, to a lesser extent, traditional 
‘intergovernmentalism’, as developed by Hoffmann (1966, 1982, 
1995). Liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to ground these insights in 
a more consistent and rigorous core of microfoundational assumptions. 
This allows Liberal intergovernmentalism in contrast to traditional 
schools of European integration, to specify the motivations of social 
actors, states, and leaders, and to derive predictions of aggregate 
behaviour or dynamic effects from their interaction that can be 
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subjected to empirical tests  (Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning 
2009:67). 
 
 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning (2009:68) also argued that liberal 
intergovernmentalism attempts to analyse the broad evolution of regional 
integration. Therefore, it is not a theory of a single political activity. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism attempts to link together several theories in a coherent 
approach because integration cannot be effectively analysed with a single 
factor. 
 
Also, they argued that liberal intergovernmentalism is parsimonious. Though 
multi-causal, it is simple and its basic grounds can be summed up in a few 
general interrelated propositions, which intentionally attempts to simplify 
European Union politics, emphasizing the important activities and excluding 
some secondary ones. However, Andrew Moravcsik and Frank 
Schimmelfenning affirm that liberal intergovernmentalism rejects mono-
causal explanation, stating that three theories arrayed in a multistage model 
are necessary to effectively analyse integration.  
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on two major suppositions: Firstly, that 
states are actors and that international organization may be more effectively 
studied by regarding states as the critical actors in a context of anarchy. It thus 
infers that states attain their objectives through intergovernmental negotiation 
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and bargaining and not through a centralized institution, which makes and 
enforces political decisions. Secondly, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes 
that states are rational actors which calculate the utility of optional courses of 
action, selecting the one that capitalize on their efficacy under the situation. 
Unanimous outcomes are rationalized results of aggregated individual actions 
based on the achievement of these preferences (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfenning, 2009:68-69). 
 
 
 2.1.4 Regionalism and New Regionalism theories.  
There are divergent views regarding the proper definition of what constitutes a 
region as well as the term “regionalism”. However, scholars generally agree 
that a region relates to geographic proximity. Therefore, a region may be seen 
as a cluster of states geographically close to each other. However, the question 
of which areas make up a region is still subject to various interpretations 
(Kim, 2007:6).  For example, scholars have postulated that the Asia-Pacific is 
a combination of two or more regions, while others insist it a single region.   
 
According to Mansfield and Milner (1999:591) “a region implies more than 
just close physical proximity among the constituent states”.  An analysis of 
various regions and perceptions regarding the concept of region will further 
show how controversial the phenomenon is. During the Cold War, Western 
and Eastern Europe were divided along the lines of economic and political 
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differences but the post-Cold War era mostly sees Europe as a single entity 
(Kim, 2007:7). 
 
 Studies in regionalism show clearly that a region is much more than a 
geographical area.  Though there is no model definition, rationality demands 
basing the definition on the key continents and subdividing them by a 
combination of religious, linguistic and cultural backgrounds as well as stage-
of-development criteria (Anderson and Norhein, 1993:91). 
 
Though geographical, economic, cultural and political definitions describe 
most regions and regionalism, the varying interpretation of a region may 
depend on the context, circumstances and purposes of the specific region.  
According to Fishlow & Haggard (1992), there is an assumption relating to 
whether regionalism refers to the regional focus of economic interactions or to 
foreign policy direction.  Some studies look at regionalism as an economic 
procedure that facilitates economic interactions among states in a given region 
in a manner that such economic interaction exceeds those between these states 
with external countries or other regions (Kim, 2007:9).  Increased flow within 
the region can be facilitated by an increased intraregional overall development 
or lower trade barriers. Also, government economic policies to promote trade 
liberalization amongst member state have the potential of facilitating 
regionalism. 
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Regional experimentations have increased, especially during the post-Cold 
War era. Scholars like Hurrell (1995) have generally agreed that globalization 
has contributed to the surge in regionalism. Globalization has reportedly 
increased vulnerability of the world economy and this vulnerability compelled 
states to pursue regional integration to preserve their economic development 
and stability. “The deepening and widening of the European Community as it 
created the European Union is believed to be, in part, a response to the 
globalization process and increasing global competition” (Hveem, 2003: 85).  
 
Scholars have also debated the issue of whether regional institutions 
contradict or complement globalization. There is the assertion that regionalism 
is a response to globalization. This assertion states that a regional block is 
merely concerned with facilitating trade liberalization policies within a region, 
while restricting and limiting trade with countries outside their region 
(Bhagwati 1993-:22-28). Based upon this argument, regional institutions are 
essentially opposed to the globalized market. There is however, the opposing 
argument, which states that regionalism, especially the new regionalism, is a 
positive path towards free trade and globalization. It asserts that new 
regionalism seeks to accomplish a more pluralistic world order in which 
various patterns of socio-economic organization stem and coexist (Kim, 
2007:12-13). 
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The resurfacing of interest in the definition of regionalism is one of the major 
trends in nascent international studies. After some years of neglect, 
regionalism has again been revisited by both academicians and policy makers 
(Söderbaum, 2003:1). The 1980s saw a series of forms of regionalisms and 
regionalist projects.  Example of this trend is seen in the changes and 
transformations within the European Union.  
 
However, there are other observed regionalization processes in other parts of 
the world. These includes: “reemergence, revitalization or expansion of 
regional projects and organizations, such as the Southern Common Market / 
Comisión Sectorial para el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
so forth” (Söderbaum, 2003:1). These nascent trends usually called ‘the new 
regionalism’, is not limited to formal inter-state regional organizations and 
institutions. New regionalism is typified by its “multidimensionality, 
complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a 
variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather 
informal multiactor coalitions” (Söderbaum, 2003: 1-2). 
 
However, the puzzling question about this development seeks to know what is 
really new in the so called “new regionalism”.  This question can only be 
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answered when we effectively identify the burgeoning changes of 
regionalism, which has necessitated the re-theorization of the concept of 
regionalism. Some of the studies on the subject cautiously refer to the new 
regionalism as the new trend of regionalism.  However, the difference 
between the old and the new regionalism can be seen through the generations 
of regionalism. “Some theorists refer to the protectionist trend of the 1930s as 
the first main wave of regionalism. More frequently, however, it is argued that 
(voluntary and comprehensive) regionalism is predominantly a post-Second 
World War phenomenon. We may therefore speak of several generations and 
varieties of post-Second World War regionalism” (Hveem 2000, cited in 
Söderbaum, 2003: 3). 
 
Scholars have generally agreed, there have been two waves of regionalism, 
the old and the new regionalism (Söderbaum, 2003:3-4). The first wave can be 
traced to the distressing experience of inter-war nationalism and the Second 
World War period.  It surfaced in the 1940s in Western Europe and it ended in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The second wave commenced in the mid-
1980s in Western Europe during the epoch of the White Paper and the Single 
European Act.  However, there are some levels of resemblance between old 
and new regionalism, therefore Söderbaum (2003: 4) has observed that “when 
studying contemporary regionalism one can easily get a feeling of déjà vu”.   
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Most regional organizations were formed during the era of old regionalism 
and eventually experienced new changes, modifications and transformations 
during the era of the new regionalism. This has led to several arguments about 
the newness of the new regionalism, since it is relatively a continuous 
historical phenomenon. However, the essential features of the new 
regionalism deal not only with transformed regional organizations but the 
emergence of several others. It is its global reach, extending to more regions, 
with greater external linkages that make the difference (Söderbaum 2003:4).  
 
Generally, old regionalism was narrowed down to specific objectives and 
content. New regionalism on the other hand is global and pluralistic and not 
Eurocentric as is the case with old regionalism. Old regionalism theorization, 
especially neo-functionalism, ignores the global environment, but new 
regionalism highlights the global relationship with globalization and other 
similar concepts.  Also, some of the regional institutions created during the era 
of old regionalism have been transformed or renewed with new names, new 
focus and new scope of membership in the 1980s and 1990s (Söderbaum,  
2003: 4). 
 
 However, one of the major distinguishing features of the new regionalism is 
its global reach and its extension to more regions, with more external linkages. 
Unlike the epoch of the old regionalism, nascent regionalism is not only 
extending to most parts of the world, but it is assuming divergent shapes in 
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different parts of the world.  “Whereas the old regionalism was generally 
specific with regard to objectives and content, and (often) had a narrow focus 
on preferential trade arrangements and security alliances, the number, scope, 
and diversity of the new regionalism has grown significantly during the last 
decade” (Schulz, 2001 cited in Söderbaum  2003:4). 
 
The term ‘new regionalism’ is essential for theoretical reasons; it is a theory-
building strategy to add the prefix ‘new’ in order to differentiate theoretical 
novelties from preceding frameworks, “e.g. new conservatism, new political 
economy, new political science, new security, and so forth” (Söderbaum 
2003:5).   
 
Also, in his attempt to differentiate old regionalism from the new regionalism,  
Söderbaum (2003: 23) affirmed that the concept of regionalism is traceable to 
the era of the bipolar Cold War context while new regionalism is traceable to 
the era of a multipolar  post-Cold War era.  According to him, it surfaced as a 
spontaneous process. Also, he said the objectives of regionalism were specific 
regarding the focus of the regional organization. However, new regionalism is 
multidimensional and goes beyond mere economic and trade integration to 
cover political, security and a vast range of affairs. 
 
The major differences between old and new regionalism are highlighted by 
Söderbaum (2003:23-24). The old phase of regionalism was specific regarding 
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its objectives in the sense that there were organizations that focused on 
security (where security-motivated), while others pursued an economic 
agenda (where economically oriented). The new phase is characterized by a 
more comprehensive and multidimensional societal process. Also, new 
regionalism and multipolarity emanated from a world order perspective, 
which is basically two sides of the same coin, while unipolarity contradicts 
with both multipolarity and regionalism. 
 
The new phase of regionalism was part of a global structural transformation 
which included a series of non-state actors operating at different levels of the 
global system. Unlike new regionalism, old regionalism focused on the 
relationship between groups of neighbouring nation-states. Old regionalism is 
a creation ‘from above’, while the new phase of regionalism was a more 
voluntary process from within the evolving regions, where the component 
states and other actors experienced the necessity of cooperation, an ‘urge to  
merge’, or the pooling of sovereignty in order to face new challenges arising 
from global changes. The old was inward-oriented and protectionist in 
economic terms, however, the new phase is characterized as being ‘open’, and 
thus compatible with an interdependent global economy (Söderbaum, 
2003:23-24). 
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2.2. Theoretical framework for conflict resolution  
The second category of theories required for this study’s topic is about 
conflict and conflict resolution. 
 
2.2.1 Conflict: A conceptual analysis 
The word “conflict” is derived from the Latin word “confligere” meaning to 
clash or engage in a fight. It denotes a confrontation between one or more 
parties seeking to attain incompatible or competitive means or ends. Conflicts 
manifest in two ways: recognizable which is based on actions or behaviors, or 
latent, by remaining dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are not 
expressly revealed but are built into institutions, cooperation and civil society. 
(King and Miller 2006:52). 
 
There are basically three forms of conflict: interstate, internal, and state 
formation conflicts. Interstate are conflicts between governments or nation-
states. Interstate conflicts arise due to a violation of the state system of 
alliances. Internal conflicts are conflicts or disputes between parties within a 
nation state. This type of conflict has been on the increase, their frequency and 
intensity has been a major concern to the international community. These 
conflicts have manifested in various forms including, anti-colonial struggles, 
secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts and battles over 
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the control of government or political power. State formation conflicts relate 
to global conflicts where non-state groups combat international and regional 
organizations (King and Miller 2006: 52-53). 
 
Theoreticians differ significantly in how they view the concept of conflict; 
their comprehension of conflict emanates from different perspectives as a 
special set of interrelated elements: parties, issues, dynamics, and contexts. 
Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding, however, they use certain abstract 
concepts such as cause and effect; direct, indirect, and intervening causes; and 
payoff matrices (Bartos and Wehr, 2002:12). 
 
Boulding (1963:5) defines conflict as “a situation of competition in which the 
parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in 
which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the 
wishes of the other”. He further explained that this definition deals with two 
words, "aware" and "wishes”. Therefore, he emphasized that these words are 
loaded with philosophical dynamite. He said the nature of awareness is very 
obscure. But there is a distinction between the competition of land forms and 
the competition of animals, men, and societies. Also, he said there is the 
possibility of a condition of competition among animals or men that may not 
necessarily lead to conflict, because there would be no awareness of the 
competitors. “Suppose we had two species of insects, one of which fed by day 
and the other by night on the same food supply. They might be in intense 
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competition, in the sense that an increase in the number of one would force a 
diminution in the number of the other, but they might be totally unaware of 
each other's existence” (Boulding, 1963:5).  
 
Based on this analysis, Boulding (1963) insists that many individuals and 
groups may be in competition but are probably not aware due to the 
complexity of the world.  Also, he said there may be no conflict where there is 
a potential conflict; if there is no desire on the part of one party to occupy a 
region of its behaviour space from which it is excluded by the other. “Thus it 
is impossible for two people to sit on top of a flagpole at the same time. In this 
area, there is competition between them, and if they are aware of this, there is 
potential conflict. If, however, neither party has any desire to sit on the 
flagpole or even if only one party has this desire, the conflict will not become 
actual” (Boulding, 1963:5).  
 
The above illustration affirms unequivocally that the definition of conflict is a 
complex task due to the explicit fact that the term is conceptualized in 
different manners due to divergent societal, cultural, political, ideological and 
linguistic backgrounds. “Park and Burgess defined it simply as struggle for 
status. Somewhat later, Mack and Snyder defined it as struggle not only for 
status but also for scarce resources and significant social change” (Bartos and 
Wehr 2002:12). The difficulty in identifying the most acceptable definition of 
conflict is not surprising as the various scholars are not only defining it based 
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on empirical analysis of divergent forms of conflict but are also influenced by 
varying theorization of the concept. “Theory assumes that conflict can 
originate either in goal incompatibility or in hostility (or in both), and that it 
involves a unique type of behaviour, conflict behaviour. Thus conflict is 
defined here as a situation in which actors use conflict behaviour against each 
other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility” (Bartos and 
Wehr 2002:12). 
 
Another contending issue is the legality of conflicts; this is due to arguments 
about actors in conflict or actions that either create conflicts or add flame to an 
existing conflict. For example, there are arguments that say all originators of 
violent conflicts are criminals and should be treated as such. This debate 
creates several questions on the matter of conflict; it raises questions about 
whether some actors in the conflict are legally justified while others are mere 
criminals, rebels or terrorists.  
 
Samuels (2007:12-19) wondered whether groups responsible for political 
violence to effect changes in government should be considered as legitimate 
actors or mere criminals. He queried the legal basis of such acts, wondering if 
its legality depends on the primary motivations for the act.  Samuels also 
wondered if it should be considered a legitimate action, if a group 
representing a community starts a campaign of political violence due to their 
lack of access to political and economic power.  He postulated some 
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thoughtful questions; asking whether a group using violence acts to resist 
authoritarian regimes should be seen as legitimate and who is authorized to 
decide such issues. 
 
States are generally perceived to possess legitimacy and perhaps monopoly 
over the use of violence.  However, the use of violence by non-state actors in 
defense or in pursuance of the fundamental rights of an oppressed or deprived 
group is mostly considered legitimate based on the principle of the right to 
self-determination and included in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions (1977).  
 
At the epoch of their struggle, use of violence by national liberation 
movements like the ANC or SWAPO was considered legitimate. Fanon 
(1963:35) saw violence by an oppressed or colonized people against their 
oppressors as a legitimate act necessary for self-determination. He stated that 
decolonization is always a violent phenomenon, which precedes the rise of a 
new nation. Also, he stressed that decolonization is the meeting of two 
opposing groups that originally came together as a result of the violent or 
forceful subjugation of the other. Therefore, the use of violence is a vital 
element because their first encounter was marked by violence and their 
existence together was a product of violence (Fanon 1963:36). 
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According to Conteh-Morgan (2004:254), it is not easy to separate legitimate 
acts of national self-determination struggles and illegitimate acts of violence.  
Violent acts considered genuine by supporters of a course may be called 
terrorist acts by those who oppose it. "One man's terrorist is another man's 
freedom fighter" (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:254).  Also, insurgency, guerrilla 
warfare, military coups and riots are interpreted by different actors in 
divergent ways depending on their preference and prejudice. The 
demonstrations, riots and rebel uprising in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria are 
clear examples of this puzzle. There were those who saw the situation as rebel 
uprisings to overthrow legitimate governments and those who saw it as a 
revolution or popular movement to chase-out corrupt dictators from the 
Middle East. 
 
Three types of human motivation (i.e. needs, values and interests) are essential 
in the comprehension of conflict. Needs are universal, primordial and genetic. 
They do not change but values are culturally specific customs and beliefs 
distinctive to individual communities and interests vary according to 
circumstances (Burton, 1990, cited in King and Miller, 2006:53).  
 
There have been divergent views regarding the difference between conflict 
and disputes: there is the school of thought that relates conflict to immovable 
resources like rivers, lakes, mountains, or mineral deposits. This school of 
thought states that disputes involve more temporary and ephemeral elements. 
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However, King and Miller (2006:53) call for caution, to avoid 
oversimplification. Dispute arises in a negotiable situation in which the 
possibility of compromise exists and changing institutions or structures are  
not compulsory.  Conflicts, on the other hand, arise from human needs that 
cannot be compromised. Therefore, conflict is only settled when it is 
managed, negotiated, or suppressed after a party or all parties relinquish 
something.  This may then be followed by a level of enforcement or coercion 
to ensure that the parties keep to the settlement (Burton, 1990:2).   
 
Conflict studies were to an extent affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international arena. 
The 1990s opened with a dramatically changed strategic landscape, triggered 
by the Gorbachev reforms of “glasnost and perestroika”, followed by the 
collapse of communist systems throughout Eastern Europe and the emergence 
of an era in which Marxist-Leninist ideology became less relevant. This 
development culminated in the collapse of the wall between East and West 
and the reunification of Germany.  The Baltic States became independent, 
starting the process of unraveling the Soviet Union. By 1992 the face of 
Europe had changed and the Soviet Union had become history. These 
developments not only created a new world order but changed the form, 
nature and context of conflicts and academic literature on the subject 
(Sarkesian 1993:3). 
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One of the major changes witnessed was the gradual dissipation of interstate 
conflicts and the budding of the phase of intrastate conflicts. The post-Cold 
War era shaped a new geopolitical environment characterized by different 
forms of intra-state conflicts. These conflicts quickly outnumbered the more 
conventional inter-state conflicts. They differed in several ways from the 
conflicts of the Cold-War period and their prevention and resolution soon 
became a complex issue requiring an effective mechanism for dealing with 
them (George 2000:15). 
 
Interstate conflicts are not a totally new phenomenon; their state of invisibility 
was not entirely due to their non-existence. They were merely overshadowed 
by the weightier matter of interstate conflicts during the Cold War era. 
(Examples were the wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, the Horn of 
Africa and others). Also, intra-state conflicts were actually one of the 
components utilized by the rival super powers to facilitate their Cold War 
agenda. Therefore, their role and impact in international security cannot be 
underestimated.  
 
It is quite clear that the total breakdown of international security during the 
first and second World Wars was partly due to the failure of states and the 
international community to resolve minor intrastate and interstate conflicts. 
Also, the crisis in Yugoslavia was a clear example of the inability of the 
international community to prevent a conflict situation from escalating.  
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Generally, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a general decline in interstate 
conflict but has seen a sharp increase in intra-state conflicts. There has been a 
new pattern of conflicts with new approaches and new agitations with 
emphasis on challenging state authority. This includes the emergence of 
several secessionist movements, which has threatened the territorial integrity 
of the State concerned (Sarkesian 1993:4; Ferguson 2002:103; Thakur 
2006:53).  
 
2.2.2 Overview of conflict resolution 
There are a series of arguments regarding the term ‘conflict resolution’; some 
of these arguments tend to query the use of the term itself. These arguments 
are based on the assertion that most of what is termed conflict resolution does 
not in fact amount to a complete resolution of the conflict in question. 
Therefore, the major question of interest is: when is a conflict said to have 
been resolved? Though this question looks simple and superficial,  it is not 
simple to answer; because mostly conflicts are rarely resolved. Most conflicts 
are often downgraded, reduced or contained after the contending issues have 
been reconstituted or reoriented (King and Miller, 2009: 54) 
 
Therefore, a downgraded or contained conflict situation does not necessarily 
mean the conflict has been resolved. A conflict is said to be resolved when the 
results fully satisfy the needs of all the parties. Though this is subject to 
debate and disagreement, a conflict may also be said to be resolved by the 
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application of five main strategies: inaction, withdrawing, contention, 
yielding, and problem solving (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994 cited in King and 
Miller, 2009: 53).  However, Galtung (2004, cited in King and Miller, 2009: 
54) opined that conflict resolution is dependent upon correcting what he calls 
the steep self. According to him, resolution is dependent upon a changing 
behavioral polarizations, and searching for the removal of incompatibilities in 
goals. This means; it necessitates conflict processing, which may lead to 
attaining a resolution from changing the situation or redefining it, 
compromise, deepening, or withdrawal. 
 
Another contending issue in conflict studies is the fact that conflicts usually 
come in divergent forms. Therefore, a perception of conflict and its resolution 
mechanism may be limited to a particular type of conflict. Also, there is no 
consistent vocabulary for considering conflict management, conflict 
resolution, conflict prevention, and conflict transformation. This is due to the 
fact that conflict is conceptualized in different ways by available publications 
emanating from the Arab world, Hindu cultures, Buddhist societies and 
diverse African cultural and linguistic backgrounds (King and Miller, 
2009:52). 
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2.2.3 Theories of conflict and conflict resolution 
 
2.2.3.1 John Burton’s Human Needs Theory 
Burton (1990:338) produced some theoretical postulations of conflict 
resolution called ‘Human Needs Theory’; the theory itself emanates from the 
assumptions of several disciplines. Burton theorized that certain human needs 
are vital pre-conditions for conflict resolution. He identified the fundamental 
needs that affect the individual and group response if violated. Burton referred 
to these needs as “ontological needs” which he considered as products of 
human nature. Also, he stated that these needs are universal and would be 
sought irrespective of the consequences.  He stressed that the fundamental 
needs of identity, recognition, equal participation and security are not 
negotiable. Therefore, protracted conflict is inevitable whenever an individual 
or group is denied these fundamental needs. The resolution of such conflicts 
requires that the deprived needs are identified and there is a restructuring of 
the social system or relationships to accommodate the needs of all individuals 
and groups. 
 
 However, Rubenstein (2001, website) indicated that Burton did not invent the 
theory of human needs; he was not the first to point out the existence of 
certain fundamental needs, which are imperative for the prevention or 
resolution of conflicts. However, Rubenstein affirms that Burton gave the 
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theory it’s most impassioned and uncompromising expression. 
 
Burton (1990:337) argued that ontological needs differ from values and 
interests because they are not negotiable. Values provide a certain level of 
opportunities for negotiation, while interests are completely negotiable. Also, 
Burton (1990:2) stated that conflict differs from dispute despite their 
similarity. According to him, conflict is a response to non-negotiable human 
needs, while dispute arises from negotiable values. He also differentiated 
conflict resolution from conflict management and conflict settlement, 
stressing that conflict resolution deals with issues that are deep seemingly and 
intractable.  On the other hand, settlement deals merely with the superficial 
factors of conflict. Burton (1990:34) stated that deterrence cannot deter; he 
draws attention to the deficiency of coercive methods to modify behavior 
when people are pressed to respond on the basis of imperative needs.  
 
Burton’s assumptions were faulted by Avruch and Black (1987:87) who 
disagreed with Burton’s claim that the theory is generic and applicable to all 
processes of conflict resolution. His assumptions on needs were also heavily 
criticized by cultural anthropologists and relativists, who are opposed to 
universal values. Despite the criticisms, Burton’s theory has a positive impact 
on conflict resolution in several ways. It enables the differentiation between 
issues that may be resolved by employing conventional force, law and power-
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based negotiation and those requiring alternative measures.  Also, it facilitates 
the differentiating of needs-based conflicts, conflict resolution processes and 
interest-based disputes.  
 
2.2.3.2  Wiliam Zartman’s Ripe Moment based on a Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate 
Zartman (2001:8) observed that most studies on conflict resolution see the 
substance of the proposals for a solution as the key to the fruitful resolution of 
a conflict. However, he stated that there is a second and equally important key 
which lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. According to him, conflict is 
resolved only when the parties are ready to do so; when “alternative, usually 
unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties 
feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament” (Zartman, 
2001:8). Also, he stated that at the ripe moment previously unacceptable 
proposals suddenly become attractive.  Zartman’s postulation is in consonance 
with Campbell’s (1976:73) who stated that the ripeness of time is one of 
essentials of diplomacy.  
 
The notion of a ripe moment is based on the parties’ perception of what 
Zartman and Berman (1982: 66-78) called a Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
(MHS), which relates to an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. 
In the view of Deng and Zartman (1991:307), the final ingredient of the 
68 
 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate is the search for a resolution or a way out, 
including the perception that a mutually agreeable formula for a solution is 
feasible. Also, Deng and Zartman (1991:384) said the sense of the stalemate is 
intensified by the view that the parties stand on a precipice where the costs of 
the conflict is likely to heighten. Resolution becomes feasible due to the fact 
that the parties are conscious of the consequences of any further escalation of 
the conflict, where none of them will gain.  
 
When parties in a conflict discover the impossibility of attaining victory 
through the escalation of the conflict and realize that this deadlock is hurtful 
to both of them, even if not in equal degree, they pursue an alternative policy 
or outcome. The hurting situation provides a lesson that the consequences will 
be sharply increased if nothing is done immediately. “The stalemate has been 
termed the Plateau, a flat and unending terrain without relief, and the 
catastrophe, the Precipice, the point where things suddenly and predictably get 
worse” (Zartman, 2001:8).  Also, Zartman affirmed that the mutually hurting 
stalemate is based on a cost-benefit analysis, which indicates that a party will 
likely pick the preferred alternative and a decision to change is produced by 
increased pain caused by  the existing conflict. 
 
Therefore, ripeness may be stressed by a mediator or any of the parties when 
one or all parties fail to recognize it. According to Zartman (2001:9), ripeness 
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is essentially a perceptual event; therefore, there is the likelihood of objective 
referents to be perceived. However he said, what makes for a MHS is the 
perception of the objective condition, not the condition itself. “[I]f the parties 
do not recognize clear evidence, in someone else’s view, that they are in an 
impasse, a Mutually Hurting Stalemate has not yet occurred, and if they do 
perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the 
evidence, the MHS is present” (Zartman, 2001:9).  To attain a ripe moment, it 
is not compulsory for the parties to identify a specific solution; mere 
recognition that a negotiated solution is feasible will be adequate.  
 
Though ripeness is a necessary condition, it is not enough for the initiation of 
negotiations. “It is not self-fulfilling or self-implementing. It must be seized, 
either directly by the parties or, if not, through the persuasion of a mediator” 
(Zartman, 2001:9).  Identification of the ripe moment entails the need for 
research and intelligence to detect the objective and subjective elements. 
Subjective demonstration includes the expressed pain, impasse, and inability 
to endure the cost of additional escalation. Objective sign of stalemate may 
include the “casualty data and material costs as well as the expressions of the 
need for a solution” (Zartman, 2001:10). 
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2.2.3.3 The Macro Theories 
The central concept of classical macro theories of conflict is the use and 
exercise of power. The theories deal with the interaction of groups, 
particularly on the conscious level. Proponents of these theories affirm that 
power comes in political, military, economic and cultural forms. Macro theory 
argues that conflicts are traceable to competition, power pursuit and 
competition over resources.  It utilizes the historical or case study approach by 
observation of groups. Macro theory examines a single event in order to 
attempt an in-depth study of the problem, to ascertain the relationships of 
many variables. The predominant methodologies used are historical or case 
study approaches.  Nineteenth  century post-Napoleonic Europe was mainly 
involved with the matter of the balance of power between alliances, or 
Realism in modern terminology. This theory became antiquated following the 
outbreak of the First World War. However, its postulations were to be utilized   
in the deterrence theory of the Cold War era. The framework of deterrence 
theory was the assumption that a balance of terror would prevent conflict due 
to the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. Deterrence theory was subsequently 
overshadowed by more sophisticated theories like decision making and game 
theories (O'Connell, 1989:15: Connor, 1994:46; Horowitz, 1994: 188). 
 
Schelling’s discussion (1960:83) of game theory as part of the rational choice 
theory introduces the importance of irrationality into strategic thought.  It 
illustrates the interdependency of conflict, competition and cooperation 
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among actors.  According to him, in every case of conflict, there are elements 
of cooperation. Therefore, he avowed that cooperative engagements often 
stimulate an element of conflict. In an attempt to break down the complexities 
of inter-group relationships, he used game playing to illustrate analogous 
situations.  
 
The theory provides vital insight into the study of conflicts in Africa as well as 
appropriate methodologies for conflict resolution. Most of the intra-state 
conflicts in Africa are due to competition over the control of political power 
and economic resources. “In severely divided societies, ethnicity finds its way 
into a myriad of issues: development plans, educational controversies, trade 
union affairs, land policy, business policy, tax policy. Characteristically, 
issues that would elsewhere be relegated to the category of routine 
administration assume a central place on the political agenda of ethnically 
divided societies” (Horowitz, 1985: 8).   
 
Also, Horowitz (1985:8) stated that there are two major societal groups: the 
ranked systems refer to complete domination of one ethnic group by  the other 
while the unranked systems are made up of two ethnic groups with their own 
internal stratification of elites and masses. Both situations clearly typify 
several conflict situations in Africa. “When ethnic violence occurs, unranked 
groups usually aim not at social transformation, but at something approaching 
sovereign autonomy, the exclusion of parallel ethnic groups from a share of 
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power, and often reversion - by expulsion or extermination - to an idealized, 
ethnically homogeneous status quo ante” (Horowitz, 1985:31). Therefore,  
resolution of such conflicts requires an approach that deals with the root cause 
of the conflict.  
 
2.2.3.4 The Behavioural Theories  
The Behaviourist School believes that conflicts can be better understood by a 
thorough examination of the human nature and psychology. It argues there is a 
vital relationship between intrapersonal conflict and conflict that pervades the 
external social order. This school of thought affirms the stimulus response 
hypothesis, which attempts to verify if human beings possess a biological or 
psychological nature that is inclined towards aggression and conflict. 
Therefore, it attempts to find the relationship between the individual and his 
environment (O'Connell, 1989: 15-30). 
 
Scholars have attempted to compare the human nature with that of other 
animals in an attempt to analyse the aggression inherent in humans and its role 
in the emergence of conflict and its escalation. O'Connell (1989) has stated 
that humans engage in both predatory and intraspecific conflict. According to 
him, the issue of motivation essentially separates humans from other animals, 
because animals are not known to pursue such a wide range of aggression. He 
argued that man is involved with a broad range of conflict and that this broad 
range is enhanced by the variety of motivators, which compel him to do so.  
73 
 
O’ Connell analysed the material aspect of human conflicts and argued that 
wars and conflicts have exacerbated with the growth of agriculture and 
politics. However, he concludes that animal behavioural studies only offer a 
clue on human behaviour and aggression, it does not provide an elucidation of 
the complexity of human conflict.  
 
Some of the questions arising from this assumption relates to the existence of 
possibilities for the resolution of human conflicts. If conflicts are inherently 
part of the human nature and existence, what is the likelihood of conflict 
prevention and resolution?  Joint research done by scientists from divergent 
background in Seville, Spain (1986) affirmed there was no scientific evidence 
for concluding that human beings are innately aggressive animals who are 
inevitably prone to war and conflicts due to their biological nature (Mack: 
1990: 58) .  
 
They argued that conflicts arise due to socialization and conditioning, which is 
a phenomenon of human organization, planning, and information processing.  
Mack (1990:58) said that the Seville findings show that humans have real 
choices and that a new kind of responsibility in the conduct of human group 
life is possible. Based on these two opposing arguments, it may be 
hypothesized that conflict resolution is almost impossible if examined in light 
of the argument that humans are inherently prone to conflicts due to their 
biological nature. However, if examined in the light of the findings of the 
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Seville group, the possibility of conflict resolution exists since conflicts arise 
from human socialization, organization and information processing. The 
Seville statement provided a focus on one of the major debates in conflict 
theory research. It attempted to clarify the matter of the roots of human 
conflicts. Also, it attempted the question whether man’s inclination to conflict 
is to be traced genetically within his nature or to his nurture within his 
environment.  
 
Another contemporary argument in the behavioural school is the evolution of 
the Frustration - Aggression theory. The Frustration-Aggression theory argues 
that both interpersonal and international aggressions are traceable to the 
frustration of one or more actors' goal achievement. Therefore, conflicts are 
the product of the frustration arising from unfulfilled objectives. This 
argument is based on the fact that human needs exceed supply; therefore the 
frustration arising from the failure to fulfil human needs creates frustrations 
and conflicts. However, the limitation of the Frustration-Aggression theory 
rests on the basic stimulus-response hypothesis. The limitation of the theory is 
evident in the fact that frustration does not always automatically lead to 
aggression. Also, not all aggressions and conflicts are linked to some catalytic 
frustration.  These facts ultimately discredited the Frustration-Aggression 
theory and the postulation of the Social Learning and Social Identity theories 
(Mack: 1990:59).  
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Social learning theory states that aggression is a learned process of 
socialization and not a mere innate or instinctual nature.  This theory is in 
conformity with the Seville statement (Mack: 1990:58).  It postulates that 
aggressive attributes are acquired by learning them at home, in school, and the 
influence of the environment.  The theory states that children who grow up in 
a violent environment or in a society where violence is common are more 
prone to violence than those who are not exposed to violence.  Regarding the 
current study of ECOWAS’s involvement in conflict, this theory seems to 
explain the reason for recurrent conflicts in some parts of Africa. Children 
bred in a conflict environment are prone to violence and conflicts; not due to a 
biological tendency but due to the impact of their environment. Therefore, the 
resolution of some conflicts may require education and social re-orientation to 
create breaks in a potential or existing vicious circle of conflict. 
 
2.2.3.5 The Enemy System Theory 
A group of psychiatrists and international relations practitioners developed the 
Enemy System Theory (EST) in the late 1980s to study the complexities of 
group behaviour, especially antagonistic group relationships. “The gist of the 
Enemy System Theory is the hypothesis that humans have a deep rooted 
psychological need to dichotomise and to establish enemies and allies” 
(Volkan 1990: 31).  The theory was initially used to study the Cold War in the 
early 1990s; it combines developmental psychology and international relations 
theory in an attempt to analyse conflicts.  
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The Enemy System Theory advances that relationships amongst people within 
groups and with those outside groups determine how the people within each 
group perceive themselves and their relationships with groups that they 
associate with. This determines the nature of relationship, whether it will be 
based on cooperation, competition, or conflict. Also, a historical relationship 
between the groups is a major factor that will affect their current relationships.  
 
The theory applies concepts of international relations and psychology in its 
analysis. It examines the human tendency to have enemies and allies and the 
interlinking of the distinct awareness of self and that of the group's 
distinctiveness with the notions of ethnicity and nationality. Also, it looks at 
the connection between intrapersonal apprehensions, the individual in the 
environment, as well as actions of a group in relationship with other groups 
and the interaction of persons in a group (Volkan 1990:32). 
 
The EST deals extensively with the concept of human identity; it states that 
humans see themselves as individuals and as members of groups of 
individuals due to their birth or race. Also, its groupings are determined 
through labour or related associations within society. Individuals and groups 
tend to divide themselves into ‘I versus not I’, ‘our group versus not our 
group’.  Consequently, there is the tendency to define our group as ‘good’ and 
discredit others as ‘bad’. The group develops a picture of themselves: “ours is 
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a superior group, better race, noble tribe”.  This starts from childhood and 
develops into the subconscious building blocks of prejudice and racism.  
 
This phenomenon is witnessed in several conflicts in Africa, including the 
Hutu / Tutsi dilemma in the Rwandan genocide. It is also noticeable in the 
conflicts in other parts of the world like Northern Ireland, the former 
Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and Lebanon.  Therefore, "the central problem in 
efforts to understand enmity between ethno-national groups is the location of 
the source of the hatred or antagonism" (Mack 1990:63).   
 
The source of the enmity in some African conflicts may be better understood 
through an examination of historical inter-tribal competitions and notion, 
which preceded the colonial era. Some of these perceptions and notions ignite 
nascent intra-state conflicts in Africa, especially as most of the states are 
artificial creations comprising of divergent tribes and nationalities, which 
were brought together during the colonization period without any prior re-
orientation (Mack 1990:63).    
 
Under this situation, conflicts arise due to the identification of a perceived 
enemy, which could be a tribe, a nation or a group.  The perception is not 
based upon an act or omission of the other group; but a man becomes an 
enemy just for belonging to the group perceived as the enemy. Such enemy is 
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demonized and pictured in a manner that promotes violence and hatred 
(Moses 1990:53).   
 
Sometimes, demonization is followed by dehumanization, in which the enemy 
is regarded as being less human and subject to eradication. This can be seen in 
the Rwandan genocide where the Hutus called the Tutsis cockroaches, 
stressing the need for them to be wiped out of the land.  Due to the 
demonization and dehumanization, the perceived enemy can be killed without 
guilt for two reasons: firstly, the enemy is less human and secondary, this 
subhuman has threatened the survival of a purer race, nation or tribe. Also, by 
the perception and propaganda against the perceived enemy, the conflict is 
justified and acts of violence are perceived as mere retaliation against a harm 
done to their race, nation or tribe. Based upon this perception, the aggressor 
sees itself as the victim despite the harm done against the other party. The 
harm done to the victim is merely perceived as the provision of justice for a 
wrongful act (Moses, 1990:53).  
 
2.2.4 Forms of conflict resolution 
There are various forms of conflict resolution, including those generally 
acceptable to scholars and peace workers and those considered crude, violent 
and unacceptable. However, an acceptable form of conflict resolution in a 
given locality may not necessarily be accepted in another locality. Also, the 
effectiveness of a form of conflict resolution is dependent upon the socio-
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economic, political and cultural background of the area. Historically, conflicts 
have been resolved in divergent ways including some non-peaceful methods 
like overpowering of an opponent, the surrender of an intimidated opponent, 
running away of one of the parties, deterrence, violence acts etc.  Modern 
acceptable forms of conflict resolution grew out of the belief that there are 
better options to resolve conflicts than to resort to violence. It is also based 
upon the realization that a conflict is not really resolved by compelling an 
aggrieved party into submission. Therefore, the most acceptable forms of 
conflict resolution are Mediation, Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration.  
 
The United Nation Charter states under chapter VI  that  parties to any 
dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security are required to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
However, chapter VII of the charter indicates that the Security Council may 
authorize economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions, as well as the use 
of military force, to resolve disputes. Chapter VIII of the charter provides 
for the possibility for regional organizations to maintain peace and security 
within their own region based on explicit or implicit authority received 
from the UN Security Council (The United Nations Charter, 1945). 
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2.2.4.1 Mediation 
Mediation is a voluntary, informal, non-binding process which is undertaken 
by an external party that advances the settlement of differences between 
directly invested parties. Theoretically, mediators are expected to be neutral 
and objective but in practice most mediators have some level of interest in the 
resolution of the conflict in question. Effective mediators do not coerce or 
impose judgments or conditions on the parties. They aim at transforming the 
dynamics of the conflict situation through the introduction of new relevant 
knowledge or information by pointing out common interests and suggesting 
possible paths towards settlement. Mediation provides the channel for the 
much needed communication between parties to a conflict where they are not 
able to create mutually satisfactory resolutions by themselves. The mediation 
process is usually initiated by an external mediator like an inter-governmental 
organization, non-governmental organization, regional or sub-regional 
organization, foreign government or by one of the parties in the conflict. 
 
Mediation has existed informally for centuries in Africa and other parts of the 
world. Records about mediation are available in the Bible and in several 
ancient dynasties like the Roman Empire, the Chinese dynasty, ancient Greece 
and the Persian Empire.  Zartman (2000:20-21) illustrated the art of mediation 
in traditional African society. According to him, mediation in traditional 
African societies was done by a neutral third party, who gains the respect of 
the parties through personal characteristics such as wisdom and integrity. 
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These mediators were more of moral mediators and not mediators with 
muscle. Such mediators, he said, were formulators and not manipulators. 
However, modern records of mediation are traceable to the Conference of 
1899 in The Hague where ideas for settling international disputes were 
discussed. This culminated into a series of declarations regarding the need to 
avoid military actions and to resolve conflicts through adjudication, 
arbitration, and mediation. 
 
Scholars generally affirm that successful mediation is dependent upon two 
factors: the personal skills and characteristics of the mediator and the 
environmental and contextual factors relevant to the conflict in question. 
However, these factors are not easily evaluated because the process of 
mediation can be difficult in a protracted conflict, which mostly involve 
extended mediation attempts, which includes several third parties and an ever-
changing environment (Assefa, 1987:50). 
 
2.2.4.2 Negotiation 
Negotiation entails the establishment of communication governed by pre-
established procedures, between representatives of parties involved in a 
conflict or dispute. Usually during a conflict, negotiation is aimed at 
identifying common interests and developing unilateral or multilateral 
initiatives in pursuit of objectives, to de-escalate a conflict situation, or to 
formulate mutually satisfactory solutions towards resolution of a given 
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conflict. Negotiation is voluntary and the parties have direct control over the 
process and outcome. Negotiation involves several tactics like bargaining, 
compromise, and concessions (Druckman, 2001:519) 
 
Fisher and Ury (1983:11) of the Harvard negotiation project made a 
distinction between positional negotiations and principled negotiations in 
which the latter applies the principles of  separation of the people from the 
problem; focusing on interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual 
gain; and insisting on using objective criteria. This assertion is affirmed by 
Rabow (1990). According to him, it is imperative during negotiation to 
concentrate on the problem and to avoid a situation where the relationship 
with the other party gets in the way of the needed cooperation, which is 
necessary to solve the problem. “This is what is meant by separating the 
people from the problem. Negotiators should neither demand concessions on 
the issues as a condition for friendly relations, nor make such concessions in 
an attempt to buy friendship. Techniques that promote a good problem-
solving relationship include imagining yourself in others' shoes; avoiding 
accusations; clarifying perceptions; understanding, explaining, and not 
escalating emotions; using appropriate symbolism; listening actively; and 
speaking purposefully” (Rabow 1990: 17). 
 
It is therefore important for negotiators to focus on interests, not positions; 
because what the parties need to satisfy are their mutual interests. Positions 
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differ from interests and the necessary problem solving which has the 
potential to integrate the interests of the parties cannot take place when the 
only consideration is the positions. Example; there may be two men who are 
struggling over a wild mango. Each of them is claiming the right to the tree. 
However, one of the men is interested in getting all the mango fruits spotted 
on the tree for his fruit juice party, while the other needs all the leaves on the 
tree to make some herbal medications.  
 
It will thus be possible to arrive at a better solution to the sharing of the 
mango tree if the interest of the two men is known.  Knowing only the 
position of the men, without a good knowledge of their interests, will not 
provide a solution to the problem (Rabow 1990).  Basic human needs such as 
security, economic wellbeing, a sense of belonging, recognition, and control 
over one's life are often not fulfilled because negotiators are instead quibbling 
over narrower positions. The interests of all who have a stake in a negotiation 
should be represented; otherwise, those whose interests are not adequately 
taken care-of may thwart any agreement.  
 
In addition to understanding the interests of the various parties, it is necessary 
to produce a solution that satisfies all those interests. This is facilitated by 
inventing options for mutual gain. One technique that can be used to get 
started is known as brainstorming. In brainstorming, a group of participants 
tries to think of, and record, as many approaches to a problem as possible; 
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negative criticism is never allowed in this stage, but friendly, enhancing 
amendments are encouraged. Subsequently, the ideas are evaluated and the 
best selected for further development (Rabow 1990: 17-18). 
 
2.2.4.3 Conciliation 
Conciliation is a voluntary referral of a dispute to a neutral party in an 
unofficial basis to recommend a non-binding settlement. Conciliation may 
only be feasible if the parties to the conflict consent to the use of a conciliator, 
who then meets with the parties separately in an attempt to resolve their 
differences.  Also, conciliation may involve explorations by a neutral party to 
facilitate more structured techniques of conflict resolution. This may include 
confidential discussions with the parties in a conflict or assistance to facilitate 
talks between the disputants. Also, conciliation may facilitate the maintaining 
of an existing agreement between the parties to prevent the conflict from 
escalating or re-occurring. The third party in a conciliatory process must be 
impartial and should not take sides with any of the disputants. 
  
The conciliator’s objectives include the following: to lower tensions, improve 
communications, interpret issues, to provide technical assistance, to explore 
potential solutions and to facilitate a negotiated settlement. The major 
difference between conciliation and arbitration is the fact that the conciliation 
process does not have any legal standing and it is not binding on the parties. 
Also, the conciliator does not have the authority to demand for evidence or 
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call witnesses. Usually, a conciliator does not write a decision and does not 
make an award. In comparison to mediation, conciliation differs in the sense 
that it continuously seeks to concile the parties by consistently seeking 
concessions.  
 
One of the most effective conciliatory techniques is that in which a conciliator 
facilitates the parties to develop a list of all of their objectives to clarify the 
outcomes expected from the conciliation process. Each of the parties is 
subsequently asked separately to prioritize their own list according to what 
they consider to be most important and what is least important. The 
conciliator goes back and forth between the parties encouraging them to 
compromise their objectives one at a time, starting with the least important 
and working towards the most important for each party in turn (Upeace 
Africa, 2009).  
 
2.2.4.4 Arbitration 
Arbitration is a legal-judicial process by which a third-party listens to parties 
in a conflict, reviews evidence from both sides and then issues an arbitration 
ruling or judgment aimed at putting an end to the dispute. Under this method, 
the parties list their grievances and demands; a procedural process is fixed and 
the parties willingly submit to the decision. The decision is supposed to be 
final and binding.  In most cases, the majority of the members of a tribunal are 
selected by the contending parties. However, arbitration processes may vary 
86 
 
depending on the pre-established procedures. Also, in the case of permanent 
arbitration bodies, like the Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague, it is 
different. 
 
Arbitration is similar to adjudication but differs in the sense that arbitration 
could be both formal and informal. Diplomatic or political arbitrations are 
considered formal, while arbitrations in private business sector or labour 
relations might be informal. Also, arbitrations are private, economical and 
relatively quick. Arbitration has some attractive advantages in general over 
other forms of third-party decisions (like its binding nature), and may be the 
only practical form for the resolution of some major conflicts (Upeace Africa, 
2009, website).  
 
Rabow (1990: 27) has identified five major characteristics of arbitration: In 
arbitration, the parties can select the arbitrator or arbitrators, whereas in a 
court of law they must accept whatever judge is assigned, and if a jury is used, 
have very limited influence on juror selection. The parties can specify the way 
the arbitration is to be conducted and can set limits on the discretion of the 
arbitrator(s), whereas in a court of law, they must conform to the existing 
rules, as well as schedules and location of the court. Whereas most court 
proceedings are open to public scrutiny, arbitration proceedings may be kept 
confidential. Arbitration insulates the dispute from court proceedings. Courts 
will not consider a dispute that is subject to arbitration, and arbitration 
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decisions cannot be appealed to the courts except in very unusual 
circumstances. An arbitration decision can be entered in court records and be 
enforced as if it were an official court judgment. 
 
2.2.4. Theoretical analysis of peace-making.  
Conflict resolution and peace-making / peace-keeping constitute two different 
traditions but in essence they refer to the same political processes. Their 
emphases might be different and Johan Galtung’s notions of “positive” and 
“negative” peace are good examples of it. “Liberal peace” is another example 
of a specific tradition regarding the type of new dispensation that should be 
produced by the peace-building or conflict resolution processes.  
 
Peace-making has been analyzed in divergent ways by scholars, especially as 
it is difficult in the first place for scholars to agree on the concept of peace, it 
becomes more complex to analyze peace-making.  The word peace is viewed 
differently by traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches with 
diplomacy assuming more of a status quo management, while conflict 
resolution, optimistically insist that natural harmony of interests are plausible. 
According to Richmond (2001: 316), the major literatures on ending conflicts 
have responded to their own identification of forms of intractable conflict in 
several ways. He observed that Realist School of thought sees intractable 
conflicts as being beyond the scope of the Westphalian system. Realists argue 
that solutions should be found in the reconstitution of existing states through 
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consent based, coercive diplomatic or military methods leading to a 
negotiation of territory and constitutional arrangements.  
 
Intergovernmental organizations, in the view of functionalists, Liberalists and 
neoliberalists, may enhance this process within an implicitly general 
normative scheme. Also, mutually hurting conditions, which may be produced 
by different factors, is likely to facilitate the process. However, state-centric 
methods, in the view of the Human Needs School, merely emphasize the roots 
of the conflict showing the necessity to involve citizens in bottom-up peace 
activities. On the other hand, peace researchers and structuralists seem to 
converge more on injustice, cultural and political issues, as well as the 
violence created by the economic systems (Richmond2001: 317).  
Peace-making approaches derived from traditional state-centric management 
diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches provide narrow frameworks 
which may merely deal with a single dimension of conflicts that in their very 
nature are multidimensional. Peace-making is a restrictive approach to ending 
conflict. However, approaches to conflict resolution which are 
monodimensional, have given the impetus for a broadening of approaches in 
the context of the human needs and human security debates. “Both 
approaches, to varying degrees, rationalize conflict via "manageable," 
acultural frameworks so that conflicts can be reduced to their dominant 
dynamics, according to each approach” (Richmond 2001:317). 
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The first-generation methods have a visible problem of reductionism and 
therefore underrate substantial parts of conflict. The second-generation 
methods give room for the attention of subjective matters; however, their 
structures again tend to limit this. The first and second-generation methods 
function by highlighting the necessary issues to be tackled; the first-generation 
methods accomplish it in the context of a Westphalian period, however, the 
second-generation methods extended it to the context of  human needs, which 
highlighted the irregularity of the initiative of the  international  system to 
reconcile human security with state security. Therefore, both methods are 
subsequently exposed to hybridization in furtherance to the creation of 
additional multidimensional methods to conflict resolution (Richmond 
2001:317).  
 
Despite the divergence in approaches, most scholars generally agree that 
peace-making in the  post-Cold War era entails the reform of the international 
system and the establishment of  permanent conflict preventative measures 
and peace building at local, regional, and global levels. Also, it entails the 
availability of sufficient space for a diversity of actors to deal with the 
multiple roots of conflicts. 
 
Peace-making theories are developed from the traditional peaceful methods of 
conflict resolution discussed in section 2.2.4. This includes traditional 
methods like inquiry, good offices, mediation, negotiation, adjudication and 
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arbitration.  Due to the unavailability of theoretical frameworks for inquiry, 
good offices, arbitration, and adjudication most theoretical analysis of peace-
making tend to focus on negotiation and mediation. However, this does not 
limit the relevance of the methods of inquiry, good offices, arbitration, and 
adjudication as information obtained from these methods can be utilized to 
facilitate negotiation and mediation theories  (Kieh 2002:13). 
 
According to Kieh (2002:13), inquiry involves the intervention of a neutral 
third party in a conflict with the aim of fact-finding or information collection. 
According to him, the apparent objective is to help determine the 
undercurrents of the conflict.  Kieh explained that good offices entail an 
impartial third party serving as a conduit for the transmission of information 
between or among the parties to the conflict. “Additionally, the third party 
may provide venues for meetings between or among the disputants. As in 
inquiry, the third party does not offer proposals for the settlement of the 
conflict” (Kieh 2002:13).  
 
Peace-making studies affirm the similarities between Negotiation and 
Mediation but take note of its major differences.  Extending the discussion in 
section 2.2.4.2 in order to focus specifically on peace-making, negotiation 
relates to the holding of face-to-face dialogue between representatives of the 
disputants. Under negotiation a third party may not be directly involved.  
Mediation relates to the intervention of a neutral third party in a conflict with 
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the aim of arriving at a peaceful resolution. “The mediator may be invited or 
may volunteer. In either case, the parties to the conflict must accept the 
intervention of the mediator. In order to be effective, the mediator must be 
neutral and must be perceived as such by the parties to the conflict. The 
mediator must bring a perspective, skills, and information that are germane to 
the resolution to the conflict” (Kieh, 2002:15). 
 
Successful mediation is dependent upon two factors: firstly, the circumstances 
of the mediator’s intervention and the qualities and attributes of the mediator. 
Prior to any mediation, the mediator must have good background information 
about the parties in the conflict and the nature of the conflict. “[T]he issue 
may cover political, cultural, economic, and social matters, such as the 
allocation of political power, ethnic discrimination, the inequitable 
distribution of resources, and poor social services. Importantly, there may be 
either a single issue or multiple issues at the center of a particular conflict” 
(Kieh, 2002:15). 
 
Theories about negotiation as a peace-making process are based on the 
following elements: The actors who are the players or the participants in the 
conflict who may include the government group, private groups in the society, 
an insurgency group, primordial groups, professional groups,  and others. 
Each of the actors has an agenda which relates to the actors’ interests, values 
and goals. Generally, each of the actors wants to pursue their agenda as much 
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as possible. The pursuit of the divergent interests of the actors is the major 
contributor to the conflict itself (Kieh, 2002:14).   
 
According to Kieh (2002:15), the actors have attitudes and perceptions that 
give them the compass for navigating the negotiation landscape.  He pointed 
out that the attitudes of the actors may range from unwillingness to 
compromise, to the use of accommodation as a face saving exit for peacefully 
resolving the conflict. Also, he said, the perceptions can run the gamut from 
viewing the other actors as weak to perceiving them as conniving to defeat 
one actor. Also, the actors have divergent resource bases in terms of finance, 
personnel, and weapons. The bargaining power of each actor during the 
negotiation process is affected by its resource base (Kieh, 2002:15).   
 
The process of negotiation may be divided into various stages: (1) the parties 
to the conflict will first present their cases by clarifying their agendas and 
their preferred solution to the conflict. (2) The structure of the conflict needs 
to be changed by changing the conflict situation through the making of 
conciliatory gestures either unilaterally or mutually. According to Kriesberg 
(1992), the conflict situation may be changed by listening to the parties to 
discover their underlying interests; also, analyzing the conflict to identify 
some common gains; and by initiating new alternatives when negotiations 
become stalemated. In such situations, it is necessary for the parties to be 
tolerant so the negotiation does not collapse entirely.  Rabow (1990:17) said 
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the parties should imagine themselves in the other party’s shoes and should 
refrain from accusations but should rather be involved in clarifying 
perceptions. Also, there should be understanding, explanations and should 
avoid escalating emotions. (3)  The process should focus on interests, not 
positions, bearing in mind that the parties will need to satisfy interests, not 
positions. (4) The parties must realize they cannot get all they want; therefore 
the need for compromise is vitally important. Also, “the various actors have 
attitudes and perceptions about the mediator and the other parties to the 
conflict. These images may either facilitate the successful resolution of the 
conflict or create difficulties in the way of a successful resolution” (Kieh, 
2002:15). 
 
2.2.6 Theoretical analysis of peacekeeping  
It is difficult to say when the first peacekeeping mission went into action, but 
the use of military force to maintain peace between potential combatants 
probably pre-dates the Roman era. However, the previous most common 
application of military force was in war, and peacekeeping missions were 
relatively rare until after World War II. Also, peacekeeping became prominent 
in the nuclear era partially because a small escalation of a conflict directly or 
indirectly involving a nuclear power was perceived to have potentially 
dangerous consequences. The first noticeable peacekeeping mission in 
modern history was the United Nations forces to the Middle East in the wake 
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of the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, which is said to have set the precedent for 
many missions to follow (Sorenson and Wood, 2004:1). 
 
These operations have been coined in several different ways; however, the 
most popular terms have been peacekeeping, peace support operations, and 
peace operations. The common element about these terms is the fact that these 
missions refer to operations which, according to Thakur and Schnabe 
(2001:9), differs from military combat between clearly recognizable enemies. 
Different scholars use divergent terms to classify the many operations that 
have been generally called peacekeeping operations. The two major previous 
distinctions were the observer and peacekeeping missions. However, several 
subsequent variations for the term emerged as the operations increased and 
became more complex. “It is possible, for example, to classify them by type of 
actor. Thus Henry Wiseman divides peacekeeping operations firstly into UN, 
regional, and independent ad hoc missions. Alternatively, they may be 
grouped chronologically. Thus Wiseman divides UN operations into the 
nascent period (1946–1956), the assertive period (1956–1967), the dormant 
period (1967–1973), and the resurgent period (1973–1978)” (Thakur and 
Schnabe, 2001:9).   
 
The post-Cold War period is significant in the study of peacekeeping because 
of the changes in types and nature of conflicts that followed. Also, these 
changes led to the emergence of new literature on the concept of 
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peacekeeping, including new classifications. This includes classification by 
“functions and tasks, as done by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James 
Wall – observation, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, preventive 
deployment, interposition, pacification, collective enforcement, etc.” (Thakur 
and Schnabe, 2001:9). The major problem with this type of classification is 
the fact that different functions may be executed by any one operation, and 
functions of the same operation may subsequently change over time.  
 
Upeace Africa (2009, website) defines peacekeeping as the maintenance of 
public security, civil services, and cease-fire agreements in war and conflict 
zones by UN or regional military, police, and civilian forces with the consent 
of the nation-state on whose territory these forces are deployed. Also, it states 
that peacekeeping involves co-ordinate efforts to ensure stability and relative 
normalcy in the aftermath of otherwise extremely volatile and chaotic 
situations. Peacekeeping is the presence of impartial multi-national troops to 
provide confidence building measure as well as psychological and physical 
space for the parties to pursue the process of peacemaking.  
 
The main goal of peacekeeping is to create a suitable condition for the 
establishment of lasting political settlements. Over the years, the scope of 
peacekeeping activities has broadened. This includes a series of civilian and 
humanitarian activities conducted by peacekeepers. Therefore, peacekeeping 
activities include such programs as food distribution, transportation and 
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infrastructure development. It should be noted that peacekeeping operations 
are supposed to be conducted by troops from countries neutral to the conflict. 
Also, peacekeeping is dependent upon some degree of consent by contingent 
parties.  
 
Peacekeeping is greatly influenced by the humanitarian assistance theory, 
which relates to the imperative need for humanitarian assistance including 
food, medicine, shelter, and safety zones to defenseless civilians caught up in 
an armed conflict. This assistance may be provided to a country that is 
engulfed in a civil war or in other countries where there are refugees from the 
war afflicted country. The main objective of humanitarian assistance is to help 
innocent people, especially children, women and other vulnerable groups. 
Humanitarian assistance in a conflict zone may be provided by a country, 
private organization, or intergovernmental organization. Generally, 
humanitarian actors are expected to adhere to the principle of neutrality and 
impartiality; therefore, humanitarian provisions must be limited to non-
combatants, according to needs regardless of the origins, beliefs, or ideologies 
of the beneficiaries.  
 
Also, peacekeeping is influenced by peace observation theory; it is almost 
impossible to have a successful peacekeeping without the existence of a cease 
fire or a cease fire agreement which will necessitate peace observation. For 
peace observation to take place there must be a stoppage of armed hostilities 
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and the parties to the conflict must accept an agreement of a cease-fire.  This 
agreement is then enforced by neutral observers from a regional or 
multilateral body who should act as representatives of the multilateral or 
regional body and not as a as representatives of their individual governments.   
 
In order to keep the combatants apart, the peace observers may create buffer 
zones and may engage in patrolling of the area to ensure the parties comply 
with the cease-fire agreement. The central purpose is to report both violations 
and compliance. Also, the peace observers may monitor the human rights 
situation in the area and will report any violation to the responsible regional or 
multilateral organization.  Thakur and Schnabe (2001:9-10) have identified six 
generations of peacekeeping: Traditional peacekeeping, Second-generation 
Peacekeeping, Expanded peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Peace restoration 
by partnership and Multinational peace restoration. Strictly speaking peace 
enforcement should not be included as part of peacekeeping, because it is 
done in terms of UN Charter Chapter VII while peacekeeping is mandated 
most of the time only in terms of Chapter VI. The last two generations are 
from a purist’s point of view also not a form of peacekeeping but rather a 
form of peace implementation or post-conflict reconstruction and 
development (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:9-10). 
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2.2.6.1 Traditional peacekeeping   
It is quite clear that one of the major limitations of the League of Nations was 
its failure to deal with localized conflicts, which eventually escalated into the 
Second World War. In its attempt to correct the errors of the League of 
Nation, Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter proclaimed its primary 
purpose of mainstreaming international peace and security. Traditional peace 
keeping evolved as a major tool for the United Nations to deal with conflicts 
at an earlier stage to prevent possible conflict escalation, a third World War 
and the potential confrontation of the super powers during the Cold War era.  
 
This pre-emptive initiative of the United Nations cannot be underestimated 
when we take a retrospective examination of the era of the First and Second 
World War. The series of wars in the Balkan and what was initially a 
confrontation between Serbia and Austria culminated into the First World War 
in 1914. The effects of the First World War were yet to cease when the 
inaction or limited action of the League of Nations to deal with the Japanese 
invasion of Chinese Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935, German rearmament, German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, 
Italian and German interference in the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939 and 
the German invasion of Austria in 1938 as well as the German occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the German invasion of Poland sparked 
off a Second World War (Thakur 2006:29). 
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The United Nations was created after the Second World War to deal with the 
inability of the League of Nations to create, maintain and keep global peace. 
Peacekeeping evolved with the legal backing of Chapters VI and VII of the 
UN Charter. The primary objective of peacekeeping was to supervise and 
monitor ceasefires and peace agreements; therefore peacekeepers were not 
allowed to engage in active combat and were expected to negotiate instead of 
fight. According to Thakur and Schnabe (2001:10), the major distinction 
between collective security and first-generation peacekeeping is seen in their 
reliance upon force and consent respectively. Therefore, they mentioned the 
following as the distinguishing characteristics of traditional peacekeeping:  
a) Consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict; 
b) International backing, especially in the UN Security Council; 
c) UN command and control; 
d) Multinational composition; 
e) No use of force; 
f) Military neutrality between the rival armies; 
g) Political impartiality between the rival countries. 
 
2.2.6.2 Second-Generation peacekeeping 
Unlike traditional peacekeeping, which was solely a United Nations ordered 
operation, the  post-Cold War era saw the emergence of new peace keeping 
initiatives outside the auspices of the United Nations. This development led to 
the coinage of the term second generation of peace keeping by scholars in the 
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1990s. Generally, the term second-generation peacekeeping refers to the 
emergence of peacekeeping operations that were created either unilaterally or 
multilaterally outside the United Nations but still in accordance with its 
Chapter VIII. Some of these new generation operations include the ECOWAS 
Mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Commonwealth peacekeeping 
operation for overseeing the conversion of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, the 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Group in the Sinai, the 
Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut, and the Indian Peacekeeping Force 
(IPKF) in Sri Lanka (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:10-11).  
 
2.2.6.3 Expanded peacekeeping  
We have so far seen that the main objective of traditional peacekeeping is to 
stabilize volatile regions and interstate conflicts pending a period when 
negotiations will produce durable peace agreements. Expanded peacekeeping, 
also called the third generation of peacekeeping, witnessed the emergence of 
operations as part of a total package of peace agreements. The peacekeeping 
mission in Namibia and Cambodia were an integral component of the peace 
agreement. It was aimed at completing the peace settlement by giving third 
party international military reinforcement for the peace process.   
 
 Peacekeeping operations needed changes to reflect new post-Cold War global 
realities. The nature of conflicts seems to have changed drastically from the 
traditional hostility between states to a new series of intrastate conflicts with 
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vast humanitarian emergencies. According to Thakur and Schnabe (2001:12), 
a new series of complex emergencies produced multiple crises, including 
collapsed state structure; humanitarian tragedies caused by starvation, disease 
or genocide. Large-scale fighting and killings between rival ethnic or bandit 
groups, horrific human rights atrocities and the intermingling of criminal 
elements and the child soldier with irregular forces were common elements in 
the epoch.  This new trend required new tasks in peacekeeping operations. 
Thakur and Schnabe (2001:12) listed the following as the major tasks of this 
type of peacekeeping:  
a) Military disengagement, demobilization, and cantonment; 
b) Policing; 
c) Human rights monitoring and enforcement; 
d) Information dissemination; 
e) Observation, organization, and conduct of elections; 
f) Rehabilitation; 
g) Repatriation; 
h) Administration; 
i) Working with or overseeing the operations of regional or non-UN 
peacekeeping operations. 
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2.2.6.4 Peace restoration by partnership  
As indicated earlier, the fifth and sixth generations are usually not anymore 
part of peacekeeping but are included here to reflect the views of Thakur and 
Schnabe. 
 
United Nations peacekeeping underwent a further transformation into the fifth 
generation of enforcement operations following the disastrous venture into 
peace enforcement in Bosnia and Haiti. These missions were authorized by 
the United Nations Security Council, but the operation was carried out by a 
single power or ad hoc multilateral coalitions. However, the United Nations 
itself took back responsibility for a traditional type consensual peacekeeping 
after the stabilization of the situation. “Modifying the Gulf War precedent 
somewhat, this was the pattern that emerged of UN-authorized military action 
by the USA in Haiti, France in Rwanda, Russia in Georgia, and NATO in 
Bosnia” (Thakur and Schnabe 2001:13).  
 
2.2.6.5 Multinational peace restoration.  
East Timor is a good example of the evolution into the sixth generation of 
peacekeeping called multilateral peace restoration or UN state creation. Under 
this arrangement, a United Nations certified multinational force is prepared, in 
case there is the need for combat action. It is provided with the mandate, 
equipment, rules of engagement and troops which are necessary for the 
mission.  “However, the military operation is but the prelude to a de facto UN 
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administration that engages in state-making for a transitional period” (Thakur 
and Schnabe, 2001:13).  
 
It relates to the involvement of a multinational organization like the United 
Nations in state creation or the emergence of the independence of a nation 
following  an election conducted by a multinational body. It thus means that 
there is no state like structures in existence; therefore, the state has to be 
formed from scratch.  The example of East Timor has shown that peace 
restoration cannot be attained without the creation of law and order. It shows 
that in a state where the writ of government does not exist or has collapsed, 
the only law to be made or enforced is that of a multilateral organization, 
regional body or a foreign government (Thakur and Schnabe, 2001). 
 
2.2.7 Reports on peace-keeping reform 
Modern peacekeeping is associated with two very important reports: the 
Brahimi and the Prodi reports. Therefore, this appraisal of peacekeeping 
operations will conclude with these important reports. 
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2.2.7.1 The Brahimi Report of 2000 
The UN Secretary General March 2000 constituted in March 2000 the Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations 
and make recommendations for change. The panel was headed by the 
Algerian and UN veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi and comprised of ten 
persons experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building.  
The constitution of the Brahimi panel was necessitated by the concerns raised 
by several UN member states that the United Nations lacks management and 
financial systems to deal with the global increase in peacekeeping operations 
(United Nations, Website). 
 
The Brahimi report (2000:1) listed three conditions for the success of future 
complex peacekeeping operations, namely political support, rapid 
deployment, and sound peace-building strategies. According to the report, all 
its recommendations are geared towards the facilitation of these three 
conditions. The report (2000:2) stated that the United Nations has expertise in 
planning and executing traditional peacekeeping operations but lacks the 
capacity for the deployment and sustenance of complex operations. Therefore, 
the report (2000:2) emphasized the need for high-quality leaders and 
managers who are granted greater flexibility, autonomy and a clear mandate.  
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The report mentioned previous peacekeeping operations and identified the 
weaknesses and the required improvements (Brahimi Report 2000:3). Also, it 
stressed the importance of the provision of personnel, financial, political and 
material support by members to UN peacekeeping operations. The report 
listed the objectives of UN peacekeeping operations and the kinds of forces 
and personnel required to accomplish these objectives. 
 
The Brahimi Report (2000:10) recommended for the deployed UN 
peacekeeping operations to have a clear mandate. Also, they should be 
adequately equipped to defend the mandate, themselves and to defend other 
components of the mission. The report recommended for the UN to ensure  
the authorized missions deploy in accordance with the principle of “rapid and 
effective deployment capacities”, which entails the ability to deploy 
traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a 
Security Council Resolution and within 90 days in the case of complex 
peacekeeping operations (Brahimi Report, 2000:16). 
 
The report made vital recommendations to facilitate the activities of United 
Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and to enable it to 
accomplish its core mission of enforcing multi-dimensional peace operations 
as well as integrated civilian and military planning. Also, the report sought to 
attain qualitative improvements in the UN Peacekeeping Operations' 
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management; commencing with concept development and proceeding to post-
conflict peace-building.  It listed some envisaged challenges to the 
enhancement of UN peacekeeping operations and indicated that member 
states and the UN Secretariat are the target groups for the implementation and 
facilitation of the recommended peacekeeping reforms (Brahimi report, 
2000:41). 
 
2.2.7.2 The Prodi Report of 2008 
The African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African 
Union peacekeeping operations (2008) was led by Romano Prodi, the former 
Italian Prime Minister and EU Commission chairperson. It was shouldered 
with the responsibility of providing modalities for the provision of support to 
African Union Peacekeeping Operations. The Prodi report (2008:5), discussed 
in the UN Security Council on 31 December 2008 as document A63/666-
S2008/813, affirmed it has been driven by the necessity to strengthen the 
African Union’s  peacekeeping structure in accordance with  the objectives of  
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
to facilitate  peace and security.  
 
The report made reference to the strategic relationship between the UN and 
the AU and listed appropriate steps to further enhance the existing 
relationship. It pointed-out some vital steps necessary to enhance the United 
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Nations / African Union relationship and the need for an effective partnership 
in dealing with issues of mutual interest.  The report examined the need to 
facilitate the capacity of the African Union to respond to crises as well as the 
structures needed for long-term stability in Africa  (Prodi Report 2008:21). 
Regarding the challenges of regional peacekeeping, the Prodi Report 
(2008:22) observed that the need for peacekeeping in Africa is enormous but 
the capacity to accomplish this is deficient. It observed that the Africa Union 
has expressed the willingness and eagerness to engage in peacekeeping 
operations but lacks the resources to effectively accomplish this objective. 
Therefore, the report called for support and the provision of resources by the 
international community to enable the African Union accomplish its 
peacekeeping objectives. 
 
The report recommended the establishment of two new financial mechanisms 
to support peacekeeping efforts in the continent. Firstly, A UN special fund, 
which is expected to be mainly in kind and limited to a six months period. 
This fund is aimed at aiding on a case-by-case basis, specific peacekeeping 
operations, under taken by the African Union.  Secondarily, a voluntary multi-
donor trust fund channeled towards institutional capacity building, conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution.  Also, the report identified the need for 
innovative options and the development of the African Union capacity in 
logistics. The report concluded with a recommendation for the establishment 
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of a joint African Union / United Nations group to appraise the broad 
modalities to accomplish the panel’s reconditions (Prodi Report: 2008:21-23).  
 
2.2. Theoretical analysis of peace enforcement.  
Peace enforcement theory (in the context of UN Charter Chapter VII) is based 
on the following assumptions: firstly, the third party intervener must have the 
military capacity to coerce the parties in a conflict to abide by the terms of a 
peace accord. Peace enforcement will not be possible without the peace 
enforcer having the capacity and might to induce compliance. However, in 
addition to being able to enforce peace, secondly, the intervener needs to be 
neutral. Thirdly, the intervener should not only be prepared but must 
demonstrate the willingness to induce compliance by all parties. This is 
necessary to show the parties to the conflict and the international community 
that the enforcer is credible, capable and impartial. Fourthly, the intervener 
should be knowledgeable of the political, economic, social, and cultural 
dynamics of the target area (Kieh, 2002:17). 
 
According to Heidenrich (2001:150), peace enforcement is the application of 
military force or the threat of its use, subsequent to international authorization, 
to compel compliance with generally accepted international resolutions or 
sanctions. The aim of peace enforcement, according to him, is to maintain or 
restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political 
settlement. Though peacekeeping has a series of similarity with peace 
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enforcement, they are different operations. According to Dobbie, (Cited in 
Heidenrich 2001: 147), “Peacekeeping requires a referee, peace enforcement 
demands a player. The referee can be strict or easy-going, authoritative or 
ineffectual, but he will always be a referee”.  A peace mission must be clearly 
defined with a specific mandate to indicate whether the operation is a 
peacekeeping mission or peace enforcement.  Therefore, Dobbie said it is not 
possible to play a middle role; neither can an enforcer be a player and referee 
at the same time. Any attempt to be both player and referee at the same time 
will prejudice the status of the other.  
 
Peace enforcement has its roots in the authorization given to the UN Security 
Council in Article 40 of the UN Charter to take provisional measures that are 
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. 
However, the term “peace enforcement” is derived from former Secretary-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal for the creation of peace 
enforcement operation within the UN.  This was immediately followed by 
media reports codifying the UN operations in Somalia and Bosnia as peace 
enforcement operations, despite the fact that these operations differed from 
the secretary-general’s proposal.  
 
Peace enforcement has most times been misunderstood and sometimes used 
interchangeably with peacekeeping. This is not surprising because of the level 
of similarity between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. According to 
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Boulden (2001:2), peacekeeping operations are in a grey area between 
peacekeeping, linked to Chapter VI of the UN Charter and enforcement, from 
Chapter VII, because they share characteristics from both types of operations. 
One of the main areas where peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping is 
the fact that it does not require the consent of the parties in the conflict.   
 
Boulden (2001:3) listed the following as the major characteristics of peace 
enforcement: They are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the 
use of force beyond self defence is authorized; they are intended to be 
impartial;  no judgment is made as to the claims or positions of the parties to 
the conflict and the action is not taken against any one state or party, as is the 
case with full-scale enforcement responses; the consent of the parties to the 
operation is desirable and may be present when the operation begins, but it is 
not a requirement. 
 
There are several arguments against peace enforcement; however, it is 
generally considered a necessary operation especially when there is the need 
to halt mass atrocities, humanitarian emergencies and genocides. However, 
arguments against peace enforcement arise from those who see it as a 
continuation of war and violence.  Heidenrich (2001: 151) said a peace 
enforcement operation is similar to going to war; it amounts to going to war 
under a different label.  
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2.3 Chapter Summary 
It is almost impossible to analyze a regional integration process without 
drawing reference from the European integration. Therefore, European 
integration is better described as the archetype of regional integration studies. 
Regional integration in Europe has greatly influenced both theory and practice 
of regionalism and remains a vital reference to regionalism in other parts of 
the world. 
 
Though most early literature on  neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism 
related to integration in Europe, attempts were made in the application of 
these theories to regional integration in other parts of the world, including 
attempts at comparative studies.  Haas (1961) was one of the scholars who 
attempted a study of comparative regional integration. He suggested a  study 
of the environment where the integration processes take place in order to 
identify the distinguished points. Also, there had been attempts at comparative 
regional integration by scholars like Laursen (2003). However, due to the 
unequalled advanced stage of European integration, several challenges have 
been observed in most of these comparative regional integration studies.  
 
To arrive at a generally acceptable definition of the term “conflict” is not an 
easy task because the term is conceptualized in different ways due to 
divergent societal, cultural, political, ideological and linguistic backgrounds. 
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The difficulty in identifying the most acceptable definition of conflict is not 
surprising as various scholars are not only defining it based on empirical 
analysis of divergent forms of conflict but are also influenced by varying 
theorizations of the concept.  
 
Peace-making theories are developed from the traditional peaceful methods of 
conflict resolution.   It is a restrictive approach to ending conflict. However, 
approaches to conflict resolution which are mono-dimensional, have given 
impetus for a broadening of approaches in the context of the human needs and 
human security debates.  
 
Peacekeeping facilitates cease-fire arrangements as well as public services and 
security in conflict areas. This is accomplished through the deployment of 
military forces as well as police and civilian professionals with the prior 
consent of the parties or the state affected. It initiates appropriate steps 
towards stability and normalcy following a state of violence and the break-
down of law and order.  Peace enforcement involves the use of armed forces 
or the threat to do so, to induce parties (or a party) to comply with a resolution 
or decision of the UN or another multilateral body. Peace enforcement is 
aimed at enhancing the restoration of peace and the facilitation of diplomatic 
channels to achieve a more permanent resolution of the conflict.  
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Chapter Three 
Regional Integration in West Africa.        
 
3.0 Introduction 
The chapter looks at the ideological foundation of Pan-Africanism and its 
impact on regional integration in Africa. It then examines regional integration 
in West Africa and the formation of sub-regional bodies.  
 
Though the term “regional integration” and “economic integration” have been 
erroneously used interchangeably in some literature, they are not necessarily 
the same. Economic integration relates to the formation or growth of 
economic ties among countries with or without a geographically contiguous 
description.  On the other hand, regional integration comprises a series of 
public sector activity like the coordination of economic policies, regional 
security, human rights, education, health, research, technology and natural 
resource management (Bamba, 2010: 3). 
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3.1 Pan-Africanism and Regionalism in Africa 
The political significance of regionalism in Africa is that it is not only 
motivated by economic, political, security and other factors but also by the 
philosophy of Pan-Africanism. Therefore a brief discussion of this philosophy 
is included here. 
 
3.1.1 Historical Foundation of Pan-Africanism      
The term “Pan-Africanism” was first used by a Trinidadian lawyer, Henry 
Sylvester Williams. According to Araia (2006, website), Pan-Africanism 
portends to all African movements that followed the ideology of liberation for 
all Africans and people of African descend in the political, economic and 
cultural spheres.  He observed that the ideological root of Pan-Africanism is 
traceable to the Caribbean and the United States. According to him, Prince 
Hall is one of the first originators of Pan-Africanism in 1787, when he 
requested for the repatriation of black people to Africa.  Prince Hall reportedly 
confronted the State Assembly in Massachusetts in 1787 to press for his 
demands. Other notable earlier motivators of Pan-Africanism are Paul Cuffee 
Quaker, and a shipbuilder, who is credited with the 1815 resettling of 40 
African Americans in Sierra Leone (Araia, 2006, website). 
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Though the early trace of Pan-Africanism is linked to repatriation in the last 
quarter of the 18
th
 century and the first decade of the 19
th
 century of Negros to 
Africa, racial discrimination soon became a major push for pan-African 
resistance. In 1829 David Walker published his appeal against racism, 
emphasizing the glorious past of African civilization. He tried to enlighten 
black people who were facing racial prejudice of their pride in the face of 
dominant white supremacists. This was followed by people like James 
‘Africanus’ Beale Horton and James ‘Holy’ Johnson of Sierra Leone and 
Edward Blyden who became prominent leaders in the fight against racism.  
 
There were other early pan-Africanist thinkers like Daniel Coker, Lott Carey, 
John Russwurrum, Martin Delaney, Henry Highland Garnet, and Alexander 
Crummell.  Early Pan-Africanist like Dr. Carey was a proponent of 
repatriation. Coker, who was himself an ex-slave and founder of the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) was able to successfully resettle 88 
Africans at Cape Mesurado in Liberia  (Araia, 2006, website).   
 
The 1791 Haitian revolution led by Boukman and Toussaint L’overture, 
which led to the creation of the first black republic in 1804 in  the western 
hemisphere, was one of the major early inspirations of the pan-African 
movement.  This event was followed by the 1896 victory of Ethiopia over 
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Italy at the battle of Adwa, which increased the confidence of the African 
Diaspora in the quest for African dignity, freedom, unity and self-rule.  These 
events culminated in the emergence of the most prominent pan-Africanists:  
W. E. B. Du Bois from the United States and Marcus Garvey from Jamaica.   
 
The first Pan African Conference was held in London from 23
rd
 to 25
th
 July, 
1900. The conference was followed by the establishment of the Pan-African 
Newspaper by Sylvester Williams in 1901, which became the first Pan 
African newspaper. Ethiopia soon became a rallying point for African quest 
for self-determination. In 1908, Bandele Omoyini, a Nigerian student at 
Edinburgh University, wrote a book titled, The Defence of the Ethiopian 
Movement. Also, Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast (Ghana) wrote a book 
titled Ethiopia Unbound. These books referred to Ethiopia as the dignity of 
the entire black race and considered self-rule in Ethiopia as the prototype of 
future Africa freedom.  
 
In 1920, following a series of race related riots in the United States; the Negro 
Convention was held in New York in August 1920 and was attended by Pan-
Africanist delegates from 25 countries. “The conference adopted, among other 
things, a comprehensive agenda known as ‘Declaration of Rights of the Negro 
Peoples of the World.’ The motto and slogan of the Declaration, in brief, was 
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‘We shall ask, demand, and expect of the world a free Africa’” (Araia 2006, 
website).  
 
In 1921 Garvey summoned the second Negro Convention at Liberty Hall in 
New York. Also, from 27 to 29 August 1921, Du Bois held another Pan-
African Congress in London. The 1921 congress was generally more radical 
and was considered by Garvey and his followers as reformist and 
integrationist (Araia 2006, website). In November 1923 the third Pan-African 
Congress was held in London and in Lisbon. This was followed by Du Bois’ 
last congress, which was held in New York in 1927. The participants were 
mainly African-Americans and other African representatives from the Gold 
Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria.  
 
The early Pan-African movement was dominated by the reformist Du Boisian 
Pan-Africanism and the radical pan-African Garveyism. In terms of 
ideological impact on Africa, Du Boism seems to have created more impact 
than Garveyism. Though there was a series of chasm between Du Bois and 
Garvey, it did not affect the emergence of the Pan-African movement in 
Africa and the unabated pursuit of this philosophy in the struggle for 
decolonization and African unity. “Some of these protagonists were Professor 
Adeoye Deniga of Nigeria, Joseph Casely Hayford (founder of NCBWA) of 
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Ghana, and Ladipo Solanke of Nigeria. After the death of Casely Hayford in 
1930, the West African Student Association (WASU) carried his legacy; and 
when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, prominent Nigerians formed an 
Abyssinian support association, and subsequently they formed the 
International African Friends of Abyssinia in London” (Araia 2006, website). 
 
In 1937, International African Friends of Abyssinia eventually transformed 
into an organization called the International African Service Bureau. The 
Italian aggression against Abyssinia revealed several issues of double standard 
by the West against African countries. Despite its nominal condemnation, the 
League of Nations failed to take punitive action against Italy.   Also, a 
purported sanction failed due to the failure of western countries to abide by it. 
In Africa and the Americas, this incident was considered racism against the 
black race and by default heightened the pan-African consciousness of the 
global black race. Consequently, Ethiopia became a rallying cry and nerve 
centre for Pan-Africanism and Garvey’s national anthem incorporated, in part, 
‘Ethiopia, land of our fathers’ (Araia 2006, website) 
 
One of the achievements of Garveyism and the pan-African conferences was 
the 1944 formation of the Pan-African Federation in Manchester with the 
following objectives:  to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples 
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and peoples of African descent throughout the world; to demand the self-
determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races 
from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over 
them and to secure equality of rights for African peoples and the total 
abolition of all forms of racial discrimination (Ajala 1974: 10).    
 
A secretariat was created by the Federation and it had several popular pan-
Africanists like Dr. Peter Millard of British Guiana as chairman; R. T. 
Mekonnen of Ethiopia, was the treasurer. Also, there were George Padmore of 
Trinidad and Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast who was the joint 
secretaries, Jomo Kenyatta was the assistant secretary, while Peter Abrahams 
of South Africa was the publicity secretary (Ajala 1974: 10). The Federation 
held its first congress in Manchester with 200 delegates in attendance from all 
over the world. It was the first congress outside Africa to be attended by most 
of the African liberation and decolonization advocates from the African 
continent. This congress was instrumental to the August 1946 West Africa 
National Congress where Kwame Nkrumah was the main speaker (Araia 
2006, website). 
 
Soon after Ghana became independent in March 1957, Nkrumah summoned 
the first pan-African conference of independent African countries in Accra 
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from 15 to 22 April 1958. Participants unanimously agreed to the pursuit of 
pan-Africanist ideas in Africa; to promote economic cooperation and to 
appreciate one another’s culture. Also, participants consented to work for the 
total independence of the African continent and declared war on the apartheid 
policy. This pan-African congress played a major role towards the pursuit of 
regionalism in Africa. It provided for further meetings and emphasized the 
need for unity and cooperation among African States.  
 
3.1.2 Ideological foundation of Pan-Africanism 
Pan-Africanism may be divided into three major phases: the first phase was 
characterized by the gathering of exiles in metropolitan centres of Europe and 
the United States. During this phase African, West Indian and American 
Negros were said to have discovered one another. “Sharing common 
disabilities and increasingly aware of many common elements in their heritage 
they convened ad hoc conferences, organized student groups and cultural 
associations, and, in the later stages, turned to explicit political agitation for 
African independence” (Apter and Coleman 1962:84). 
 
The second phase was characterized by the nationalization of political Pan-
Africanism. This period witnessed a progressive shift in the focus of political 
agitation to individual territories in Africa following the establishment of 
territorial nationalist movements. The third phase was characterized by 
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political actions by independent African states with the aim of achieving 
greater unity as well as political action by African states and nationalist 
leaders with the intent to complete the liberation of Africa from alien rule and 
eradicate all forms of racial discrimination.  
 
Though Pan-Africanist activities were centred on Africa, it started outside the 
African continent. Its founders were mainly intellectuals studying or resident 
abroad and African Diaspora. They did extensive research on Negro and 
African affairs and utilized principles and perspectives for understanding 
colonialism and adopted key methods to effectively seek the liberation and 
independence of Africa.  
 
Pan-Africanism was ideologically impacted by the Marxism-Leninism 
political ideology.  Writings of some pan-Africanists related the proletarian 
dimension of socialist thought with the struggle for independence in Africa. 
They posited that traditional African culture was actually communal and 
therefore socialist in character. They argued that socialism provided an 
effective basis for a political order combining democratic ideas with strong 
government (Apter and Coleman, 1962:85-86).  
 
Pan-Africanism was also impacted by the Gandhian political ideology, 
especially in southern Africa where there was the belief that the desired 
changes could be accomplished through non-violent agitation. “Moreover, 
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apart from the fact that passive resistance fortified their moral position, they 
were also confronted with the ever-present reality that any other type of 
political action could and would be smashed by the superior power of both 
colonial and metropolitan governments. As the freedom struggle moves south 
to the Rhodesians, the Portuguese territories, and the Union of South Africa it 
remains an open question whether the strategy of non-violence will continue 
to prevail” (Apter and Coleman, 1962:87).  
 
African cultural heritage had its own impact on pan-Africanism. Scholars, 
especially from West Africa, emphasized the respect for traditional African 
culture and the development of a new pride in historic African institutions.  
These scholars threw more light on both the necessity for unity and the 
diversity in African culture. One of the major contributions of cultural pan-
Africanism is its revival of the pride of African cultural heritage.  
 
The previous anthropological concept, which indicates that the African culture 
perceives social change in an unacceptable perspective is unrealistic in the 
context of the dialectical connection between time and culture. This erroneous 
assumption emanates from the dismissive classification of pre-colonial 
practice as consistently communal. African involvement with internal 
organizations extending to enormous population and large geographical areas 
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pre-dated the epoch of Islamic influence and that of European imperialism.  
There was a historical existence of both centralized and decentralized 
societies, at times sharing symbiotic connections. The cultural diversity of 
Africa comprises economic, political and social diversity as shown and 
referenced by the concept of Afrocentricity. Therefore, the concept of Pan-
African nationalism is enhanced further by the cognizance of this diversity 
(Poe 2003:149). 
 
Generally the founding scholars of Pan-Africanism were from divergent 
background. There were West-Indian, Negro-American, West African, and 
East African scholars. However, despite their divergent cultural and 
ideological background they were united in their pursuit of a common agenda 
for black liberation, African independence, cooperation and unity.   
 
Initial attempt at regional integration in Africa is almost wholly attributed to 
the influence of Pan-Africanism, decolonization and anti-European 
imperialism. Pan-Africanism was the major inspiration of African leaders and 
scholars. The experience of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and the 
emergence of neo-colonialism and economic subjugation spurred radical Pan-
Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah to vehemently project the need for unity as 
a basis for political and economic liberation of the African continent.  
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The energetic clamour of the early Pan-Africanists for African unity became 
the fundamental reason for the commencement of regional integration in 
Africa and the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
Though the OAU was not precisely the kind of unity envisaged by radical 
pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, they accepted this compromise as a 
gradual progression of African unity. Some of their demands were reflected in 
the inaugural summit of the OAU, including the resolution on Africa and the 
United Nations, which demanded equitable representation of Africa in the UN 
Security Council and other principal organs of the United Nations.  
 
Representatives of African states in the United Nations were directed by the 
OAU to unite and create an African group, which should have a permanent 
secretariat to facilitate closer cooperation and coordination. “In the Resolution 
on Disarmament, the delegates declared Africa a denuclearized zone and took 
strong exception to all nuclear and thermonuclear tests as well as the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. The superpowers were urged to reduce 
conventional weapons, put an end to the arms race, and sign a general and 
complete disarmament agreement under international control” (Esedebe 
1994:198).  Also, the OAU called for the strengthening of inter-African 
cooperation and the creation of an African trade union (Esedebe 1994: 198). 
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3.1.3 Regionalism in Africa 
There have been two major waves of regionalism in Africa: the first relates to 
the period of colonization, de-colonization and Pan-Africanism; the second 
wave relates to the  post-Cold War era. African regionalism in both the first 
and second wave was characterized by competitive regionalisms. African 
regionalism has continuously faced the problem of competition for the 
benefits of political prominence and institutional relevance on a local, sub-
regional or continental level.  
 
Several levels of cooperation and regionalization were established during the 
decolonization period. Some of these were practical, while others were 
ideological. The emergence of colonial federations such as the Afrique 
Occidéntale Francaise (AOF), the Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF), and 
the Central African Federation showed the negative consequences of the 
divisions and the problematic viability of the political divisions and economic 
circuits arising from the colonial period. The colonial powers actually 
discouraged any form of cooperation within the various sections in Africa 
(Franke 2007, website).  
 
According to Nkrumah (1973: 282) "by far the greatest wrong which the 
departing colonialists had ever inflicted on Africa, namely, to leave us divided 
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into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real 
development". Franke  (2007, website) has thus postulated that the need to 
correct this wrong, to combat the ongoing exploitation of the continent's 
resources and to attain some level  of economic and political viability was a 
major motivation for the African states to begin regional cooperation.  
 
However, the major catalyst to regional integration in Africa is the ideological 
framework of Pan-Africanism, which advocated for African integration during 
the first Pan African Congress. The first Pan African Congress advocated 
unity and integration as the only means of facilitating true self-rule and self-
determination in Africa. With the gradual disappearance of colonialism in the 
1950s and 1960s, this framework became the basis for the pursuit of unity and 
integration in the face of obvious vulnerability and the fear of neo-
colonialism. Pan-Africanism became an ideological assertion for the clamour 
for regional integration in Africa.  
 
The zeal for cooperation was also extended to a proliferation of 
intergovernmental organizations, federations and unions. The proliferation of 
organizations on the continent was partly due to the divergent interpretation of 
Pan-Africanism.  This phenomenon ironically promoted disunity, conflict and 
competition at a time when there was a general call for unity and cooperation.  
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Prior to the formation of the Organization of African Unity, there were several 
conflicts and competition between the Monrovia group and Casablanca group. 
Also, Nkrumah's so-called Union of African States (UAS) faced some level of 
conflict with other groups.   However, the major rivalry was between the 
Casablanca and the Monrovia groups. The Casablanca group was made up of 
Ghana, Egypt, Algeria, Mali, Morocco, Guinea and Libya while the Monrovia 
group initially comprised Nigeria, Liberia and Togo. Its membership 
subsequently increased after it merged with the Brazzaville group, which 
included, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar, Benin, 
Gabon, Mauritania,  the Central African Republic, Niger, Senegal and Chad 
and Burkina Faso (Franke 2007, website). 
These groups vehemently disagreed over the basis for unity. Also, they could 
not agree on what should be the objective of the inter-African cooperation and 
how it should be institutionalized. This was further complicated by 
disagreements over the type of relationship Africa should maintain with 
former colonial powers. There were those who preferred collaborative 
structures to enhance continuous assistance and those who argued for total 
independence and intra-African cooperation. These disagreements were also 
seen in the antagonism between the Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone, 
and Arabic groups (Woronoff, 1970:587). 
Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca group wanted an immediate creation of 
an African union with centrally coordinated economic, cultural, and military 
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activities. Due to their radical position, this group was referred to as the 
revolutionaries, while the Brazzaville group, known as the moderates were 
more conservative and  they preferred a more gradual approach.  Julius 
Nyerere argued that immediate continental unity was desirable but was not 
practical for immediate implementation. He said Africa would need to achieve 
unity gradually or stage by stage (Nyongo 1990:5).  The Brazzaville group, 
which was initially made up of the Francophone countries, did not support 
Nkrumah's aggressive Pan-Africanism. They preferred a unity that was not 
"political integration of sovereign states, but unity of aspirations and of action 
considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political 
identity" (Chimelu 1977:164).  
The Brazzaville group,  at a stage, proceeded to create various institutions and 
adopted a charter creating the Organisation Africaine et Malgache de 
Cooperation Economique (OAMCE), the Union Africaine et Malgache 
(UAM), as well as a defence organisation, the Union Africaine et Malgache de 
Défense (UAMD)  (Franke 2007, website). This rivalry also contributed to the 
formation of sub-regional groups in addition to the already tensed atmosphere. 
There were groups like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which was named the 
Union of African States (UAS). Though it claimed to pursue the vision of a 
broader union for Africa, it never extended beyond its original size. On 1
st
 
May 1959, it declared a common flag and anthem, common citizenship and 
extended an open invitation to other African states to become part of the 
union.  The UAS remained a nominal union until it eventually went moribund.   
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The Casablanca group realized that African countries were not likely to 
proceed with this type of complete political integration, which they had 
envisaged. There was thus the need for compromise. Therefore, Guinea led 
other members of the Casablanca group to a compromise with the Monrovia 
Group. This created the atmosphere for dialogue, culminating into the 
formation of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963.   
 
Nyongo (1990:5) asserts that the creation of the OAU was a watered down 
version of what Kwame Nkrumah’s had fought for. Nkrumah clamoured for a 
vibrant and active organization, which would build on the ruins of 
colonialism. Therefore, Nyongo (1990) stated that Africa merely created a 
club that was incapable of attaining the aspirations of its members. He also 
observed that it took almost twenty years for African leaders to realize that the 
OAU had no vision and cannot take Africa anywhere. Consequently, the OAU 
produced the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1981, but he lamented that 
Nkrumah was not acknowledged, despite the realization that the deviation 
from Nkrumah’s type of unity did not yield any dividends. 
 
The formation of the OAU did not lead to an end to the rivalry amongst the 
African groups. This phenomenon continued with the emergence of a series of 
sub-regional organizations due to ideological, linguistic and cultural 
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divergences. The peculiar experience of the southern African countries 
resulted in the creation of  southern African forums  like the Front Line States 
(FLS) aimed at the struggle against apartheid. Even within the emerging sub-
regional cooperation, there were some disagreements based upon divergent 
political ideologies. In 1977 the first experiment in sub-regional integration in 
East Africa failed, because the initial East African Community (EAC), formed 
in 1967, was faced with a major ideological conflict. Tanzania preferred an 
organization inclined towards a socialist ideology but Kenya insisted on 
following the capitalist pattern (Franke, 2007, website).  
 
Neo-colonialism has played a major role in the state of regionalism in Africa, 
due to the ties between some of the states with their former colonial masters. 
The ties between them and the western powers were far stronger than their ties 
with their regional neighbouring  states. This situation is worsened by the fact 
that most countries in the region do not have the economic and technological 
advancement to encourage closer trade cooperation. Also, most of the states 
within the same regions are producing similar agricultural raw materials and 
unfinished mined items.  
Though the level of regional economic integration has not produced an 
effective success story on the continent, the situation has slightly improved 
with the transformation from the OAU to the African Union (AU). The 
African Union and the sub-regional organizations have made nascent strides 
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in the promotion of peace and security in their regions. These organizations 
have been able to respond effectively to conflicts in their region. Also, most of 
them have added security and conflict management initiatives to their original 
mandate (Berman and Sams 2000:380).  
As indicated earlier, regionalism in Africa has been negatively affected by 
several factors, which did not only limit the scope of regional integration on 
the continent but contributed to the rivalry nature of regionalism on the 
continent. Some of the states were suspicious of the dominance of others 
whose economic and political influence seems to be much stronger. This 
disparity arises partly from the differences in the size of states in the regional 
groupings, creating apprehensions about the distribution of advantages.  
 
Matthews (2003, website) identified the following as the major constraints to 
regional integration in Africa: Intra-regional trade in African regional bodies 
is minimal when compared to other regions of the world.  Trade between 
member states is far less than trade with outside countries. Unlike other 
regional bodies, like the EU and ASEAN that has an appreciable level of 
intra-regional trade. Most African countries have experienced serious 
macroeconomic disequilibria as well as poor trade finance, a tight tax base, 
foreign debt service burdens, over-valued currencies and over dependence on 
customs duties as a major source of revenue. Their economic background has 
been adverse to regional cooperation.  
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Also, he said the approach of African integration patterns around inward-
looking industrialization meant that the members’ economic costs of 
participation are often instant and concrete in the shape of  lower tariff 
revenues and greater import competition but the economic benefits are not 
evenly distributed and are long-term in nature. The issue of neo-colonialism 
and dependence of some of the states on their former colonial masters affected 
the possibility of any functional regional groupings. African regionalism is 
directed by the public sector and does not have the much needed participation 
and steering of the private sector and the general public. Cooperation has been 
seen as encompassing bloated and exclusive bureaucracies, rather than 
opportunities for advancement and development. There are too many regional 
bodies, which leads to top-heavy structures with numerous political 
appointments. This factor contributes to the inability of the governments to 
comply with their financial obligations to the regional organizations, 
inadequate preparation and planning and the inability of government 
ministries to properly follow up on resolutions of the regional organization. 
The integration process is hampered by the presence of weak states as well as 
a political disagreement to share sovereignty. Most integration institutions are 
intergovernmental and integration measures are not symbolized by potent 
supranational bodies. 
Regionalism in Africa has experienced several nascent changes, especially 
regarding security related affairs. The major bodies, the African Union (AU), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African 
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Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) in East Africa and the Horn have all developed the 
machinery for enhancing peace and security (Franke 2007, website).  African 
leaders have realized that their economic advancement cannot be ensured in 
the midst of a series of intra-state conflicts. They have seen the need to 
cooperate more closely to enhance their collective security. This was difficult 
to achieve under the OAU.  Under the OAU Charter, members agreed to the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. However, this 
notion seems to have changed with the transformation to the African Union 
(AU). A nascent wave of regionalism “has been pitting the values of unity and 
solidarity against those of democracy, accountability, democratic governance, 
and transparent politics all of which are considered vital correlates to 
continental security” (Landsberg 2004:117).  
African leaders have generally shown a readiness to redefine the principle of 
the sovereign rights of nations. This is shown clearly in the formulation of the 
Constitutive Act by the African Union. Under this concept, sovereignty is 
defined in the conditional terms of the capacity and willingness of a state to 
protect its citizens. This has thus shifted the focus from regime security to 
human security; also it recognizes the authority of the AU to militarily 
intervene in the internal affairs of its members, but only under very specific 
“grave” circumstances defined in Article 4 (h) in the Constitutive Act (Powell 
2005:13)   
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The emergence of African Union to replace the OAU has set the pace for a 
new level of regionalism in Africa. Unlike the epoch of the OAU which was 
characterized by inter group conflicts, the level of integration seems to have 
intensified and the poor level of cooperation between the OAU and sub-
regional African organizations has abated. AU, and specifically its Peace and 
Security Council, has actively promoted and supported sub-regional efforts in 
conflict resolution, resulting in an appreciable level of progress in the ability 
of African regional organizations to resolve their own conflict. This is evident 
in the efforts of ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC in the resolution of sub-
regional conflicts. IGAD was involved with successful mediation efforts in 
Sudan and Somalia while ECOWAS was able to effectively intervene in the 
conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia.  
 
Apart from its support to sub-regional organizations that are involved with 
conflict resolution, the AU itself has provided exemplary actions in this regard 
through its African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) (Franke 2007, website). The level of cooperation between the 
AU and sub-regional bodies is also evident in the support AU has given to 
SADC in the resolution of the political conflict in Zimbabwe. The AU has 
continuously supported SADC’s position on the conflict in Zimbabwe and has 
depended on SADC position as the basis for all its actions and 
pronouncements on  the matter.  
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Despite efforts by the AU to limit regional organizations on the continent, the 
number of sub-regional cooperation on the continent is still high. The AU 
officially recognises eight of them in the five regions. Most countries on the 
continent belong to a number of sub-regional bodies. Out of the 54 countries 
in Africa, 26 of them belong to two regional bodies, while 19 belong to three 
regional bodies. Two countries namely Swaziland and DR Congo, belong to 
as many as four regional bodies.  Only six countries belong to a single 
regional body.  
There are numerous regional organisations on the continent but  14 economic 
communities can be mentioned;  most of them have established a parallel type 
of peace and security mechanism. In Southern Africa, the list includes SADC, 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC), which share the essential part of their integration spaces 
among themselves and with COMESA. In West and North Africa there are 
ECOWAS, UEMOA, MRU, and the Community of Sahel and Saharan States 
(CENSAD). In the Central African sub-region, there is ECCAS which covers 
the CEMAC and Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) 
(AU Report 2005:3). 
 
3.2 Regional integration in West Africa 
West African history is characterized by a series of cooperation and 
regionalization; especially during the decolonization period. Some of these 
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were practical, while others were mere ideological expressions. Though some 
of these bodies were created to attain a positive objective, others were created 
in furtherance of an existing rivalry between the Anglophone, Francophone 
and Lucophone states. The attainment of independence in the early 1960s by 
most of the West African states witnessed a hike in intra- regional 
cooperation. This is due to the fact that the regional cooperation during the 
colonial era was limited as the colonial powers discouraged any form of 
cooperation within the various sections in Africa (Franke, 2007, website).  
 
It is a well-known fact that a regional integration does not flourish in an 
environment with low  levels of industrialization and a poor economy. Post- 
independent West African initiatives in regional integration can be analysed in 
two ways: there was the desire for regional cooperation and regionalization 
but this desire was affected by the poor state of the economies of the member 
states.  According to Nkrumah (1973: 282) "by far the greatest wrong which 
the departing colonialists had ever inflicted on Africa…[was] to leave us 
divided into economically unviable states which bear no possibility of real 
development."  However, the need to correct this wrong, to combat the 
ongoing exploitation of the continent's resources and to attain some level  of 
economic and political viability was a major motivation for the African states 
to begin regional cooperation (Franke  2007, website). 
 
137 
 
It is imperative to note that the major catalyst to regional integration in Africa 
is the ideological framework of Pan-Africanism, which advocated for African 
integration in 1900 during the first Pan African Congress. Pan African 
Congresses advocated unity and integration as the only means of facilitating 
the end of colonialism, this framework became the basis for the pursuit of 
unity and integration in the face of obvious vulnerability and the fear of neo-
colonialism. Therefore, Pan-Africanism became an ideological assertion for 
the clamour for regional integration in Africa.  
 
However, even after independence, regional integration in West Africa had 
been limited due to the attachment of the economies of the countries to their 
former colonial masters; especially the francophone countries that still have 
strong ties with France. Cooperation with former colonial masters affected the 
level of regionalization as some of these countries depended on the colonial 
powers for their economic advancement. The ties between them and the 
western powers were far stronger than their ties with other states in the West 
African sub-region. This situation was worsened by the fact that most 
countries in the sub-region did not have the economic and technological 
advancement to encourage closer trade cooperation. The states in West Africa 
produced similar exports (agricultural raw materials and mining), which made 
economic cooperation less fanciful, since they all needed the advance 
products and machinery from the western countries. 
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Despite the challenges to regional integration in West Africa, ECOWAS 
followed a similar trend seen in other regional bodies to develop the 
machinery for facilitating sub-regional integration and to enhance peace and 
security within their area (Franke 2007, website). Within the short span of its 
history, the regional integration process in West Africa has metamorphosed 
from mere economic cooperation to include political and military cooperation.  
West African leaders have realized that economic advancement cannot be 
ensured in the midst of a series of intrastate conflicts. They have seen the need 
to cooperate more closely to enhance their collective security.  
 
To comprehend regional integration in West Africa, it is essential to 
understand the key factors that shaped and influenced the West African 
society, including the ideological, socio-cultural, political, economic, 
institutional, and administrative dimensions and their impact on the regional 
integration process in the sub-region. The integration process in West Africa 
from 1975 to date has been slow due to the fact that most countries in the sub- 
region lack national development plans, which includes regional economic 
considerations. Also, most governments of the West African countries have 
not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border investments and 
transactions. 
 
Another challenge is the role of nationalism in West Africa, which had 
historically inspired the people during the epoch of colonialism to seek 
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political independence. Nationalism has remained a strong force for national 
identity and the exercise of national sovereignty and has contributed in 
limiting the level of cooperation in respect of regionalism. Also, the effort of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in sub-regional 
integration is limited by the fact that national interests hold sway over almost 
all decision-making bodies in the West African sub-region (Ntumba 
1997:303).  
 
The integration process is also affected by the fear of Nigerian domination. 
The gigantic size of Nigeria is feared by some of the countries in the sub-
region, especially as it overshadows other countries in the region by its vast 
population, gross domestic product, and natural resource endowment. This is 
worsened by the dependence of most countries in the sub-region on states 
outside the region for their economic and trade activities. Therefore, the 
integration process within the region has been slow due to the limited 
economic independence of the countries and the poor level of industrialization 
(Lavergne, 1997:22-23).  
 
Bundu (1997:29) listed the following as the major factors impeding regional 
integration in West Africa: the absence of an integration culture and, indeed, a 
development culture generally, in the countries of the region; the priority 
accorded to nation-building in the years following independence; differences 
in ideology and approach and the fear of domination by Nigeria as well as the 
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burden of certain institutional and economic structures inherited from the 
colonial era; the economic crisis that has plagued the region since the early 
1980s and Political instability.  
 
Also, Bundu (1997:29) stated that the success of regional integration in the 
sub-region will demand firm institutional arrangements at the national level, a 
degree of external support, and renewed leadership from all quarters. 
However, he affirms that the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty in 
Abuja (June 1991) gives an ambitious blueprint for economic integration and 
development. He however lamented that the Abuja event failed to examine the 
main issues and problems of regional cooperation and integration. According 
to him, a thorough and critical examination of the West African integration 
process is imperative in attaining an appreciable level of integration 
comparable to other parts of the world. 
 
3.3 The formation of sub-regional bodies in West Africa  
Regionalism and regional cooperation in West Africa predates the 1975 
formation of ECOWAS. These regional bodies were formed by a specific 
linguistic block or as a result of agreement between countries within a 
geographical location to deal with trade and other economic issues. Some of 
them were even formed to counter the initiatives of similar bodies or to 
compete in a perceived rivalry. There are a series of arguments regarding the 
existence of these bodies and their role in the integration process in West 
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Africa. Generally, most of them have either complemented ECOWAS’s 
initiatives or countered it, especially as their members were more committed 
to them than to ECOWAS. 
 
Francophone West African countries and those of the Central African sub-
region have been members of regional groups predating the independence 
period. These regional groupings included the creation of   l’Union Monétaire 
de l’Ouest Africaine - UMOA (Monetary Union of West Africa) in 1962 
which was later extended as the l’Union douanière des Etats d'Afrique de  
l'Ouest - UDEAO  (Customs Union of West African States) in 1966 to deal 
with trade before it later transformed to the Communauté économique de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest – CEAO (West African Economic Community)  in 1973 
and l’Union économique et monétaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest - UEMOA,  
(West African Economic and Monetary Union) in 1994.  Under CEAO 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal), a 
free trade for raw materials was introduced in 1973 before its transformation 
to UEMOA in 1994. New developments under UEMOA included some levels 
of free internal trade and a common external tariff. Also, there was a plan for 
subsequent long term free movement of services, capital, and people (Page 
and Bilal 2001:2). 
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Prior to the 1980s, UEMOA countries (Benin, Burkina Faso,  Côte d'Ivoire, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) saw trade policy as a tool of 
national development and industrialization, which was needed to enhance 
agricultural development.  The existing trade policy was primarily meant to 
avoid interfering with the policies of member countries and it was aimed at 
probably countering the economic weight of Nigeria in the region. Also, it is 
argued that these policies were promoted by Côte d'Ivoire to promote its 
influence over its Francophone neighbors. In furtherance of its main 
objectives, UEMOA members agreed on some basic economic policies in 
1995, which included an end to internal tariffs on agricultural raw materials 
and handicrafts. It also agreed to reduce tariffs on some manufactured 
products (Page and Bilal 2001:3). 
  
In principle, UEMOA countries had a special access to the French and the 
European market. This privilege was jealously guarded by member countries, 
making the formation of a sub-regional body which may entail including other 
countries in the sub-region an uphill task. However, the introduction of the 
Lomé Convention opened up the UEMOA countries to a sub-regional 
agreement due to the fact that the convention gave the former British colonies 
equal trade access to the EU market, which was already available to the 
former French colonies. The objective behind the formation of these 
communities was the need for trade liberalization and economic cooperation 
(Page and Bilal 2001:3). 
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 Regarding monetary cooperation, UEMOA which comprises seven 
francophone countries under the Central Bank of West African States 
(BCEAO), adopted a series of policies to facilitate a common currency, the 
CFA franc. It has been successful in its mission especially due to strong 
support from France and its supranational nature. Regarding the entire sub-
region, the central banks established the West African Clearing House 
(WACH) to promote transactions within the sub-region and to economize on 
the use of foreign convertible currencies. The scope of WACH is subsequently 
transformed to the West African Monetary Agency, which is a specialized 
agency within ECOWAS shouldered with sub-regional monetary program. 
The ultimate aim is the creation of a single currency to replace the CFA franc 
and other currencies in the sub-region (Page and Bilal 2001:5-6). 
 
A series of inter-governmental organizations have contributed to the 
advancement of regional cooperation in the West African sub region.  These 
bodies are engaged with different areas of sub-regional cooperation, like the 
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) 
which was formed in 1973 to deal with the problem of drought and 
desertification in the sub-region. It has facilitated several initiatives relating to 
the management of ecological degradation and enhancing viable development 
in the Sahel area. There is also the effort aimed at advancing the livestock 
industry through the 1970 creation of the CEBV (Communauté économique 
du bétail et de la viande). 
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Others are the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) which 
was created in 1970 to enhance rice production. Also, there were the 
Organisation internationale de lutte contre le criquet migrateur africain 
(OICMA) and the Organisation commune de lutte anti-acridienne et de lutte 
anti-aviaire (OCLALAV) created to handle the important issue of pest-
management and to dealt with issues of crop destruction by locusts and other 
pests. Apart from those, there were  the Gambia River Development 
Organization (OMVG), the Liptako Gourma Authority that focus on 
facilitating  the joint resources of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as the 
Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) and the Niger Basin Authority (Bundu, 1997:33). 
 
The 1975 formation of ECOWAS, comprising the CEAO members and the 
Anglophone countries as well as Guinea was the most successful effort to 
integrate the entire West African sub-region. The economic objectives of 
ECOWAS were similar to that of UEMOA. Unlike the case of UEMOA, 
Nigeria was no longer considered a threat. However, the political will for the 
formation of ECOWAS was so strong that there was no serious analysis of the 
economic costs and benefits of regional integration. Also, unlike UEMOA, 
private sector initiatives contributed to the emergence of ECOWAS and there 
is a formal provision for private sector participation. The emergence of 
ECOWAS saw a more defined objective in the coordination of national 
policies on agriculture, natural resources, and industry, as well as 
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macroeconomic and non-economic policies (Page and Bilal 2001:6). The 
emergence of ECOWAS on the scene took regional integration in West Africa 
to an unprecedented dimension. ECOWAS particularly promoted measures to 
enhance free movement of people, including visa-free travels within the sub-
region and cooperation regarding agriculture and industries (Bundu, 1997: 
31). 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
The early Pan-African movement was dominated by the reformist Du Boisian 
Pan-Africanism and the radical Pan-African Garveyism. In terms of 
ideological impact on Africa, Du Boisian Pan-African ideology has had more 
of an impact than Garveyism.  There have been two major waves of 
regionalism in Africa: The first relates to the period of colonization, de-
colonization, and Pan-Africanism, the second wave relates to the post-Cold 
War era. It has been observed that Pan-Africanism has influenced both waves 
of regionalism in Africa but had been in particular a major catalyst for  the 
first wave of regionalism.  
 
African regionalism in both the first and second wave was characterized by 
competitive regionalisms. African regionalism has continuously faced the 
problem of competition for the benefits of political prominence and 
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institutional relevance on a local, sub-regional or continental level. 
Competitive regionalism has been due to several factors, including political 
ideology, cultural diversity and the divergent interpretation of Pan-Africanism 
by successive generations of Pan-Africanists within the African continent.  
 
The integration process in West Africa has been slow due to the fact that most 
countries in the sub-region lack national development plans, which include 
regional economic considerations. Also, most governments of the West 
African countries have not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border 
investments and transactions. Another challenge is the role of nationalism in 
West Africa, which had historically inspired the people during the epoch of 
colonialism to seek political independence. Nationalism has remained a strong 
force for national identity and the exercise of national sovereignty and has 
contributed in limiting the level of cooperation in respect of regionalism.  
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Chapter Four 
The Formation, Structure and Growth of ECOWAS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Most regional organizations, including ECOWAS started as regional 
economic integration schemes but gradually developed to cover additional 
sectors. Some of these bodies started with a preferential trade arrangement and 
were dealing with provisions for the lowering of trade barriers among 
participating nations and the establishment of free trade areas where all 
barriers to trade are removed. This is sometimes followed by the 
establishment of a Customs Union following the removal of tariff and other 
barriers on members and the establishment of a common external tariff on 
non-members.  
 
Also, the establishment of a common market, which includes the major 
characteristics of a Customs Union, without any visible trade restrictions: 
including the harmonization of the monetary and fiscal policies of its 
members. However, the most advanced type of economic integration is the 
establishment of an Economic Monetary Union, which includes all the 
attributes of a common market and coordinates the macroeconomic and 
budgetary policies of its members. A good example of a regional body that 
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has attained most of the above stages of economic integration is the European 
Union.  
 
The  ECOWAS Treaty (1975) indicated a proposed removal of custom duties 
between member states, removal of quantitative and administrative 
restrictions on trade among its members and the establishment of a common 
external tariff structure and commercial policy towards non- member 
countries. Also the treaty listed the elimination of obstacles that restrict the 
free movement of persons, services and capital between member states, the 
harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of research, agro-
industrial research and other common projects in the sub-region as well as the 
facilitation of the joint development of transport, communication, energy and 
other infrastructural facilities. The treaty aimed at the harmonization of 
economic and industrial policies of its members and the elimination of 
disparities in the level of development of its members as well as the 
harmonization of monetary policies of member states, and the establishment 
of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. 
 
Though the above objectives show a clear path towards successful sub-
regional economic integration, the fact that some of them remained mere 
nominal goals tells a different story of ECOWAS. The ECOWAS treaty has 
been described as one of the most ambitious ones, because it implied the 
establishment of a free trade area, a customs union, a common market and an 
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economic union or monetary integration all at the same time while European 
integration went through these elements in the form of stages over a period of 
almost forty years.   
 
The economic integration process in West Africa has been slow and the zeal 
and commitment of member states has not been high enough. However, the 
success of the integration process in Western Europe has led to increased 
interest in other regional integration projects, including ECOWAS. However, 
most of the ECOWAS countries do not have the capacity to ensure the 
expeditious attainment of its objectives.  Most countries in the sub-region are 
small and have minimal economic output. Apart from Nigeria, Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire, all the other countries in the sub-region have a population of 
less than 10 million. 
 
Development demands the availability of social and economic activities on a 
larger scale than the current situation in each of the ECOWAS countries. 
Integration involves a series of economic advantages like lower unit costs of 
production, increased specialization and competition, access to technology 
and greater sharing of ideas in a larger economic system. But the economic 
integration process in West Africa is worsened by the fact that some of the 
ECOWAS countries are yet to attain full national integration as most of them 
comprise several distinct nationalities brought together by European colonial 
powers purely for their own objectives. Also, there are limited or poor levels 
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of inter-regional infrastructure, including railway links and air transportation. 
This should not be surprising, bearing in mind that most of the countries have 
not fully attained these infrastructures locally, thus limiting the possibility of 
intra-regional links  (Bamba, 2010:19). 
 
4.1 The formation of ECOWAS 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a sub-
regional body of fifteen West African countries. It was created on May 28, 
1975 following the signing of the Treaty of Lagos with a mission to facilitate 
economic integration in the West African sub-region. Cape Verde joined the 
organization in 1976. The total number of member countries only increased 
temporarily as Mauritania withdrew its membership in December 2000. 
ECOWAS has its secretariat and headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. Its 
fundamental objectives as indicated in its Treaty are, among others, to 
promote co-operation and integration in order to create an economic union in 
West Africa.  
 
ECOWAS’s member states includes:  Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Togo, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Senegal and Niger. The ECOWAS Treaty indicates its 
focus will be to facilitate accelerated and sustained economic development of 
its members and the creation of a homogeneous society, leading to the unity of 
the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of all types of obstacles to the 
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free movement of goods, capital, and persons. The ECOWAS Treaty 
envisages the region to be a common market with the eventual removal of 
customs duties and quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among 
its members. Also, ECOWAS aims at attaining common customs duties and 
commercial policy toward non-members and free factor mobility among its 
members in the same fashion as found within the European Union (Hanink 
and Owusu 1998: 366).  
 
The formation of ECOWAS was preceded by the incorporation of the 1973 
free trade area called the West African Economic Community (CEAO) which 
was made up of the francophone countries of the sub-region: Mali, Benin,  
Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger and Togo (as an 
observer). CEAO members aimed at developing into a customs union within 
12 years; also CEAO had a mission to eventually establish a complete 
common market. CEAO members planned a progressive liberalisation of trade 
by reducing tariffs on imports of goods manufactured within the community. 
However, in 1990 CEAO was dissolved and replaced by the West African 
Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA) which included all the former 
CEAO members, except Mauritania. 
  
The emergence of ECOWAS provided the first major economic integration 
between the Francophone and Anglophone blocks in West Africa. The 
complexities between the two blocks are a direct consequence of colonial 
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heritage. West African leaders saw the need to overcome colonial ties and 
facilitate inter-regional economic activities as a major means by which most 
of countries in the region can overcome the constraints to their economic 
growth, which seems to be the consequence of their small size and limited 
capital (Mbaku, 1995:142). The emergence of ECOWAS provided the right 
integration tool for escaping the colonial trade pattern, which the West 
African states were trapped into.  
 
Hanink and Owusu (1998:366) however observed that the prospect of 
ECOWAS providing a meaningful vehicle for the increase of trade, linkage, 
and economic development among its members does not seem to be strong. 
According to them, trade creation effects of customs unions are likely to be 
realised either in the conventional theory of comparative advantage or the new 
trade theory of increasing returns in differentiated markets. They observed 
that both result from a decrease in transaction costs that should occur with a 
freer trade.  
 
Also, based upon conventional theory of comparative advantage, Hanink and   
Owusu (1998:366) said such trade liberalisation may likely lead to trade based 
on comparative factor costs, and there will be an increase due to the national 
specialisations that would result. “If the new trade theory of increasing returns 
in differentiated markets is invoked, then the ultimate result is the same. 
Liberalised trade leads to particular specialisations within the members of a 
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customs union based upon variations in market preferences rather than on 
variations in factor cost” (Hanink and Owusu 1998:367). 
 
Despite the good intentions regarding the formation of ECOWAS, the 
integration process in West Africa has been limited by several factors. 
Sommers and Mehretu (1992) said political problems have contributed to the 
hindrance of trade within ECOWAS. This is further worsened by the uneven 
size of ECOWAS's member states, which comprised of Nigeria, a very large 
country, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, which are medium sized countries 
and a vast number of other smaller countries.   
 
4.2 The ECOWAS Institutions 
To accomplish its objectives ECOWAS has four main institutions: the 
ECOWAS Commission, the Community Parliament, the Community Court of 
Justice and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). 
 
4.2.1 The ECOWAS Commission 
Based upon a decision of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, the 
former ECOWAS Secretariat has been transformed into a Commission in 
2006. The ECOWAS Commission has enhanced powers and oversees smaller 
and clearly defined sectors of the organization. The objective of the 
Commission is to play a more effective role in the integration and 
development process and to support member states to build their capacities for 
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programmed implementation. The Commission is headed by a President who 
is assisted by a Vice-President and seven Commissioners (ECOWAS, 
website). 
 
4.2.2 The Community Parliament  
According to Ousmane (Website), the ECOWAS Parliament plays a major 
consultative role by providing advisory opinions on issues covering a wide 
range of areas that are vital for the integration process. According to him, 
these include respect for human rights, the interconnection of communication 
and telecommunication links, health, education, and revisions of basic 
community texts.  
 
There are 115 seats in the ECOWAS Parliament distributed among the 15 
member states according to the size of their populations. The most populous 
ECOWAS country, Nigeria has 35 seats, while the smallest countries - Togo 
and Gambia - have five seats each. The political organs of the Parliament are 
the plenary, the Bureau, the Conference of Bureaux and the parliamentary 
standing committees. The ECOWAS Parliament Secretariat is under the 
authority of the Speaker of Parliament. The Speaker is elected for a four year 
term to reflect the directives of the Authority of Heads of State (ECOWAS 
website).  
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4.2.3 The Community Court of Justice
  
Following a protocol signed in 1991, the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice was created to handle disputes between ECOWAS states.  The newly 
created court became a legal institution of the organization when the 1991 
protocol entered into force on 5 November 1996. Articles 9 and 76 specify the 
jurisdiction of the Community Court of Justice and deal with rulings on 
disputes between states over the interpretations of the Revised Treaty and 
providing the ECOWAS Council with advisory opinions on legal issues in 
accordance with Article 10. Also, the court is empowered to look into cases of 
fundamental human rights abuse (ECOWAS website).  
 
4.2.4 ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). 
The treaty establishing ECOWAS instituted the ECOWAS Funds for 
Cooperation, Compensation and Development (ECOWAS Funds) which was 
to be the major financial instrument of the organization. In December 1999, 
ECOWAS Heads of States made vital decisions to enhance the financial 
resources of the funds by transforming the ECOWAS funds into a regional 
body called ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). EBID 
was to operate with two professional subsidiaries, the ECOWAS Regional 
Development Funds (ERDF) and the ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank 
(ERIB). However, on June 14, 2006, the bank was restructured into a single 
body to streamline overhead costs. 
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EBID became a full international finance institution under Article 21 of the 
revised treaty and its subsequent amendment of 19
th
 January 2007 with the 
objective of promoting the private sector and the development of the public 
sector. EBID is positioned to facilitate the overall ECOWAS objective by 
contributing to economic development of West Africa by the provision of 
financial assistance to ECOWAS projects, particularly in the areas of industry, 
transport, poverty alleviation, energy, telecommunication and environment 
(ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3. The ECOWAS Specialized Agencies 
Despite the criticism about the slow state of progress in the attainment of 
appreciable levels of integration in West Africa, there is no doubt that the 
approximately 35 years of ECOWAS’s existence has not been a waste. There 
are remarkable levels of progress in the ECOWAS effort in West Africa and a 
remarkable development of a series of specialized agencies to facilitate the 
integration process. 
 
ECOWAS has developed ten main specialized agencies: the West African 
Health Organisation (WAHO), West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), 
West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), ECOWAS Youth & Sports 
Development Centre (EYSDC), ECOWAS Gender Development Centre 
(EGDC), Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU), ECOWAS Brown  
Card, The West African Power Pool (WAPP), The Inter-Governmental Action 
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Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa 
(GIABA) and West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO) 
(ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.1 West African Health Organisation (WAHO) 
The division between the anglophone and francophone West Africa was 
noticeable even in sub-regional health matters. The francophone countries had 
the Organisation de Coordination et de Coopération pour la Lutte Contre les 
Grandes Endémies (OCCGE) while the anglophone states created the West 
African Health Community (WAHC).  There was thus the need for a single 
body to synchronize these efforts and combine resources to enhance the 
impact of their programmes in West Africa. Therefore, the OCCGE and 
WAHC merged to form The West African Health Organisation (WAHO), 
which transcends linguistic borders in the sub-region to serve all fifteen 
ECOWAS Member States. 
 
The West African Health Organisation (WAHO) was created in 1987 after the 
adoption of the Protocol creating it by ECOWAS Heads of State. The Protocol 
grants WAHO the status of a Specialized Agency of ECOWAS with a mission 
to facilitate the attainment of the highest possible health standard and the 
protection of health of the peoples in the sub-region through the 
harmonization of the policies of the Member States, pooling of resources, and 
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cooperation with one another and with others for a collective and strategic 
combat against the health problems of the sub-region (ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.2 West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) 
The West African clearing house (WACH) was established in 1975 as a 
multilateral payment organ to facilitate trade within the West African sub-
region. It was shouldered with the responsibility of routing and clearing trade 
transactions and services. Also, it functioned as the monitoring, coordinating 
and implementing organ of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme 
(EMCP), which aimed at the creation of the ECOWAS single currency. 
WACH was eventually transformed to the West African Monetary Agency 
(WAMA) in 1996 and made an autonomous and specialized agency of 
ECOWAS. 
  
WAMA comprises the eight Central Banks of ECOWAS member states: the 
BCEAO (the common central bank of seven francophone and one lusophone 
countries); Central Bank of Nigeria; Bank of Cape Verde; Bank of Sierra 
Leone; Central Bank of The Gambia; Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea; 
Central Bank of Liberia; and the Bank of Ghana.  
 
It has fours administrative organs, namely; The Committee of Governors, 
which comprises the Governors of all ECOWAS Central Banks; The 
Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee, which comprises the Directors of 
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Research of member Central Banks; The Operations and Administration 
Committee, which is made up of the Directors of Foreign Operations of 
member Central Banks; and the Directorate of the Agency which is headed by 
the Director General  who is assisted by his subordinates and a team of 
professionals involved with the managerial responsibility of the Agency.  
 
The major objectives of WAMA are the following: to promote the use of 
national currencies in trade and non-trade transactions within the sub-region; 
to bring about savings in the use of member states’ foreign reserves; to 
encourage and promote trade and exchange liberalization among member 
states and to enhance monetary cooperation and consultation among member 
states.  Also, to facilitate the harmonization and coordination of monetary as 
well as fiscal policies and structural adjustment programmes; to ensure the 
monitoring, coordination and implementation of the ECOWAS Monetary 
Cooperation Programme; to initiate and promote policies and programmes 
relating to monetary integration in the sub-region; to ensure the establishment 
of a single monetary zone in West Africa, paving the way for the eventual 
conduct of a single monetary policy and the establishment of a single currency 
(ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.3 West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), 
The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was established by the 
Governments of Ghana, Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Guinea on 
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December 15, 2000 as an institution of the West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ), following the signing of the Accra declaration with the intent of not 
only a single currency for the participating states but the possibility for this 
monetary zone to be eventually merged with the CFA Franc Zone to form a 
single monetary zone in West Africa.  
 
Though it officially commenced in January 2000, its operations did not start at 
its Headquarters in Accra, Ghana until March, 2001. The establishment of 
WAMI was in furtherance of the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Program 
and was supposed to facilitate preparatory activities for the establishment of 
the proposed West African Central Bank (WACB,) which was supposed to 
issue a single currency for these countries by the year 2005. 
  
On December 15, 2000, during the second summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the zone, which was held in Bamako, Mali, a date of January 
1, 2003 was set for the introduction of the common currency. However, it was 
later rescheduled to July, 1 2005 and later to December 1, 2009. This was 
again rescheduled because most of the countries concerned are yet to be ready 
for the proposed currency.  
 
However, the following framework for establishing the zone was adopted by 
Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Ghana during the December 
15, 2008 summit: the agreement of the West African Monetary Zone 
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(WAMZ); the statutes of the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI); the 
statutes of the West African Central Bank (WACB); and the provisions on the 
Stabilization and Cooperation Fund (SCF). 
 
WAMI is headed by a Director General and it is administratively divided into 
five Departments: Finance and Administration, Legal, Research, Operations 
and Internal Audit. The major functions of the organization are to monitor the 
state of macroeconomic convergence, to harmonize regulations and to design 
a policy framework and to promote a regional payment system. Also, to 
exchange rate mechanism and conversion rate, to facilitate public support for 
the currency by embarking on a programme of sensitization of citizens of the 
participating countries, to do both the design and technical preparation of the 
new currency, to formulate the modalities for setting up a common central 
bank,  to foster cooperation among countries in  a  way similar to the role of 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and  to create an enabling 
environment for a smooth transition to the new common currency (ECOWAS 
website).  
 
4.3.4 ECOWAS Youth & Sports Development Centre (EYSDC) 
The relevance of sport as a tool for trans-national cooperation has become 
increasingly clear and most regional organizations have realized the need to 
harness sport as a tool for the facilitation of their integration process. In the 
European Union, there is a Sport Unit in the Education and Culture Section of 
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the European Commission. The sport unit is responsible for cooperation 
within the Commission and with other institutions on sport related issues as 
well as cooperation with national and international sports institutions, 
organizations and federations. Also, it is responsible for organizing bilateral 
meetings with sports institutions and organizations and international sports 
federations.  
 
EYSDC was formed on 19
th
 January 2005 following the transformation of the 
Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports to a specialized ECOWAS 
agency. It is a permanent institutional framework within ECOWAS for the 
development of youth and sporting activities as a tool to facilitate integration 
in West Africa. EYSDC is mandated to initiate, develop, coordinate, monitor 
and implement intra-regional sport and youth programs in the sub-region 
(ECOWAS, website). 
 
4.3.5 ECOWAS Gender Development Centre (EGDC) 
EGDC provides the framework for gender related issues in ECOWAS and 
facilitates ECOWAS’s policy of equal opportunities between men and women 
as a necessity for facilitating the integration process. EGDC is divided into 
five departments: the Secretariat; Division of Policy and Gender Programmes;  
Department of General Coordination; Department of Administration and 
Finance; and Division of New Information and Communication Technology, 
Training and Capacity Building; 
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The center seeks to establish, develop, facilitate, coordinate and follow up the 
strategies and programmes to facilitate the promotion of women’s rights and 
to ensure the inclusion of matters related to the disparities between men and 
women in the integration process of ECOWAS within the framework of 
objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty.   
 
Its objectives are to implement the ECOWAS policy and system of gender 
management, to strive for the increase in the performance of women in their 
fields of activities (seminars, round tables, study trips in order to stimulate the 
spirit of entrepreneurship and enjoy better exchange of experience) as well as 
to ensure apprenticeship and development of skills needed to execute the 
Millennium Development Goals on sex equality in the sub-region and in 
programmes and to build networks and partnership with relevant Agencies 
and Institutions for financial, technical and statutory support to the activities 
of the Centre; (ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.6 Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU) 
WRCU was created as an ECOWAS specialized agency after the process of 
integrated management of water resources in West Africa was adopted 
following the West African Ministerial Conference on the integrated 
management of water resources held in Ouagadougou from 3
rd
 to 5
th
 March 
1998. During that conference, the ECOWAS countries committed  themselves 
to move from pectoral and technocratic water resource management to an 
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integrated and participative management. This was meant for the sub-regional 
water management objective to conform to the principles adopted by the 
Dublin Preparatory Conference of January 1992  (ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.7 ECOWAS Brown Card 
The ECOWAS Insurance Brown Card Scheme is one of the features put in 
place to facilitate an integration process by promoting intra-regional 
movement in West Africa. Under this arrangement, there is a National Bureau 
as well as an issuing Bureau, which issues the Brown Card and a Handling 
Bureau, which settles claims in the locality of an accident. Under this 
arrangement, wherever there is an accident affecting the holder of the brown 
card, the claim is made to the National Bureau of the territory of the accident 
(ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.8 The West African Power Pool (WAPP) 
The West African Power Pool (WAPP) was created on 5
th
 December 1999 to 
address the issue of power supply deficiency in the West African sub-region.  
WAPP’s objectives are pursued by a Steering Committee, which comprises 
the Power and Energy Ministers of ECOWAS Member States. They are 
assisted by a Project Implementation Committee which is made up of the 
Managing Directors of ECOWAS’s Utilities and Technical and Institutional 
Working Groups. WAPP’s headquarters is located in Cotonou, Republic of 
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Benin. It is governed by a General Assembly, an Executive Board, 
Organisational Committees and a Secretariat.  
 
The main objectives of WAPP are the following: to formalise an official and 
extended collaboration in the region in order to develop power generation and 
transmission facilities, thus enhancing power supply and strengthening power 
security within the sub-region; to improve the reliability of power system and 
quality of power supply in the region as a whole; to minimize operating costs 
of networks; to increase investments needed for power grid expansion in the 
region, with emphasis on the implementation of cross-border projects; to 
create an attractive environment for investments in order to facilitate the 
funding of power generation and transmission facilities and to create common 
operating standards and rules in the sector. Also, to create a transparent and 
reliable mechanism for the swift settlement of power trade transactions and to 
increase the overall level of power supply in the region, through the 
implementation of priority generation and transmission projects that will serve 
as a foundation for economic development and the extension of cheaper 
electricity supply to a greater number of consumers (ECOWAS website).  
 
4.3.9 The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) 
The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA) was established by ECOWAS as a specialized institution in 
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2000 for the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist 
financing in West Africa. Its original mandate was to develop strategies to 
protect the economies of West African states from trans-national financial 
crime and money laundering as well as to prevent the laundering of proceeds 
of crime in the sub-region and to facilitate sub-regional co-operation.  
 
The establishment of GIABA as an ECOWAS specialized agency became 
imperative as West Africa, particularly Nigeria has become a popular location 
for global financial crime and money laundering. Most of the money 
laundering cases in the sub-region arise from money attained through 
corruption and trans-national financial crimes. Financial crimes like the 
popular “419” scam is practiced from Nigeria and other West African 
countries but its victims are in different countries, especially the developed 
countries. Apart from money laundering, the most popular types of financial 
crimes practices in West Africa are the advance fee fraud, black money scam, 
Insurance Scam and Credit Card / Counterfeit Check Scam.  
 
The “419” scam has become a major financial crime responsible for the loss 
of over Seven Billion U.S. Dollars.  The extensiveness of this crime and its 
sinister effect on Nigeria’s relationship with the world necessitated the 
promulgation of Decree 13 of 1995. It is difficult to arrive at the exact amount 
of loss since the emergence of the transnational 419 scam about thirty years 
ago. This is due to the simple fact that most victims prefer to suffer the effect 
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of their gullibility rather than making it a matter of public notice. It is 
estimated that the Nigerian conmen have successfully swindled about seven 
billion Dollars from America, Europe, South Africa and Asia between 1985 
and 2001. 
According to the “419” Coalition, a body constituted to fight the scam, the 
scam is responsible for the loss of over five Billion U.S Dollars as at 1996. 
Records from the United States show that about a hundred million Dollars is 
lost every year by Americans to the “419” scam with an estimated unreported 
loss of over three hundred million Dollars yearly. This is perhaps the reason 
why American author, Brian Wizard, affirmed that, “…419 is a global 
problem, affecting nearly every nation on earth”.  Despite the various public 
enlightenment initiatives of the 419 Coalition, the International Investigation 
Services (IIS), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), several persons continue to succumb to the scam (Tive, 
2001:1-5). 
 
Following the vicious trends of global terrorism, the GIABA Statutes were 
revised in January 2006 to also deal with terrorism, which has a major link 
with money laundering. This was based on the fact that money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism were declared in the revised statute of GIABA as 
issues of critical importance to the world community. The statute affirms that 
West Africa needs to address these issues and find global solutions to them. 
Also, the revised GIABA statute declared that West Africa is particularly 
vulnerable to money laundering and the financing of terrorism and that the 
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capacity of individual countries to deal with these issues is limited, due to the 
nature, complexity and international scope of the problem posed. Therefore, it 
called for close cooperation between West African states to deal with this 
problem (ECOWAS website). 
 
4.3.10 West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO). 
The West African Regional Health Programme (PRSAO) was created through 
a joint agreement between the European Commission and ECOWAS to 
provide health related assistance to the 15 West African states. It is 
administered by a Coordination Unit comprising an Administrator and an 
Accountant, as well as a team of experts and a team of supporting staff. 
PRSAO’s main objective is to facilitate regional integration in the sub-region 
by coordinating and the harmonizing health policies as well as to promote free 
movement of people, goods, services and technologies by facilitating the 
efficient health systems in areas of common interest (ECOWAS website). 
 
4.4 Economic and political developments in ECOWAS 
The ECOWAS Treaty (1975) declares its mission as the promotion of 
cooperation and economic integration within the West African sub-region, 
including the removal of customs duties and taxes, establishment of common 
external tariff, harmonization of economic and financial policies, and the 
creation of a single monetary zone in West Africa. However, most scholars 
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have argued that ECOWAS has either failed to accomplished its fundamental 
missions or have been slow in its accomplishment.   
 
Despite the poor or slow level of economic integration, ECOWAS has 
gradually encompassed a series of political related missions, including conflict 
resolution and preventive diplomacy, leading to the questions raised by 
scholars about the focus of ECOWAS: the puzzle relates to whether 
ECOWAS is aiming at sub-regional economic integration or political 
integration. Generally, most scholars agree that a regional body may transform 
from mere economic integration to a series of issues including political and 
security related cooperation.  
 
There has been a number of studies and “theoretical interest in the causes and 
processes whereby a regional economic organization might take on additional 
roles” (Laursen 2003:239).  Also, Haas (1961) and Nye (1971) have analyzed 
several international organizations that have broadened their mandate in the 
course of time. However, the argument regarding ECOWAS emanates from 
the fact that it is perceived to be at an elementary level of economic 
integration; therefore it is assumed it does not have the capability to grapple 
with integration in other sectors. Therefore, it is argued that ECOWAS’s 
involvement with sub-regional political and security issues will negatively 
affect it and prevent it from attaining its economic related objectives.  
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However, this argument fails to take note of the relationship between security 
and Regional Economic Integration. During an interview with Dr. Adeboye 
Adeyemo (March 2010) of the African Capacity Building Foundation, 
Zimbabwe, he stressed that ECOWAS involvement in the enhancement of 
Sub-regional Security will subsequently facilitate its economic initiative. 
Also, during an interview with Dr. P. Nyityo (June 2011); Senior Lecturer in 
International Relations, Benue State University Nigeria, he affirmed that 
ECOWAS involvement with Sub-regional Conflict Resolution has a positive 
impact on its Economic Integration.   
 
Also, it has become a common trend for regional and sub-regional 
organizations that commenced as regional economic bodies to transform to 
political and security bodies also. There are several examples in this trend: the 
European Union may be traced to its commencement as the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community 
(EEC), created by six countries in 1958. However, it transformed into a 
political and security organization called the European Union (EU) after the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1993.  
 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also experienced this phenomenon; 
it transformed from the OAU to the African Union (AU) on 9 July 2002. 
Right from its inception, the AU differed from the OAU in its structure and 
focus. Unlike the OAU, which was cautious about the issue of non-
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interference in the internal affairs of member states, the AU is more channeled 
towards the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations.  
 
Therefore, its activities include peacekeeping operations and its objectives are 
more ambitious than that of the OAU. Its listed objectives include the 
acceleration of political and socio-economic integration, the promotion of 
African common positions, the pursuit of peace and security in Africa and the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights.  
 
The trend is also noticeable in another major regional body in Africa; the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  Initially started in April 
1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), major changes were introduced after its transformation to the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 17 August 1992. 
Under the new scheme the organization focused more on socio-economic, 
political and security cooperation. Also, its structure now includes the Organ 
on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. 
 
The SADC initiative in Zimbabwe, particularly its mediatory role in the 
political conflict between the ruling ZANU PF (led by Robert Mugabe) and 
the opposition MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai) is one of its current initiatives 
in its conflict resolution mechanism. Other examples are its involvement in 
Madagascar and the DRC. It is thus clear that new regionalism in Africa has 
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shifted from mere economic cooperation to multi-dimensional spheres, 
including conflict resolution. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite the 
low level of economic cooperation in West African, ECOWAS has gradually 
added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution to its core activities. 
 
The commencement of ECOWAS’s transformation from a sub-regional 
economic body to a political integrative scheme may be traced to the 
promulgation of the Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty (1976). This 
culminated into the signing of the Non-Aggression Protocol (1978) and the 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) (Aning, 2000:50).   
 
However, scholars have argued that ECOWAS’s conflict management system 
was not a result of the signing of these protocols but was established due to 
ECOWAS’s experimental involvement in the Liberian conflict. This argument 
cannot be totally ignored.  As a result of the involvement of ECOWAS in the 
Liberian conflict, appropriate mechanisms were put in place to effectively 
deal with subsequent conflicts in the West African sub-region.  
 
ECOWAS’s gradual transformation to a sub-regional political and security 
body was immediately faced with two major challenges: the issue of national 
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states. Also, ECOWAS’s intervention in West African conflicts has generated 
arguments relating to the theoretical advantages of such interventions.  
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However, Dennis and Brown (2003:230) listed the following possible 
advantages of the engagement of regional organization in the resolution of 
conflicts in their locality: regional actors are more effective peacekeepers 
because of in-depth understanding of the conflict, a shared history, cultural 
heritage and regional identity convey to regional peacekeepers greater 
acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of combatants civilities and regional 
peacekeepers have strong incentives to foster long term stability because of 
geographical proximity and economic interdependence. Also, a greater 
consensus for action may be obtained among members of regional 
organization than in organizations like the United Nations with its large and 
diverse membership and regional peacekeepers possess more suitable 
equipment and personnel for battlefield conditions.  
 
Dennis and Brown (2003: 230) affirmed that the two empirical questions 
suggested by these theoretical assertions are whether ECOWAS indeed has 
these advantages and whether these advantages were the basis for ECOWAS 
intervention in sub-regional conflicts. In attempt to analyze the above 
questions, they argued that the post-Cold War conditions of interstate conflicts 
requiring peacekeepers are very complex.  ECOWAS may be seen on one 
hand as the most suitable convener of peacekeeping missions in its area, but 
on the other hand as being unprepared and ill equipped to do so.  
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Though proximity of the intervener has some benefits, it could actually 
become a disadvantage when accessed in the context of neutrality. Dennis and 
Brown (2003: 232) have thus avowed that neutrality is generally assumed to 
be a prerequisite for successful conflict resolution. ECOWAS and its 
members’ intimacy and knowledge of the conflict may preclude their 
neutrality in the conflict. Therefore, ECOWAS has been accused in this 
manner by those who argue that ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional 
conflicts was merely a plan by West African power hungry rulers to protect 
the interest of their fellow rulers; with an expectation that their own interest 
and position will be protected as a matter of reciprocity if they faced a similar 
internal upheaval.  
 
The argument about the acceptability of a regional body for peacekeeping and 
conflict resolution due to linguistic and cultural affinity is also not tenable, 
because ECOWAS countries have divergent cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds. Regarding the suitability of regional weapons to effectively deal 
with crises in the area; it is rather the opposite. It is quite clear that ECOWAS 
countries are militarily ill-equipped.  
 
It is a well-known fact that ECOWAS countries do not manufacture these 
weapons and so cannot boast of tailoring them peculiarly to the West African 
terrain. On the contrary, multi-national peacekeeping forces like UN 
peacekeeping missions are better equipped militarily and institutionally to 
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deal with conflicts in the area. However, despite these arguments, the capacity 
and advantages of ECOWAS dealing with conflicts in its sub-region should 
not be ignored.   
 
The school of thought that is unhappy with ECOWAS’s involvement with 
conflict resolution and peacekeeping argues for ECOWAS to concentrate on 
facilitating its economic integration agenda except where there is enough 
evidence to justify its diversion to conflict resolution.  According to Alaba 
(2006:8) regional integration in West Africa is anchored primarily on trade, 
therefore any distraction or diversion from trade related issues is capable of 
impeding the integration process. Also, he lamented that the regional 
integration process is still a challenge because intra-regional trade in West 
Africa remains very low. He asserted that the average intra-regional trade in 
West Africa is approximately 11 percent of trade with non-ECOWAS 
countries. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr Chambas seems to agree 
that ECOWAS’s involvement in political affairs, especially conflict 
resolution, has derailed its agenda for sub-regional economic integration 
(Ankomah and Asante 2005:24). 
 
Despite the necessity to resolve conflicts in the sub-region, ECOWAS’s 
involvement in the wars in Liberia and Sierra as well as other conflicts 
affected its economic integration process. Resources and time were dedicated 
to the resolution of these conflicts. As ECOWAS became gradually free from 
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this problem, its economic integration process began to improve with 
appreciable economic measures.  For example, the ECOWAS revised master 
plan led to the implementation of the 14 priority transmission projects in the 
region under the West African Power Pool (WAPP).  Also, ECOWAS listed 
new measures to accelerate the liberalisation of air transport in West Africa, 
which was followed by the creation of an air transport unit in its Secretariat to 
facilitate intra-regional air links (Ankomah and Asante 2005:24).  
 
4.5 ECOWAS’s initiative in regional integration 
An analysis of policy formation in ECOWAS shows some level of 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as the major pattern of power 
allocation and redistribution. Adebajo and Rashid (2004:75) defined 
supranationalism as the “pattern of interaction between states and 
international institutions that is entrusted with the management of sovereign 
powers in specifically defined areas”. Under supranationalism, decisions are 
taken by a majority voting system and its implementation is supervised by the 
organization; not the state. 
 
The ECOWAS Charter of 28 May 1975 only indicated the facilitation of 
economic cooperation and development without any reference to integration 
or supranational empowerment. However, the revised ECOWAS Charter (July 
1993) broadened its objectives to include integration. Even under the revised 
treaty, the issue of sovereignty was so paramount that there was no direct 
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recourse to supranationalism, except some inferred references regarding a 
possible eventual pooling of resources to the community. Rather the revised 
ECOWAS treaty had an objective that tilt more towards 
intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism as a theory of regional 
integration indicates that member states collectively possess authority in 
regional organizations and decisions are made by bargaining amongst the 
governments of the members.   
 
Chosen representatives and those appointed by the governments have mere 
advisory roles on implementation responsibility.  Unlike neo-functionalism, 
the theory asserts that the pace of integration is controlled by the heads of 
governments.  Also, they reject the argument that supranational organizations 
have equal political influence as the national governments. 
 
Despite the emphasis on intergovernmentalism and the powers of the 
ECOWAS heads of states on major decision making institutions in ECOWAS, 
some level of supranationalism is seen in the independence of the institutions, 
budgetary affairs, the ECOWAS parliament and the Court of Justice. The 
ECOWAS Court of Justice has vital supranational functions and is supposed 
to be independent of ECOWAS institutions and member states. However, on a 
general level, ECOWAS cannot be classified as a supranational organization; 
though policy statements from within and outside the organization indicate a 
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possibility of attaining a supranational status in the future (Adebajo and 
Rashid 2004:76). 
 
 
The poor state of constitutionalism has impacted the state of regional 
integration in West Africa in various ways. Unlike the integration process in 
Europe which was facilitated by the existing culture of shared power, the 
West African system itself makes the possibility of complete supranationalism 
very unlikely except that there is a major change in the current concentration 
of power in the hands of personal rules in the West African countries.  
 
Intergovernmentalism may continuously provide the basic framework for the 
study of regional integration in West Africa due to the jealousy with which 
West African rulers have guarded their power and authority. “Politically, a 
system of governance that is devoid of defined mechanisms and structures of 
representation or participation undermines the kind of consistent political 
commitment and long-term legitimacy that regional integration demands, 
because a change of ruler is sufficient to undermine agreements arrived at by 
his predecessor” (Adewoye 1997: 328). 
 
The role of the private sector is essential in the integration process; however, 
this role has been overshadowed by the emphasis of the powers of ECOWAS 
heads of state in directing the integration process. Unlike ECOWAS, the 
private sector played a major role in European integration. Private trans-
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national enterprises have been instrumental in the unification of European 
economies. Unpredictability and poor contract enforcement measures make 
regional economic ventures in the sub-region risky. The consequent of this is 
that most private enterprises in the region seem to limit their investments to 
within their countries. 
 
According to Adewoye (1997: 329), unavailability of constitutionalist 
underpinnings has affected the economies of West African states in ways that 
have several negative consequences for regional integration. According to 
him, repressive regimes stifle economic and political initiative, because 
repression or coercion saps human energy and creates economic stagnation. 
He said it is not possible to galvanize the population to productive efforts 
under such circumstances, or to inspire people to look beyond the narrow 
confines of the national state. Adewoye (1997:33) also said that a 
constitutionalist framework produces an open society which liberates human 
energy, enhances creativity, and stimulates competition, to the benefit of the 
economy. Therefore, well developed economies are easier to integrate, 
because of larger numbers or availability of easily exchangeable products and 
services, efficient communications, transportation and appreciable levels of 
education.   
 
Though neo-functionalism may provide some insight into the study of 
ECOWAS, it does not provide a good framework for effective analysis, 
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especially as its focus is too Eurocentric. According to Laursen (2008:3), the 
theory of neo-functionalism was primarily developed to explain European 
integration. However, despite Laursen’s assertion, the theory cannot be  
ignored in the West African integration studies due to the central role 
European integration plays in the comprehension and analysis of nascent 
regional integration processes.  
 
It is difficult to exhaustively analyse any regional integration process without 
an in-depth study of the West European integration process, including the 
related theories. This is due to the fact that regional integration started in 
Europe in the early 1950s with the 1952 establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) (Laursen 2008:3). Neo-functional concepts like 
spill-over provide an understanding of the transformation in ECOWAS and 
the changes which necessitated additional integration in new areas.  
 
The theory of neo-functionalism stresses the role of non-state actors like the 
secretariat of the regional organization and related actors in directing the pace 
for further integration. The revised ECOWAS treaty seems to recognize the 
initiative of the ECOWAS Secretariat in leading the integration process. 
However, due to the strong hold of ECOWAS Heads of States on ECOWAS 
and the integration process in West Africa, neo-functionalism may provide 
only a minimal insight into the integration process.  
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However, continuous changes in ECOWAS may lead to a stage when the 
ECOWAS Heads of States may only set the terms of initial agreements of the 
regional integration process in accordance with the suppositions of neo-
functionalists, but will not be determinants of the course and extent of 
subsequent transformation. As explained by Schmitter (2003:3), “regional 
bureaucrats in league with a shifting set of self-organized interests and 
passions seek to exploit the inevitable spill-overs and unintended 
consequences”.  However, most scholars have avoided the possibility of using 
neo-functional thought to analyze nascent regional bodies like ECOWAS, not 
only because it is a theory developed for the study of European integration but 
because it is considered anachronistic (Schmitter, 2003:3).   
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
The emergence of ECOWAS provided the first major economic integration 
between the Francophone and Anglophone blocks in West Africa. The 
complexities between the two blocks are the direct consequence of colonial 
heritage. West African leaders saw the need to overcome colonial ties and 
facilitate inter-regional economic activities as a major means by which most 
of the countries in the region can overcome the constraints to their economic 
growth, which seems to be the consequence of their small size and limited 
capital. The emergence of ECOWAS provided the right integration tool for 
escaping the colonial trade pattern, which the West African states were 
trapped into.  
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It has become a common trend for regional and sub-regional organizations 
that commenced as regional economic bodies to transform to include political 
and security issues. A good example is the European Union which 
commenced in the 1950s as an economic body called European Economic 
Community (EEC) and later transformed to a political and security 
organization called the European Union (EU) after the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1993. The major regional body in Africa has also experienced this 
phenomenon by transforming from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
to the African Union (AU), which now extends its activities to include 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite the slow 
pace of economic growth among West African countries, ECOWAS has 
gradually added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict resolution to its core 
activities. 
 
Several regional integration theories provide appreciable building blocks for 
the comprehension of the integration process in West Africa.  However, 
intergovernmentalism seems to provide the basic framework for the study of 
regional integration in the sub-region while neo-functionalism provides some 
vital tools for the study.  Most scholars have avoided the possibility of using 
neo-functional thought to analyze nascent regional bodies like ECOWAS, not 
only because it is a theory developed for the study of European integration but 
because it is considered anachronistic. However, neo-functionalism identifies 
basic building blocks for any valid theory of regional integration. Therefore, 
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rather than discard the theory, it is essential to examine how it helps in the 
analysis of the integration process in the sub-region. 
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Chapter Five 
 
ECOWAS’s approach to conflict resolution. 
 
5.0 Introduction.  
The initiative of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in Liberia in the early 1990s was the first serious effort by an 
African sub-regional organization to deal with a major conflict through its 
defense forces, logistics and funding. The ECOWAS initiative is therefore a 
major reference case for regional security in the post–Cold War period. Also, 
it shows a clear interest and willingness by Africa states to proffer a solution 
to their conflicts. The Liberian mission was an experiment that was 
subsequently applied to Sierra Leone and other conflicts in West Africa. The 
action of ECOWAS in this regard is consistent with Article 52(2) of the UN 
Charter, which mandates regional organizations to settle disputes in their area. 
Article 53 (1) also urges the Security Council to utilize regional bodies to 
enforce actions under its authority, subject to their prior authorization 
(Adebajo 2002c:15). 
 
The ECOWAS Treaty (1975) did not make provision for political and security 
integration, however, the need for peace and security throughout the sub-
region as a precondition for regional integration was clearly evident. The 
climax of the shift of focus from mere economic integration to security 
cooperation was the Liberian conflict and the creation of the ECOWAS 
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mediation mechanism for regional disputes. The Liberian conflict became a 
wake-up call for West African leaders to look beyond mere economic 
integration. The first step taken was the ECOWAS Peace Initiative which was 
aimed at stopping the carnage in Liberia, as well as the need to restore peace 
and to initiate an electoral process. Though the ECOWAS Peace Initiative was 
aimed at dealing with a single conflict situation and was not necessary focused 
on future conflicts, the impact of the conflict on the sub-region necessitated 
the establishment of the mechanism to deal with future conflicts (Bundu 
1997:40). 
 
The earlier mechanisms like the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (1981) contributed to the initiation 
of security cooperation in the sub-region, however, the extent of the needed 
security cooperation was not clear enough, prior to the Liberian conflict. One 
of the major lessons of the Liberian conflict was the need for an enhanced 
security arrangement that would facilitate sub-regional peace and security 
(Bundus 1997:41).  The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State (1991) 
acknowledged the fact that the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) was deficient; 
therefore, a Committee of Eminent Persons was created to identify the 
solution to this deficiency and make recommendations for its revision.  The 
focus of the committee was to include regional peace and security, regional 
economic integration, institutional matters, political cooperation, and the 
financing of the regional integration process (Bundu 1997:43). 
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However, it is vital to clarify that; despite the inclination of the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression to the OAU’s concept of non-interference in states’ internal 
affairs, there was some level of  collective security as provided by the 
Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). The PMAD 
provided for  collective intervention when necessary to defend the territorial 
integrity of a threatened member state, but most member states were initially 
unwilling to partake in such interventions.  
 
The major reason for ECOWAS involvement in sub-regional conflict 
resolution is perhaps the realization that economic integration is not possible 
in a conflict situation, especially as the effect of these internal conflicts spread 
across borders. Therefore, the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981) provided the fundamental 
way forward that led to the signing of the Protocol on the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (17 
December, 1999). This protocol provided the major framework for the 
addition of security and political cooperation to its economic integration 
agenda.   
 
The Protocol provided for the establishment of six organs: the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government; the Mediation and Security Council, a heads 
of state level body made up of nine member states that is empowered to take 
emergency decisions and a 15-member Council of Elders (now the Council of 
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the Wise), bringing together one eminent senior West African from each state 
to mediate and reconcile warring parties as well as an observation and 
monitoring system known as ECOWARN to provide early warning of 
impending crises, made up of a Regional Observation and Monitoring Centre 
at ECOWAS headquarters and four observation nodes in The Gambia, Benin, 
Liberia and Burkina Faso; a standby ECOMOG peacekeeping force made up 
of military and civilian national contingents ready to deploy at short notice 
and the Defence and Security Commission made up of national chiefs of staff, 
security and other relevant experts, to provide technical advice. (Toure and 
Okae, Website). 
 
The West African sub-region has witnessed a series of intra-state conflicts, 
especially during the post-Cold War period. Though most of these conflicts 
are intra-state conflicts, their impact are rapidly felt in surrounding countries 
as well as other West African countries. A causative analysis of these conflicts 
shows they are the consequences of political rivalry, control over natural 
resources, disenfranchisement and limited socio-economic opportunities.  
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played an 
unprecedented role in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa. However, 
ECOWAS’s approach to conflict resolution and its military intervention has 
been criticized due to the question about its mandate and competence. 
ECOWAS’s action is perhaps justified by the Pan-African argument regarding 
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an African approach to African conflicts. Also, ECOWAS’s action may be 
justified by the school of thought which asserts that regional bodies are more 
properly positioned than other multilateral bodies to resolve conflicts in their 
own area. 
 
 5.1 Justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in intrastate 
conflicts. 
 
The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts is drawn 
from various foundations and legal documents of its own, the African Union, 
and the United Nations. The ECOWAS Treaty of 28 May 1975, which 
declared the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance and non-aggression, 
provided the general framework for ECOWAS’s activities. Based upon this 
principle, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) which 
was followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense. These 
documents provided the background upon which the organization evolved its 
mechanism for conflict resolution. 
 
The organization has over the years provided various frameworks for peace 
building to prevent both intra- and inter-state conflicts. The Protocol on Free 
Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment (1979) 
creates a borderless region to facilitate the movement and settlement, as well 
as citizenship within the Community.  Most intra-state conflicts in Africa are 
caused or worsened by human rights violations, injustice and political 
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oppression. Therefore, the Declaration of Political Principles (1981) provided 
for member states to guarantee fundamental human rights, individual freedom, 
the rule of law, and responsive and responsible governance to their citizens 
(ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 2008). 
 
However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution initiative effectively drew its 
mandate from the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24th July, 1993. The revised 
treaty focused on the promotion of co-operation and integration in furtherance 
of its objective of creating an economic union in West Africa. Therefore, 
justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts may be 
derived from its revised treaty and not its original treaty. Article 58 of the 
revised treaty looks at sub-regional security arrangements and includes an 
undertaking by its members to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive 
to the maintenance of peace, stability and security. Paragraph 2 of Article 58 
provides for the reinforcement of the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the 
timely prevention and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts.  
This study indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to work 
together to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance 
of peace, stability and security within the region. It indicates that ECOWAS 
member states have undertaken to establish and strengthen appropriate 
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra- and inter-state 
conflicts, paying particular regard to the need to maintain periodic and regular 
consultations between national border administration authorities; establish 
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local or national joint commissions to examine any problems encountered in 
relations between neighbouring states; encourage exchanges and cooperation 
between communities, townships and administrative regions; organize 
meetings between relevant ministries on various aspects of inter-state 
relations; employ, where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, meditation  
and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes; establish a regional 
peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where 
appropriate and provide, where necessary and at the request of member states, 
assistance to member states for the observation of democratic elections 
(Revised ECOWAS Treaty, 1993) 
The 31 October 1998 declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, 
Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons is a clear indication of the 
focus of ECOWAS leaders to minimize sub-regional conflicts through 
preventive disarmament. In June 2006, this Moratorium became a binding 
instrument, called the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their 
Ammunition and other Related Materials. However, the most inclusive 
framework for permanently dealing with sub-regional threats to peace and 
security is perhaps the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted on the 10
th
 
December 1999. 
The Protocol provides for the facilitation of ECOWAS’s conflict prevention 
capabilities, speedy resolution of conflicts, and post-conflict reconstruction.  It 
also commits the states to the maintenance of peace and security by promoting 
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the principles of separation of powers, good governance, the promotion of 
non-partisan and responsible press,  respect for the rule of law, democratic 
control of the armed forces and independence of the judiciary.  
 
ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional conflicts is justifiable in terms of 
Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter which provides a 
role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and 
security, which can be inferred to include conflict management. Article 52 
calls for regional organizations to facilitate the settlement of disputes in their 
locality (Ghali, 1992, website).  This ECOWAS initiative is similar to the 
Constitutive Act of the Africa Union (Article 4h), which lists the right of 
intervention in a member state to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity. However, the likelihood of the member states accepting the 
intervention principle is due mainly to the fear of state failure which may lead 
to severe humanitarian crises. (Thakur 2006:271-272). 
 
It is affirmed by most scholars that despite the legal challenges of such 
interventions, they are justifiable because such regional bodies are more 
acquainted with the problems, characteristics and nature of the conflicts in 
their area. Therefore, they are more prone to understanding the parties to the 
conflict and their conflicting demands. Based upon this argument, it may be 
assumed that ECOWAS is better positioned to proffer a lasting solution to the 
conflicts in West Africa (Northedge and Donelan, 1971:245). In terms of the 
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Charter Chapter VIII any action taken by a regional body must in any case be 
reported to the UN Security Council as soon as possible and the Council can 
decide that the region must continue or to take itself control of the situation. 
Nowadays the AU Peace and Security Council also play an important part in 
the process and no regional organisation in Africa will be allowed to act 
unilaterally. 
ECOWAS has received assistance, encouragement and implied authority to 
engage in sub-regional conflict resolution from the Organization of African 
Unity and its successor, the African Union.  Despite the fact that the OAU was 
slow and inactive in conflict resolution, the declaration on the establishment, 
within the OAU, of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution was adopted by the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 
30 June 1993 (African Union, 2010). 
 
As the perennial situation of recurring conflicts continued, African leaders 
began to envisage a more active role in conflict resolution. During preparation 
for the transformation from the OAU to the AU, decision was adopted by the 
37
th
 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and 
Government, held in Lusaka, Zambia from 9 to 11 July 2001, to strengthen 
and incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, in 
accordance with Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
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The emergence of the AU came with a series of changes including a more 
active role in conflict resolution. The AU showed its commitment to conflict 
resolution by the adoption on 9
th
 July 2002 of its Protocol relating to the 
establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as the 
substitute for the OAU Mechanism, which is to serve as a standing decision 
making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The 
Peace and Security Council was created to provide collective security and 
early-warning arrangements to facilitate timely and efficient response to 
conflict and crisis situations in Africa (African Union, 2010). 
The African Union, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations have 
intensified their level of cooperation in the promotion of peace and security in 
Africa (Berman and Sams 2000:148). This cooperation has encouraged sub-
regional bodies like ECOWAS to respond to conflicts in their sub-region. 
Therefore, the emergence of the African Union to replace the OAU has set the 
pace for a new level of cooperation in Africa.  
Unlike the epoch of the OAU which was characterized by inter-group 
conflicts, the level of integration seems to have intensified and the poor level 
of cooperation between the OAU and sub-regional African organizations has 
abated. Unlike the OAU, the AU has actively promoted and supported sub-
regional efforts in conflict resolution, resulting in an appreciable level of 
progress in the ability of African regional organizations to resolve their own 
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conflict. This is evident in the effort of ECOWAS in the resolution of sub-
regional conflicts.  Also, the AU has provided a worthy example in this regard 
through its African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (Franke 2007, website).  
 
5.2 Multilateralism and Regionalism: ECOWAS - UN 
relationship in conflict resolution.  
The emergence of ECOWAS as a major peacekeeper in West Africa was 
necessitated by several factors, including the over stretched effort of the UN 
in Africa. Nascent UN operations have intensified due to the vast cases of 
intra-state conflicts in Africa with countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Namibia, 
Western Sahara, Angola and Mozambique experiencing some form of UN 
peacekeeping presence.   
Also, peacekeeping in Africa saw a trend where peacekeepers were no longer 
seen as been neutral but additional parties to the existing conflicts. UN 
peacekeepers were forced to withdraw from Somalia following the killing of 
18 American soldiers as well as 1,000 Somalis in October 1993. The UN 
became reluctant about additional UN military intervention in Africa.  For 
example, the UN Security Council did not respond to calls from the 
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda - UNAMIR) to strengthen their mandate and capacity during the 
genocide of 1994.  
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This situation contributed to the decision by ECOWAS and other regional 
bodies to adopt a regional approach to peacekeeping and to intervene in 
conflicts in their areas. ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia became the first 
major attempt by a sub-regional organization in Africa to manage conflict 
using regional resources and regional troops. Though the UN later 
supplemented the ECOWAS effort by sending troops to the area, it became a 
major turning point in UN-ECOWAS cooperation in conflict management, 
especially as ECOWAS is clearly credited for laying the foundation in Liberia 
that was eventually built upon by the UN.  
This first experimental mission was later followed by additional ECOWAS 
interventions in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 1999 and Guinea-Bissau 
between February and May 1999. This immediately provided a new status for 
ECOWAS, especially as previous peacekeeping experiences in Africa were 
UN operations and there was an assumption that the UN had the monopoly 
over peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS intervention in intra-state conflicts 
demonstrated both the positive and negative lessons of sub-regional security 
organizations. It exhibited the advantage of an indebt understanding of the 
complex dynamics of the sub-regions; but it also exhibits the disadvantage of 
the pursuit of parochial and self-interested goals due to partisanship and a lack 
of neutrality of member states (Adebajo 2002a:16). 
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The old perception about multilateral and regional relationships in security 
matters was that the UN assumes a position of dominance and delegates 
responsibilities to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS, SADC, 
AU, ASEAN etc. This treats the regional body as a mere intermediate actor 
that undertakes tasks and that follows decisions by the UN. This perception is 
both a reflection of the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII and the reality of many 
peacekeeping operations. The AU/UN hybrid force in Darfur is one of the 
interesting new developments in this respect. 
This school of thought seems to think that regional organizations only 
contribute to a multilateral system led by the UN Security Council.  Hettne 
and Söderbaum (2006) said this approach ignores the fact that a UN-led 
approach and regional security governance have the tendency to follow 
divergent logics. Consequently, they are potentially competing structures 
especially as the UN model is based on a Westphalia nation state logic, while 
the regional approach tends more towards a post-Westphalia world order.  
 
The dominant role of the UN in conflict resolution may be understandable in 
the era of old regionalism. However, under the epoch of new regionalism, 
ECOWAS and several other regional organizations have become actors in 
their own right. During the first attempt of ECOWAS in the resolution of 
regional conflicts, there was a debate amongst West African leaders regarding 
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the legitimacy of such military actions without a mandate from the UN 
Security Council.  
However, it was eventually resolved that ECOWAS as a regional organization 
has the authority to initiate and implement measures necessary to resolve 
conflicts within its sub-region.  Apart from ECOWAS, this trend has also been 
noted in several other regional bodies like the European Union (EU), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  
These regional bodies have not only experimented with conflict resolution but 
have institutionalized the concept by developing the mechanism for conflict 
management in their area.  “This complexity is not likely to decrease in the 
future. The greater "actor-ness" of regional bodies needs to be recognized. It is 
more realistic to think of the relationship between multilateralism and 
regionalism in more horizontal and reciprocal terms, compared to the 
orthodox approach where regional agencies are subordinated to the UN 
Security Council”  (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2006:277). 
Boutros-Ghali (1992) said regional organizations should be involved in 
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making, and post conflict 
reconstruction. From 1992 to 2005 the UN convened six high level meetings 
with most regional organizations that are involved with the resolution of 
conflicts.  In 2005 Koffi Annan demanded for complementary roles by the UN 
and regional organizations in dealing with the challenges to peace and 
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security.  Also, the UN Secretary General’s panel on threats, challenges and 
change acknowledged in its report of 2004 that regional organizations have 
contributed to the security and stability of their members.  The panel advised  
the Security Council to facilitate regional bodies to be more involved with the 
resolution of conflicts in their region in accordance with chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter (Thakur, 2006:1-3).  
New regionalism studies does not content to the orthodox approach which is 
Westphalian in context and outlook. This is due to the fact that it emphasizes 
how regional organizations like ECOWAS can contribute or facilitate the UN 
system and UN Charter. The primary approach of this argument is that 
regional security operations cannot be executed outside of a UN framework. It 
seems to infer that the UN Charter authorizes regional bodies to undertake 
non-military dispute settlement as well as conflict prevention; however, it 
narrows such activities to be subject to the approval and oversight of the UN 
Security Council. Though the assumption that the UN has monopoly over 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution may be erroneous; it is not feasible for 
regional bodies to intervene in the internal conflicts of their member states 
without the approval of the UN Security Council (UN Charter, Chapter VIII). 
 
Thakur (2006:65) affirmed that regional bodies have brought new ideas into 
multilateralism and are able to fill some of the gaps left by the UN. Therefore, 
the UN should not see these organizations as merely depending on it for 
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guidance and direction, but as new entrants capable of dealing with issues the 
UN may have failed to deal with or delayed to tackle.  ECOWAS’s response 
to West African conflicts should therefore be seen as a complementary role in 
global peace and security, but not necessarily a role played in support of the 
UN approach. For example, there are instances where the UN was accused of 
inaction or delayed response; the emergence of regional bodies is thus 
necessary to deal with these challenges. In 1994, the UN was criticized for its 
failure to act during the Rwandan genocide . Also, the former UN Secretary 
General, Boutros Ghali was criticized for his inability to muster support in the 
UN for intervention in the perennial Angolan civil war.  
In the view of Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:228), the current state of world 
politics is not suitable for this idealized hierarchical order, where the UN is 
perceived as being positioned in a higher realm, while regional bodies are 
perceived as mere intermediaries that connect the UN. They see such orthodox 
approach as outdated and argue that new regionalism adopts a level of 
legitimacy of different regional actors, which differed from the ideals of old 
regionalism.  
 They further stated that the UN does not provide mandate for the regional 
organizations; they receive their mandate from their member states. Also, they 
observed that contemporary changes in the international arena reveal an 
increasing relevance of regions in the global security architecture. “The 
ultimate outcome may be a regional multilateralism built around regional 
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bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the EU, as opposed to an "orthodox 
multilateralism" centred on the UN, with nation-states as the basic units. 
Regional multilateralism expresses the ambition of groups of states to control 
the global environment by pooling their sovereignties according to a post-
Westphalian logic, rather than relying on the one state-one vote procedure in 
the UN General Assembly or the undemocratic plurilateralism ("false 
multilateralism") of the UN Security Council” (Hettne and Söderbaum 
2006:277).  
The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as 
facilitation of global security and not a confrontation against multilateralism. 
Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and 
even when available, the deployment takes a long time. ECOWAS’s initiative 
in its sub-region is more relevant than a UN led approach in the emerging 
global security context.  Many scholars (Lavergne 1997, Adebajo 2002, 
Adekeye and Rashid 2004) affirmed the impotence of regional solutions in 
domestic conflicts; therefore, ECOWAS’s initiative in the sub-region is a 
clear evidence of this fact.  However, it should be noted that in some instances 
the regional organisations do not have the means to respond quickly and 
effectively. In the case of Mali in 2013 for example, the French had to assist 
as ECOWAS required a longer time to muster personnel and resources for the 
task. Other examples includes the Gbagbo situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the crisis 
in Darfur where the AU response was yielding only minimal results until the 
201 
 
UN came-in to supplement the AU effort, and the DRC conflict where no 
African formation had the required capacity to deal with the situation. 
 
Generally, there is no doubt that a regional approach in a post-Cold War world 
has proved to be more efficient than multilateral mechanisms.  The ECOWAS 
and UN approaches can potentially be competing for authority; however, it is 
not advisable for ECOWAS to see itself as rival to the UN despite its 
unilateral effort in conflict resolution. ECOWAS’s conflict management 
mechanism has recognized the importance of its relationship with the UN and 
its continuous cooperation with the UN on issues affecting the sub-region.  
 
ECOWAS and the UN need each other and must assume shared responsibility 
for resolving security problems. The UN has a series of intra state conflicts as 
well as other threats to global security and needs the support of regional 
bodies like ECOWAS to manage problems affecting their region.  On the 
other hand, ECOWAS needs the continuous support and partnership of the 
UN to effectively operate. 
  The era of regionalism and that of new regionalism implies that multilateral 
and regional positions in conflict resolution differ depending on the period 
under consideration. According to Hettne and Söderbaum (2006:228), the 
principle of genuinely shared responsibility is in contrast to the orthodox 
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approach where the UN vertically delegates authority to regional bodies. They 
observed it is impossible for the UN to continue to maintain primacy if 
regionalism continues to deepen and strengthen around the world. According 
to them, a UN based on nation states is not well suited to control strong 
regions. Also, they argued that the progress and strength of regionalism entails 
that regions will gradually and increasingly manage their own conflicts.  
 
5.3 The role of ECOWAS in conflict prevention. 
Conflict prevention has been defined by Carment and Schnabel (2003:11) as a 
medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken 
by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions 
for a stable and more predictable international security environment.  Conflict 
prevention has been a major subject in international affairs for a long time; 
however, the previous focus was the prevention of inter-state conflict.  
The post-Cold War era witnessed a series of intra-states conflicts with vast 
humanitarian implications, which compelled the international community to 
evolve strategies through multilateral and regional bodies to prevent intra-
state conflicts. The publication of the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention 
of Deadly Conflicts (1999) examined international actions and identified 
conflict prevention as including actions or policies to: 1) prevent the 
emergence of violent conflict and identify non-violent means of resolving the 
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tensions; 2) stop ongoing conflicts from spreading; and deter the re-emergence 
of violence.  
The report classified conflict prevention into operational prevention or direct 
prevention and structural prevention or root causes prevention. The 
publication indicates that operational prevention is the immediate measures 
taken to deal with the conflict. This includes the sending of diplomatic 
missions to mediate between parties, immediate economic sanctions and 
demobilizing fighting units. It also includes the deployment of peace keepers 
to the area to enforce or supervise peace agreements. The report indicated that 
structural prevention or root causes prevention relates to dealing with the root 
causes of the conflict. The root causes of the conflict could be poverty, 
political repression or uneven distribution of resources. Long term measures 
to prevent such conflicts will require addressing the above problems. (Naraghi 
and Stanski, 2009, website).   
 
ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive sub-regional conflict prevention 
framework to guide the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of 
conflict prevention initiatives. This is based on the realization that preventing 
conflicts is an integral part of regional integration and development.  
ECOWAS member states have witnessed a series of intra-state armed 
conflicts and civil unrest in West Africa, causing severe humanitarian 
problems and large scale displacement of persons.  
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Most of these conflicts are the consequence of poverty, bad governance and 
weak states. The impact of the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte 
d’Ivoire have severely affected most West African countries in several ways, 
including the mass exodus of refugees to countries already suffering from 
poor economic and infrastructural development. To deal with this vicious 
situation, ECOWAS member states agreed on the development of a viable 
structure for deterring, mitigating and preventing a resurgence of violence 
(Ekiyor, 2008:3-4). 
The ECOWAS approach to conflict prevention is promoted by activities 
which are designed to facilitate peace building and reduce tension as well as 
to prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence. 
ECOWAS’s preventive strategies are based upon operational prevention, 
which entails measures applicable during a conflict situation and structural 
prevention which entails measures put in place to prevent the emergence of a 
conflict situation or the re-occurrence of a resolved conflict.  
 
The major objectives of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework are the 
following: to enhance the conceptual basis for conflict prevention; 
mainstreaming conflict prevention into ECOWAS’ policies and programmes 
as an operational mechanism; strengthening capacity within ECOWAS to 
pursue concrete and integrated conflict prevention and peace‐building 
initiatives using existing resources, such as the departments of the 
Commission; the Early Warning System; organs of the Commission, including 
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the Council of the Wise and Special Mediators; and other ECOWAS 
institutions. Strengthening awareness, capacity and anticipation within 
member‐states and civil society as principal constituencies and actors in 
conflict prevention and peace‐building and increasing understanding of 
opportunities, tools and resources related to conflict prevention and 
peace‐building at technical and political levels.  
 
Also, extending opportunities for conflict prevention to post‐conflict 
environments by means of targeted restructuring of political governance, 
conflict‐sensitive reconstruction, development and other peace‐building 
initiatives;nhancing ECOWAS’s anticipation and planning capabilities in 
relation to regional tensions; generating a more pro‐active and operational 
conflict prevention posture from member‐states and the ECOWAS system; 
and increasing awareness and preparedness for collaborative ventures between 
ECOWAS, member states, civil society and external constituencies (RECs, 
AU, EU, UN, IFIs and development/humanitarian agencies) in pursuit of 
conflict prevention and peace building (Ekiyor, 2008:7).   
 
5.3.1 ECOWAS Early Warning system 
Conflict prevention cannot be effective without an early warning system.  
ECOWAS has developed an early warning component which provides 
preventive response options to policy makers and sets the objective to furnish 
incident and trend reports on peace and security. The ECOWAS early warning 
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system as analysed in the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework is aimed 
at ensuring predictability. It provides the vital information for timely 
interventions to avert, defuse or creatively transform acute situations of 
conflict.  
Though ECOWAS should be applauded for its ability to develop an early 
warning system, this  system should be strengthened to focus more on issues 
like human rights abuse, state failure, international displaced persons, refugee 
flows, food crises and uncontrolled inflow of arms. This is due to the fact that 
these issues have played a significant role in the outbreak of violence in the 
sub-continent.  
 
The ECOWAS security protocol (1999) provided for the establishment of an 
Observation and Monitoring Center in the ECOWAS secretariat.  The 
protocol also established a peace and security observation mechanism and an 
early warning system to effective deal with sub-regional conflicts. Apart from 
the Secretariat, the early warning system has four observation centers in 
Banjul (to cover Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal), Cotonou 
(to cover Benin, Nigeria and Togo), Monrovia (to cover Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone) and Ouagadougou (to cover Burkina Faso, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger).  The main task of these early warning centers is to 
regularly assess security situations like arms flows and civil-military relations 
as well as the environmental, political, economic and social conditions in the 
sub-region.  A Nigerian based institute, The African Strategic and Peace 
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Research Group (AFSTRAG), is engaged by ECOWAS to further develop its 
early warning system in line with the constant changes in the sub-region 
(Adebajo 2002a:150). 
5.3.2 ECOWAS’s initiative in preventive diplomacy  
ECOWAS’s preventive diplomacy initiative is based upon the provisions of 
Article 58 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty and Article 36 of the 
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It is aimed at 
the use of preventive diplomatic actions to defuse tensions and ensure the 
peaceful resolution of disputes within and between member states. The 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework states that preventive diplomacy 
will utilize good offices, mediation, conciliation and facilitation based on 
dialogue, negotiation and arbitration to resolve conflicts. Under the ECOWAS 
initiative in preventive diplomacy, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security 
Council will appoint an eminent personality of a high-level position to deal 
with intra- or inter-state conflicts within or between member states.  
 
The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is a three-tier, nine-
member group, elected for a two-year renewable term. The MSC is mandated 
to make decisions on peace and security and by virtue of its authority; it is 
responsible for the authorization of all forms of interventions. It comprises of 
the Committee of Ambassadors (meets monthly); the Committee of Ministers 
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of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Security (meets quarterly) and the 
Heads of State of the Council (meets twice a year) (Articles 8-14). 
 
The use of preventive diplomacy in conflict prevention is one of the 
approaches of the United Nations which has been adopted by ECOWAS. 
Lund (1999:6) traced the coinage of the term “preventive diplomacy” to the 
former United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960.   
Hammarskjöld first used the phrase with reference to the Cold War context 
regarding the United Nations’ effort to keep localized international disputes 
from provoking larger confrontations between the superpowers. Preventive 
diplomacy as a concept remains vital due to the fact that no one can accurately 
predict the extent to which any particular conflict may stretch. Therefore, 
Hamilton and Longhorne (1995:224) stated that preventive diplomacy “has 
become a prerequisite for the fashioning of a new world order”.   
 
ECOWAS’s conflict prevention mechanism affirms the need for the 
utilization of diplomatic and other peaceful means for the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. Former Nigerian President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo played a key role on behalf of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN in the 
utilization of the principles of preventive diplomacy for the resolution of 
conflicts in West Africa. Mr. Obasango’s mission to Togo (2005) contributed 
to the resolution of the emerging political crisis.  After the death of President 
Gnassingbe Eyadema (February 5, 2005), his son (Faure Gnassingbe) with  
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the support of the military was surprisingly sworn-in as the new President. A 
potential crisis was developing as this act was opposed by most key Togolese 
elites. Consequently, sub-regional leaders demanded that the constitution of 
Togo be upheld. The intervention by ECOWAS through its negotiations 
necessitated the late President’s son to step down and to conduct presidential 
elections. 
 Another example of preventive diplomacy was the fact that ECOWAS 
succeeded in preventing the escalation of the 1999 Liberian conflict. A 
rebellion against President Charles Taylor began in 1999 in the northern part 
of Liberia, led by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD). As the situation continued to deteriorate, with several fatalities, 
ECOWAS-led negotiations facilitated Taylor’s resignation and relocation to 
Nigeria to prevent further bloodshed. The diplomatic position taken by 
ECOWAS facilitated the return of peace to the country and the 
implementation of the Accra Accord (2003) as well as the emergence of Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf (2005) as the first female president in Africa (Eme 2011, 
website). 
 
5.3.3 ECOWAS’s strategy for conflict prevention 
Apart from early warning and preventive diplomacy, the ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework (ECPF) provides several fundamental components for 
the prevention of conflict in West Africa. The ECPF has identified democracy 
and political governance as one of the bases for peace and security. The 
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framework indicates that the creation of space and conditions for fair and 
equitable distribution and exercise of power and the establishment and 
reinforcement of governance institutions is a prerequisite for peace and 
security. It has thus called for the active participation of all citizens in the 
political life of member states under common democratic, human rights and 
constitutional principles as articulated in the ECOWAS Protocols, the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the NEPAD principles and other 
international instruments.  
 
Under the ECPF, gender affairs as well as youth empowerment are recognized 
as being vital in facilitating the satiability of ECOWAS member states. Also, 
it indicates human rights and the rule of law, the media, natural resource 
governance, cross-border initiatives, security governance and practical 
disarmament as being imperative for sub-regional security.   ECOWAS has 
established a Standby Force to deal with emerging conflicts on a timely basis.  
The organization has identified humanitarian assistance and peace education 
as essential components in strengthening human security and peace building.  
 
However, the challenges of ECOWAS’s conflict prevention mechanism are 
the conversion of the ECPF principles into real action. ECOWAS’s success in 
conflict prevention will not be determined by the robust nature of the ECPF 
document but by the translation of the framework into actual eradication of 
the perennial conflict situations in West Africa.  Ekiyor (2008:13) applauded 
211 
 
the preparation of this framework and argued that ECOWAS should be 
commended for attempting to address conflict prevention because it is an 
arduous task.  
 
5.4 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in West Africa 
ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operations effectively commenced with its mission 
in Liberia, however, the framework for its involvement in peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement developed over a long period of time. This is traceable 
right from its adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) which was 
aimed at facilitating security and defence cooperation as well as enhancing 
peace among its members. Though the Protocol on Non-Aggression was vital 
for enhancing security cooperation, it was not sufficient for dealing with the 
major security challenges facing the community. Therefore, the Protocol 
relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) was created to provide the 
mechanism for a combined military action during a major threat to sub-
regional security (Frempong 2003:6). 
 
The Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (Articles 2 and 3) adopted the 
principles of collective security and collective defence. It declared (Article 2) 
that a threat against a member state will be considered a threat against the 
entire community. Also, the protocol (Article 13) provided for an Allied 
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Armed Forces of the community to be provided by units from the defence 
forces of member states during emergencies. Unlike NATO, ECOWAS does 
not have a standby army. The Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence only 
provided for voluntary contributions by national forces during emergencies. 
This has proven to be a major challenge getting the member states to comply 
with the requirement of this protocol. During the Liberian crisis, the bulk of 
the forces were provided by Nigeria as some of the members did not provide 
forces initially or provided only few personnel (Frempong 2003:7-8). Also, 
this trend was visible during the recent crisis in Mali. Though, ECOWAS 
member states agreed in principle to deploy peacekeeping troops to Mali, the 
time required for the mobilization of the troops from the various member 
states was forecasted to be up to a six months period. Consequently, the 
French came to the rescue; which has raised questions about ECOWAS’s 
position to respond on a timely basis to conflicts in the sub-region.  
 
At the outbreak of the Liberian civil war, the only available reference 
materials for ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operation were the Protocol on Non-
Aggression (1978) and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense 
(1981). The practical situation of its effort in Liberia revealed the inadequacy 
of ECOWAS’s preparedness for peacekeeping operations, especially as its 
Treaty (1975) did not envisage such a  situation. Therefore, the ECOWAS 
Revised Treaty (1993), which dealt with the new challenges, was adopted. 
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Under the revised Treaty, the two existing protocols on defence matters were 
reviewed and made operational to handle the defense cooperation program 
and to ensure regional peace and security (Bundu 1997:44-45). 
 
Though ECOWAS’s peacekeeping operation is a nascent phenomenon, 
peacekeeping operations in Africa can be traced as far back as the1960 
establishment of a United Nations peace keeping mission in Congo following 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 143 of July 14, 1960.  
Contrary to the general perception that peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
are the responsibility  of the United Nations, ECOWAS emerged as the major 
peacekeeping body in West Africa following its experimental mission in 
Liberia, which was later extended to Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.   
 
The post-Cold War period is significant in the study of peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement in West Africa because of the changes in types and nature 
of conflicts in the sub-region within this period. Generally, the post-Cold War 
period has seen the emergence of new literature on the concept of 
peacekeeping, including new classifications. This includes classification by 
“functions and tasks, as done by Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James 
Wall – observation, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, preventive 
deployment, interposition, pacification, collective enforcement, etc” (Thakur 
and Schnabe 2001:9). The major problem with this type of classification is 
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due to the fact that different functions may be executed by any one operation, 
and functions of the same operation may subsequently change over time.  
 
One of the major challenges of ECOWAS’s military mission has been the 
absence of a clear mandate and the fact that the operations were difficult to 
define. ECOWAS’s military missions oscillated between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement, raising questions about the mandate of the mission. 
However, the nature of the conflicts (in Liberia and Sierra Leone) required 
ECOWAS to adopt both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement strategies at 
different stages of the conflict. Peace enforcement will not be possible without 
the peace enforcer having the capacity and might to induce compliance. 
ECOWAS has exhibited both the characters of a peacekeeper and an enforcer. 
Also its knowledge of the area gives a certain advantage over any outside 
intervener that may not be knowledgeable of the political, economic, social 
and cultural dynamics of the area (Kieh, 2002:17). 
 
5.4.1 ECOWAS’s Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
In this section the involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia is discussed. The 
intention is not to discuss the Liberian intervention in detail but the purpose is 
to demonstrate the regional nature of the operation; the fact that ECOWAS 
became involved as a regional organisation and how it acted collectively.   
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The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established 
during the 13th ECOWAS Summit in Banjul, the Gambia (6–7 August 1990) 
and mandated to intervene militarily to facilitate a ceasefire agreement 
between the parties in the Liberian conflict. The crisis in Liberia was deeply 
rooted in a long existing political and socio-economic discontent which 
manifested initially in riots, including the rice riots (1979) and later resulting 
in the emergence of Samuel Doe (1980) following a military coup (Reno 
1999:102-103).   
 
This situation developed into a major conflict in 1989 following an 
insurrection by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
which sought to overthrow President Samuel Doe. Following the assassination 
of President Doe (September 9, 1990), the NPFL controlled about ninety 
percent of the entire country. However, the situation became more complex 
with several new entrants into the conflict, including the 1991 entry of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the formation of the United Liberation 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) in 1996 as well as other 
factions that emerged from the NPFL (Adebajo 2002b:42-52). 
 
The emergence of ECOMOG and its military intervention in sub-regional 
conflicts was an unprecedented action by an African regional organization. 
During the formation and tasking of ECOMOG, ECOWAS leaders observed 
that the conflict in Liberia has led to the massive destruction of lives and 
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properties, particularly; it has caused the massacre of thousands of innocent 
civilians, including foreign nationals, women and children. They also argued 
that the conflict has trapped thousands of ECOWAS citizens and other foreign 
nationals without any means of escape or protection.  They also declared that 
the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was imperative due to the fact that the 
Liberian government was unable to deal with the situation in the country, 
creating a mass exodus of traumatized Liberian refugees to other West 
African countries. Therefore, on 25 August 1990 about 3,000 ECOMOG 
forces arrived in Liberia to commence a historical operation that launched 
ECOWAS into a sub-regional peace keeping body (Khobe, 2000:97). 
 
ECOMOG operations comprise three main methods: intervention, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which have been applied to deal with a 
series of sub-regional conflicts. The ECOWAS intervention missions were 
based on express invitation by member states that were facing armed 
confrontation with rebels. ECOWAS troops were deployed with the expressed 
aim of preventing a humanitarian crisis and total breakdown of law and order. 
However, these missions were focused on protecting the government of a 
member state from the embarrassing consequences of a potential overthrow by 
rebel forces.   
 
ECOMOG peacekeeping missions were a follow up of an intervention mission 
or peace enforcement mission and eventually peace keeping. ECOWAS peace 
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enforcement missions mostly started as mere intervention following an 
invitation from the government of the member state. However, these missions 
transformed to peace enforcement missions when the rival armed groups did 
not accept the proposed agreement for the resolution of the conflict. An 
ECOMOG peace enforcement operation is aimed at compelling the parties to 
comply with a ceasefire proposal (Malu 2010, website).  
 
The emergence of ECOMOG was not a planned initiative but a response by 
ECOWAS leaders to a conflict that was capable of destabilizing the sub-
region. “The decision to intervene in Liberia was not taken unanimously, and 
nor had the highest-level committee of ECOWAS approved Operation Liberty 
when the troops landed in Monrovia” (Duyvesteyn, 2004:29).  The Liberian 
conflict became a major concern as the country was sliding into anarchy. The 
Liberian government, under Samuel Doe completely lost control of the 
situation, giving the two rebel factions, the Yomie Johnson faction and the 
Charles Taylor faction, the chance to intimidate the populace.  
 
The rebels were almost over running the unpopular government of Samuel 
Doe. Consequently, President Doe requested for ECOWAS assistance in 
accordance with the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance.  
Doe’s request divided the West African Heads of States. Côte d’Ivoire, that 
was at ill terms with Doe’s government, led most francophone countries to 
reject the request, while the Nigerian government under Ibrahim Babangiba, a 
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friend of Samuel Doe, led some anglophone countries to respond to this 
request (Khobe 2000, website). 
 
In order to develop an understanding of the integrative nature of ECOWAS in 
its emerging peace and security format, the linguistic differences in the region 
played a very important role. It is illustrated in the following way: A meeting 
of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, which was dominated by 
the anglophone West African countries, was held in Banjul, Gambia on 7 
August 1990. A decision was made to intervene in the Liberian conflict by the 
immediate dispatch of their military to bring the situation under control. Apart 
from Guinea, the other francophone countries objected to military intervention 
and called for a diplomatic solution. Despite this objection, the anglophone 
countries as well as Guinea proceeded with the mission, dispatching a military 
intervention force named ECOMOG with military personnel from Nigeria, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea, under the command of General 
Quinoo of the Ghanaian armed forces.  
 
The troops arrived in Liberia on 24 August 1990 and immediately occupied 
the Freeport in Monrovia. Though ECOMOG may be called a multinational 
force, most of its military, equipment and finance was provided by Nigeria. 
The mandate of ECOMOG was to restore law and order, to create a conducive 
environment for humanitarian operations, and to facilitate a cease-fire. 
Though the initial troops to the ECOMOG mission were contributed by only 
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members of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Senegal was later 
persuaded by Nigeria to contribute troops but they withdrew after losing five 
of their soldiers, with some of their men held hostage by the rebels. 
 
ECOMOG received the cooperation of President Samuel Doe and Prince 
Yormie Johnson’s rebel faction. They were opposed by the Charles Taylor’s 
rebel faction which disagreed with the intention of ECOMOG to disarm his 
forces. “Taylor viewed disarmament as a threat to his claims to leadership. 
ECOMOG interference was a threat to his almost unstoppable advance and 
military success. To counter this threat, Taylor decided to attack and strive to 
expel the ECOMOG forces from Liberia” (Duyvesteyn, 2004:30).   
 
3.4.2 The Command Structure of ECOMOG 
The military-security integration of ECOWAS raises the question: how much 
of a regionally integrated military structure emerged at the time when 
ECOMOG was established? Was it a combination of national commands or 
indeed an integrated one? The answer lies in how the command structure  
operates. 
 
ECOMOG operations are directed by the Chair of ECOWAS on behalf of the 
ECOWAS Heads of State who exercise final authority over all operations.  
However, routine administrative and political issues in the course of an 
authorized ECOMOG mission are handled by the ECOWAS Secretariat. The 
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ECOMOG military command is under a force commander who is assisted by 
senior military subordinates.  The political structure of an ECOMOG mission 
comprises of a Defence Council and a Defence Commission. The Ministers of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS countries make up the Defence 
Council, which is headed by the incumbent chairperson of the Community. 
The major task of the Defence Council is to plan and adopt appropriate 
strategies of intervention to be used by ECOMOG in a proposed mission.  The 
Defence Commission is made up of the chiefs of defence from the armed 
forces of ECOWAS member states. It focuses on the provision of technical 
advice on ECOMOG military missions (Khobe 2000, website). 
 
According to Khobe (2000, website) the effectiveness of ECOMOG depends 
directly on the level of political consensus existing within ECOWAS 
regarding the manner in which it is engaged in a mission.  It has been difficult 
to achieve a consensus and this remains one of the major problems 
confronting ECOMOG operations. According to him, there was a clear 
division between the five members of the Standing Mediation Committee and 
the other eleven members of ECOWAS during the Liberian mission.  Also, 
there was contention in the Sierra Leone mission on when force should be 
employed and to what extent.  
 
Though ECOMOG military operations are under the command of a force 
commander, prior to 1999 the force commander did not have authority over 
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the entire forces as they were controlled by their respective governments. The 
respective commanders of the various contingents had control over their own 
forces and depended on their governments for daily guidance. Therefore, the 
command and control of forces in ECOMOG operations were deficient, 
particularly during the Liberian and Sierra Leone missions.   
 
The command structure was deliberately made to accommodate the interests 
of all contributing member states. Each Commander of the contributing forces 
was regarded as the Deputy Force Commander in his contingent. In principle, 
the Force Commander was supposed to exercise authority over all forces and 
to delegate specific mission to the various contingents, but that was not the 
case.  ECOMOG forces had two parallel command structures: the ECOMOG 
Force Commander and the contingent commanders reporting to the 
government of the contributing countries. This affected ECOMOG operations 
and the decision making process as tactical decisions could only be 
implemented after each contingent commander obtained approval from home 
(Adebajo 2002a:153-158). 
 
5.4.3 ECOMOG Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) 
In December 1989 Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) which has established a base in Côte d’Ivoire invaded Liberia in an 
attempt to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. The ensuing fight led to 
a severe destruction of lives and property as well as an imminent humanitarian 
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crisis with thousands of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. 
Consequently, ECOWAS attempted a diplomatic solution to the crisis by 
establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to facilitate resolution of 
the conflict.   
 
Due to the slow pace of the diplomatic effort in light of the intensity of the 
violence, the SMC chose to discard the diplomatic effort for military 
intervention and on August 7th 1990, ECOMOG was created to intervene in 
the conflict. The mandate of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was to repress 
the warring factions, disarm the rebels, to facilitate a cease-fire, to release 
prisoners of war and to stop importation of arms to the conflict area. The 
Liberian operation commenced in Monrovia with 3,000 ECOMOG soldiers on 
24 August 1990. The Liberian mission was targeted to last for six months but 
it extended to a period of nine years. 
 
ECOMOG mission in Liberia was generally an experimental mission; it was 
the first time that ECOWAS embarked on a multinational military mission. 
Lessons learnt from this mission were supposed to be applied to subsequent 
missions. Though the members of the SMC were the sole contributors of 
troops at the beginning of the mission, other West Africa states eventually 
sent troops to participate in the mission. Eventually a series of countries 
participated in the Liberian mission at one stage of the conflict. These 
included  Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, 
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Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania and Niger. However, 
the bulk of the troops and equipment as well as the finance for the mission 
were provided by Nigeria.  
 
By 1995 ECOMOG’s strength was a force of 8, 430 soldiers with more than 
50 per cent of these troops (4,908) coming from Nigeria (Tuck 2010:2). The 
ECOMOG operations in Liberia involved the protection of humanitarian aid, 
disarming of factions, cantonment, mediation and peace enforcement. Though 
ECOMOG peacekeeping operations were officially terminated in February 
1998, about 5,000 troops remained in Liberia to train the Liberia military and 
to assist with peace building activities (Tuck 2000:7).  
 
Several factors contributed to make the Liberian expedition a complex and 
difficult task for ECOMOG. The various parties to the conflict exploited the 
ethnic division in the country to continuously keep the fighting aflame thus 
making it difficult to attain a cease fire. The parties to the conflict exhibited 
double standards during the cease fire negotiations and sometimes accepted a 
cease fire as a pretext to enable them to re-arm again. Also, the situation was 
further complicated by the number of factions to the conflict and the use of 
tribalism by the various factions to keep the conflict aflame.  
 
At the commencement of the conflict, the major parties were the government 
forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) under President Samuel Doe and 
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Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Whereas the 
government forces were mainly from the Krahn tribe, the NPFL forces were 
mainly from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. However, the situation became 
more complex with the emergence of Yormie Johnson’s Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) which had broken away from the  NPFL. 
By 1991, there were a series of factions fighting each other: the United 
Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) which broke into 
two factions in 1994; the ULIMO-J from the Krahn tribe under the leadership 
of Roosevelt Johnston and the ULIMO-K by the Mandingo ethnic group 
under the leadership of Alhaji Kromah.  
 
 In 1994, ECOMOG’s effort in Liberia was supplemented by the 
establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 
following the Cotonou agreement in 1993. However, the ECOMOG and 
UNOMIL relationship was affected by disagreements over control of the joint 
ECOMOG - UNOMIL operations. There were also disagreements regarding 
the overall command of the joint operations. ECOMOG believed it should 
have the overall command since it started the mission and had a larger force 
than UNOMIL. However, UNOMIL position was based on the Cotonou 
agreement which gave it some implied supervisory and command 
responsibilities (Adebajo 2002b:176) 
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5.4.4 ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone 
Following its independence in 1961, the political leadership of Sierra Leone 
was dominated by the descendants of former African slaves who resettled in 
Sierra Leone after the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Successive 
governments failed to provide the much needed economic growth in the 
country due to mismanagement and corruption. The situation in the country 
led to discontentment, violence and hostilities. Consequently the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which comprised Sierra Leonean 
dissidents and Liberian NPFL rebels, began a revolt in March 1991 led by 
Foday Sankoh with the intention of overthrowing the Sierra Leonean 
government.  
 
However, the focus of the rebels was more inclined towards the control of 
diamond mining than any other political objective. The precarious situation in 
Sierra Leone was exacerbated by the May 25 1997 overthrow of the 
government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in a coup d’état led by Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma who appointed himself as Chairman of the newly constituted 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The new military regime allied 
itself with the RUF rebels. The situation in Sierra Leone was fuelled mainly 
by the Liberian conflict, especially as the NPFL rebel leader, Charles Taylor 
was an ally of the RUF rebel leader, Foday Sankoh (Adebajo 2002b:250-51). 
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The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was not only due to the degrading 
volatile situation in the country but also due to the involvement of the 
Liberian NPFL rebels in fuelling the Sierra Leone conflict and the potential 
that  an unstable Sierra Leone could undermine any ECOMOG achievement 
in Liberia. Though ECOMOG recorded a number of achievements in Sierra 
Leone, including the restoration of the elected government to power, this did 
not translate into peace and security as the rebels continued to intimidate and 
harass both the Sierra Leonean government and the ECOMOG forces.  
 
 The ECOMOG effort to dislodge both the AFRC and the RUF from this 
location continued for a while without success, especially as ECOMOG troops 
were not well equipped to expel the AFRC and the RUF rebels from their 
strongholds in the densely forested areas. As the fighting continued, the rebels 
attained some temporal advantages and invaded Freetown in January 1999, 
leading to another round of severe fighting for control of the capital. The 
Nigerian ECOMOG forces bombarded rebel positions in Freetown, with 
ground troops repeatedly shelling the outskirts of eastern Freetown. After six 
weeks of fighting, the rebels were expelled by ECOMOG forces from the 
capital. The casualty rate included 3,000 civilians, 100 Nigerian soldiers and a 
vast destruction of Freetown by the retreating rebels.  Due to this 
embarrassing situation, the previous ECOMOG strategy of focusing its 
operations in Freetown was revised. ECOMOG started to strategically deploy 
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its soldiers in the entire country to mitigate any surprise attack by the rebels 
(Adebajo 2002a:95). 
 
Perhaps the most important limitation of ECOMOG in its Sierra Leonean 
operations was its inability to learn from the Liberian experience as a series of 
tactical errors in the Liberian operation were repeated in Sierra Leone. The 
ECOMOG operation had limited knowledge of the forest terrain in Sierra 
Leone. The RUF took advantage of this in its guerrilla tactics to prolong the 
conflict and thus generate more disagreements amongst the West African 
leaders. Also, ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone were viciously affected 
by the poor morale of most ECOMOG forces due to poor wages, allowances 
and rations. This situation created some disciplinary problems; some 
ECOMOG soldiers were accused of being involved with the illicit diamond 
trade. 
The ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone revealed that sub-
regional intervention to enforce law and order is a complex task, even in such 
small states. How then will the Community deal with a similar conflict 
situation if it arose in a bigger member state like Nigeria? The unpreparedness 
of ECOWAS to engage in peace keeping operations was evident in the lack of 
rule-enforcing mechanisms to deal with such cases of indiscipline amongst its 
troops. Perhaps, one of the major failures was the inability of ECOMOG to 
apply the lessons learnt in Liberia to the Sierra Leon operation; consequently, 
such errors were repeated in Sierra Leone (Frempong 1999:28). 
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5.4.5 ECOMOG operations in Guinea Bissau   
In June 1998, the armed forces of Guinea Bissau rebelled against President 
Joao Bernardo Vieira.  Following negotiations led by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of the 
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), a cease fire was attained to allow the 
deployment of a peacekeeping team to supervise the ceasefire. However, this 
ceasefire was short-lived as the rebel group under Ansumane Mane demanded 
for the peacekeeping troops to be withdrawn as a condition for further 
negotiation with Nino Vieira’s government.  
 
A subsequent peace agreement was signed in November 1998 allowing for the 
deployment of an ECOMOG peacekeeping force in the country. Unlike the 
previous ECOMOG deployments that were dominated by Nigeria, the 
ECOMOG mission to Guinea Bissau comprised mainly of francophone 
countries.  (Adebajo 2002a:117). 
 
The delays, logistics and operational problems witnessed in the ECOMOG 
operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were again seen in Guinea-Bissau 
(December 1998 to June 1999). In this mission, the absence of Nigeria was 
clearly felt as the participating members could not muster enough personnel 
and the mission lacked vital logistical and financial strength. Though these 
deficiencies were also present in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean mission, the 
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absence of Nigeria as the backbone of the other two missions, meant a worse 
scenario.  
 
The conflict in Guinea-Bissau brought to light the existing rivalry between 
Portugal, the country’s former colonial master, and France whose influence 
over the country surpassed Portugal after Vieira joined the CFA currency zone 
in 1997.  Also, the membership of Guinea-Bissau in the CFA  currency zone 
drew it closer to the francophone block, which saw the interest and 
involvement of more francophone states in the conflict.  Senegal and Guinea 
supported by France, financed and transported the predominantly francophone 
ECOMOG force to Bissau (Adebajo 2002a:112).  
There were three main challenges to the peacemaking mission in Guinea-
Bissau. At the domestic level, the two main opponents (Vieira and Mane) 
were reluctant to accept a peaceful resolution of their differences; they were 
more interested in the manipulation of the support of external forces. Despite 
the presence of ECOMOG peacekeepers, Mane utilized the military to 
accomplish his political objectives. At the sub-regional level, it became clear 
that Senegal and Guinea were not neutral, therefore could not be effective 
peacekeepers. Consequently, they were replaced by ECOMOG troops with no 
prior involvement in the conflict. However, the meager size of the ECOMOG 
troop (712 men) was not adequate to provide the needed protection of the 
capital and the disarming of the militants. At the extra-regional level, peace-
building efforts could not be implemented despite the willingness of actors 
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like the UN, the World Bank and the EU to support some peace-building 
efforts. The security situation was not conducive for donors to deliver on the 
pledges made at the 1999 Geneva conference (Adebajo 2002a:112). 
 
Just like the Nigerian mistake in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean missions, 
Senegalese and Guinean peacekeepers overestimated their military 
capabilities to intervene in an existing armed conflict. They presumptuously 
thought the intervention will easily overcome and overpower the junta. Also, 
their neutrality was questioned by many who viewed their effort as a device to 
help a friend and neighbor (i.e.Vieira). However, they argued that their 
mission was justified based on an existing bilateral defense pact with Guinea 
Bissau.  The above challenges forced them to withdraw their troops (March 
1999) and were replaced by ECOMOG troops from Benin, Gambia, Niger, 
and Togo marking another chapter in ECOMOG peacekeeping operations 
(Adebajo 2002a:116).  
The departure of Senegal and Guinea did not end the interest of the 
francophone countries in the Guinea-Bissau conflict (though it is a lusophone 
country). As indicated previously, it is partly due to the interest of France in 
the area as well as Guinea-Bissau’s membership of the CFA currency zone. 
Apart from the Gambia, all the other peacekeepers were from francophone 
countries. Even Nigeria, the leading ECOMOG peacekeeper, was absent from 
this mission, though the Nigerian absence was partly due to its overstretched 
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responsibilities in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. This shows that 
ECOWAS does not have the capacity to deal with several conflict situations at 
the same time.  The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone seem to have 
overstretched the sub-region to an extent that affected further deployment to 
Guinea-Bissau. The three countries combined are less than Nigeria and 
therefore it is almost impossible to think that ECOMOG can deploy a 
peacekeeping operation in a country like Nigeria (Adebajo 2002a:121). 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary  
The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts is drawn 
from various foundations and legal documents of ECOWAS, the African 
Union, and the United Nations. However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution 
initiatives effectively drew their mandate from the Revised ECOWAS Treaty 
of 24th July, 1993. The revised treaty focused on the promotion of co-
operation and integration in furtherance of its objective of creating an 
economic union in West Africa. Therefore, justification for ECOWAS’s 
intervention in sub-regional conflicts may be derived primarily from its 
revised treaty and not its original treaty.  
 
ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive  sub-regional conflict prevention 
framework to guide the conceptualization, implementation and evaluation of 
conflict prevention initiatives. This is based on the realization that preventing 
conflicts is an integral foundation for regional integration and development.  
232 
 
ECOWAS member states have witnessed a series of intra-state armed 
conflicts and civil unrest in West Africa, causing severe humanitarian 
problems and large scale displacement of persons. To deal with this vicious 
situation, ECOWAS member states agreed on the development of a viable 
structure for deterring, mitigating and preventing a resurgence of violence. 
ECOWAS has developed a comprehensive conflict prevention framework 
which deals with fundamental issues that will enhance the security of the sub-
region, including early warning, preventive diplomacy, good governance, 
standby force, youth and gender affairs and arms control. 
 
 
In its attempt to resolve conflicts within its sub-region, ECOWAS has been 
involved with peacekeeping missions and have created the ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which has played a major role in bringing the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict under control. ECOWAS’s intervention 
missions were based on express invitation by member states that were facing 
armed confrontation with rebels. ECOWAS troops were deployed with the 
expressed aim of preventing humanitarian crisis and total breakdown of law 
and order. However, these missions were sometimes focused on protecting the 
government of a member state from the embarrassing consequences of a 
potential overthrow by rebel forces.   
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Chapter Six 
Transformation to a Political and Security Community 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the transformation of ECOWAS from a primarily 
economic community to one that is also a political and security community 
with institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution. Due to the fact that 
the changes in ECOWAS relating to its transformation is a nascent trend also 
observed in many other regional and sub-regional organizations,  a theoretical 
analysis of this transformation is vital to provide insight into this 
phenomenon.  This chapter analyses the issue of sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs before proceeding to examine the 
“responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle as a negation of the principle of 
non-interference.  
The historical experience of the ECOWAS member states created suspicion 
about any likelihood of external intervention in the internal affairs of member 
states. Non-interference was an accepted doctrine, not only in the sub-region 
but in the entire continent. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was the 
guiding principle in the sub-region prior to its mission in Liberia and the 
commencement of its peacekeeping operations. ECOWAS was created in the 
Cold War era with all the complex security challenges of that period that 
made the non-intervention doctrine a viable ideal.  However, the end of the 
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Cold War came with new security challenges, including intra-state conflicts 
with vast consequences for neighbouring countries. It became clear that non-
intervention may not suffice for the new era as the impact of nascent conflicts 
quickly extended beyond domestic borders. Consequently, the ECOWAS 
Treaty (1975) which emphasized the Non-Interference doctrine was replaced 
by the revised treaty (1993) which provided for collective security and 
defence cooperation (Berman and Sams 2000:75).  
For the purpose of this study, we assume that ECOWAS realized that the 
security situation in West Africa was one of the major constraints on 
economic development and that it has contributed to ECOWAS’s involvement 
in conflict resolution and its transformation to a sub-regional security body.  
Most West African states are infested with different forms of crisis. There are 
the cases of tension arising from human rights abuses in Burkina Faso, the 
crisis in the southern region of Casamance (Senegal), the aftermath of the 
crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the unrest in Guinea-Bissau since the deposition of 
Vieira, the political tension in Togo following the transfer of power from a 
deceased father to a son, the Niger Delta conflict as well as religious tensions 
in Nigeria and the aftermath of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
ECOWAS has continuously adjusted to deal with sub-regional security 
because its goals can only be met within the confines of a secured community 
(Thiam, 2009:1) 
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ECOWAS’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations, which 
commenced with its military intervention in Liberia, were institutionalized by 
the establishment of a security mechanism which may be traced to the 
formation of the Mutual Defense Assistance (PMDA) in Sierra Leone on May 
29, 1981. This was followed by the establishment of an Allied Armed Force 
of the Community (AAFC). However, the establishment of ECOMOG on 
August 25, 1990 during the outbreak of violent conflict in Liberia was the 
major landmark in ECOWAS becoming a security community. 
 
ECOWAS’s transformation and its intervention in intra-state conflicts have 
been criticized by proponents of the ‘principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs’. However, proponents of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
have argued that ECOWAS’s intervention is justified by the fact that it has a 
responsibility to prevent its sub-region from humanitarian disasters and 
human suffering.  There are also arguments regarding the competency and 
justification for ECOWAS’s military actions.  
 
Northedge and Donelan (1971:245) argued that regional intervention in 
intrastate conflicts is justified by the fact that regional bodies are better 
acquainted with the cause and nature of the conflict and have a better 
understanding of motives of the parties to the conflict. They said regional 
bodies are able to proffer a better resolution, which will be more acceptable to 
the parties to the conflict. Members of a regional organization have 
236 
 
similarities which make them suitable for resolving conflicts in their area.  
However, Meyers (1974, cited in Frempong, 1999) disagrees with the above 
position, because the similarities of interests, problems and loyalties are not 
sufficient to guarantee success if the conflict management capacity of the 
regional organization is weak. 
 
6.1 ECOWAS’s transformation into a security community 
It is assumed in this study that sub-regional economic development is an 
essential component of sub-regional security, because there is a positive 
relationship between economic development and peace building.  Ekiyor 
(2008:13) observed that the mechanisms put in place for ECOWAS’s security 
cooperation are based on the understanding that citizens are the primary 
custodians of peace and security in the sub-region and true regional 
integration is not possible without peace and security.  
 
The revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 provides for sub-regional cooperation 
in multi-dimensional issues. This study assumes that regional integration 
cannot be attained in an environment without security and stability. Therefore, 
economic growth can only be attained in an environment where security is 
maintained. On the other hand, this study postulates that peace and security 
cannot be attained in an area which is characterized by poor economic 
development. The pursuit of sub-regional peace and security entails the 
pursuit of economic development, education, health and infrastructure 
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development. One of the major differences between the ECOWAS Treaty 
(1975) and the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993) is the fact that the former 
provided the framework for mere economic integration, while the later 
provided the framework for economic, political and security integration.  
 
According to Adebajo (2002:62) lack of security is intimately linked to issues 
of poverty, disease, environment, ethnicity, political crisis and instability. He 
observed that the above factors have unfortunately characterized the West 
Africa sub-region. Apart from these issues, security challenges in West Africa 
are also affected by political ambitions, unemployment, underdevelopment, 
poor education and discrimination in political and economic opportunities. 
Therefore, West African leaders must break the current vicious circle of 
conflict by embarking on economic development and good governance. 
 
The transformation of ECOWAS from an economic cooperation to a political 
and security body may be traced to the Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty 
(1976), which was followed by the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 and the 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 1981. ECOWAS’s 
transformation was further heightened by the revision of the ECOWAS 
conflict management system in 1993 and the establishment of various 
institutional mechanisms and administrative processes to deal with sub-
regional conflicts.   
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The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence provides for ECOWAS 
member states to constitute an Allied Armed Force of the Community, which 
is made up of armed forces from member states.   It includes the Defence 
Council which is composed of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of 
the member states and a Defence Commission, which comprises of the Chiefs 
of Staff from member countries. ECOWAS’s transformation to a security 
community necessitated the establishment of procedures for defence and 
security issues detailing the incidents requiring the intervention of ECOWAS 
and circumstances under which member states may call for intervention. 
These include aggression from non-member states, conflict between member 
states, and intrastate conflicts (Aning 2000, website). 
 
Under the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, whenever a 
member state requests for the intervention of ECOWAS due to the aggression 
of a non-member, a decision will be made regarding the expediency for 
military intervention and a resolution for military intervention will be referred 
to a force commander for enforcement.  ECOWAS’s strategy for dealing with 
violent conflicts between member states as well as intrastate parties will be the 
deployment of a peacekeeping mission to facilitate a ceasefire and to ensure 
that the parties keep the terms of peace. ECOWAS’s strategy for dealing with 
a non-member state and an internal rebel group is the same. ECOWAS’s 
response to an uprising against a member state will depend on the nature of 
the request made by the member state and the determination regarding the 
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necessary assistance to be authorized by the community.  
 
The Liberian civil war necessitated the updating of the ECOWAS mechanism 
for conflict resolution and to correct the errors observed in its mission. 
However, apart from the observed errors, there was the question of national 
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states. In December 1997, an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS was held in 
Lomé, Togo, to deal with the question of sovereignty, non-intervention and 
other perplexing issues. It was agreed that the ad hoc nature of ECOWAS’s 
conflict resolution procedure was inadequate. Therefore, a decision was taken 
to establish a permanent conflict resolution structure. 
 
One of the immediate aftermaths of the Togo summit was the creation of the 
ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Peacekeeping in line with the OAU’s own Mechanism.  A technical document 
regarding the Mechanism was referred to a meeting of experts in July 1998. 
The final document, which was approved for the management and resolution 
of conflict in the sub-region dealt with the establishment of a Mediation and 
Security Council which operated at the level of Heads of State, Ambassadors 
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Under this arrangement, the Mediation and 
Security Council has the responsibility to deal with  all issues of peace and 
security in West Africa.  
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To facilitate a sub-regional security system, the ECOWAS early warning 
system plays the role of observing and analysing social, economic and 
political situations in West Africa. It tries to assess situations that are capable 
of flaming into a conflict and provides a threat analysis report to the 
Observation and Monitoring Centre, which is located at the ECOWAS 
Secretariat in Abuja. The report would then be used by the Mediation and 
Security Council to ascertain the appropriate action or response. One of the 
new development in ECOWAS’s conflict resolution strategy, following the 
Liberian experience, was the authorization of ECOMOG to intervene 
militarily in situations that threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or 
situations that pose a serious threat to peace and security in West Africa, as 
well as precarious situations following the overthrow or attempted overthrow 
of a democratically elected government (Aning 2000, website), 
 
 Despite the challenges and limitations of ECOWAS’s approach to conflict 
resolution, there are some viable lessons, which other regional and sub-
regional organizations need to learn.  However, ECOWAS needs to improve 
its approach and to learn from previous mistakes and build a more effective 
sub-regional security mechanism. In the view of Aning (2000, website), 
ECOWAS needs a better design of warning methodologies. The 
methodologies need to deal with information on historical surveys and 
analyses of events; comparative analyses of relevant information; physical 
inspection and field visits as well as modelling and remote-sensing. According 
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to him, early warning in West Africa should be strengthened and that there 
should be an in-depth understanding of the local dynamics that are fuelling the 
conflicts.  
 
6.2 Theoretical examination of the ECOWAS transformation. 
ECOWAS’s transformation from a sub-regional economic body to an 
economic, political and security body has generated vast interest among 
scholars and political actors. However, a theoretical examination of this 
phenomenon shows that the transformation is not totally surprising, because 
this trend is not limited to ECOWAS but a nascent phenomenon observed in 
several other regional and sub-regional organizations. Therefore, it is 
imperative to analyse this trend.  
 
ECOWAS is a case which affirms that the emergence of security communities 
in Africa cannot be fully explained by the traditional paradigms of 
international politics. Unlike the African Union (AU), the emergence of 
ECOWAS as a security community is better analyzed under the Realist school 
of thought than liberalism or constructivism. The argument of the liberal 
school of thought that security communities emerged out of shared democratic 
values is insufficient when relating to a community which originated at a time 
when most of its members did not share democratic principles. The 
constructivist argument which argues that security communities are a product 
of shared identities, is also limited in the face of significant differences in 
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terms of colonial history and dominant languages. The Realist theory appears 
to be more useful for analysis of the situations under which ECOWAS and 
ECOMOG were formed. These conditions are based on a structural 
community and not on a community of values and identity (Thiam, 2009:2). 
 
Realist assumptions provide a vital framework for the study of the formation 
as well as the early part of ECOWAS’s history. The role played by West 
African states in its formation is clearer when analyzed under the Realist 
School which sees states as the primary actors in international affairs and its 
postulation that international relations are focused primarily on relations 
between states. The initial assent of ECOWAS’s member states to the doctrine 
of non-interference (in the 1975 Treaty) was in line with the Realist 
assumption that the state is a unitary actor that participates in international 
affairs as an integrated unit. Therefore, Realists argue that states suppress or 
ignore intra-state political differences when dealing with other states in the 
international system (Kufuor 2006:79). 
 
Post-Cold War regionalism in Africa seems to follow a new trend where an 
emphasis is placed on conflict management. Apart from ECOWAS, both the 
AU (i.e. the Peace and Security Council and AU Commission) and SADC (i.e. 
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) have also developed 
and institutionalized their own mechanisms for the management of conflicts. 
These nascent trends are well-reflected in the theoretical assumptions of ‘new 
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regionalism’ and are not limited to formal inter-state regional organizations 
and institutions. New regionalism is typified by its “multidimensionality, 
complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a 
variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather 
informal multiactor coalition” (Söderbaum, 2003: 1-2). 
 
ECOWAS; like most other regional organizations experienced new changes, 
modifications and transformations that can be understood in terms of  new 
regionalism. This has led to several arguments about the novelty of the new 
regionalism, since it is a relatively continuous historical phenomenon. 
However, the essential features of the new regionalism are its global reach, 
extending to more regions, with greater external linkages.   
 
 According to Söderbaum (2003:2) new regionalism as a theory emphasises 
the multidimensional nature of regional integration and goes beyond mere 
economic and trade integration to include also political, security and a vast 
range of affairs. Therefore, the transformation in ECOWAS is not a strange 
phenomenon but a general trend in regionalism, as reflected in the epoch of 
new regionalism.  
 
6.3 The principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter indicates that its relationship and activities are 
“based on the principle of the sovereign equality of al1 its Members".  Also, 
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the Declaration on Principles of International Law (1970) indicates that “al1 
states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are al1 
equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of 
an economic, social, political or other nature” (Abew, 1997:55). The 
declaration affirms that sovereign equality includes the following: 
i. States are equal; 
ii. Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; 
iii. Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states; 
iv. The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are 
inviolable; 
v. Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, 
social, economic and cultural systems; 
vi. Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its 
international obligations and to live in peace with other states (Abew, 
1997:55). 
 
The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs is a complementary 
principle of state sovereignty in international law. It states that no state should 
interfere in the internal affairs of another state.  This is based upon the 
assumption that each state is sovereign and has the ability to manage its affairs 
as it deems fit. Article  2(4) of the UN Charter states that: “All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
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the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. 
 
However, the 1992 International conference on human rights protection for 
internally displaced persons argued that sovereignty must be back up with 
responsibility. This conference, including human rights experts, international 
organization and international jurists, affirmed that a state that cannot protect 
the vulnerable or that cannot prevent humanitarian disaster or genocide may 
lose its right to sovereignty and non-interference. In such instance, external 
intervention may become necessary as sovereignty must go hand in hand with 
the responsibility to protect (Deng, 1993).  “The Westphalian, state-centric 
system of international relations had long privileged non-intervention. 
Inspired by the horrors of World War II, the UN Charter enshrined the 
equality of state sovereignty in Article 2(1) and the principle of non-
intervention in Article 2(7) as means to protect states from external 
aggression” (Kikoler 2010, website).  
 
Internal conflicts contribute to the insecurity of not only the country 
concerned but also neighboring countries due to their impact on diminishing 
access to resources. Insecurity in a state within a geographical area is capable 
of producing other problems in the neighboring states. Such conflicts become 
catalysts to problems in other states, such as the lack of national unity, ethnic 
tensions and religious divisions (Frempong, 2003:2)   
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Insecurity in a state is capable of aggravating intra-state conflicts, including 
socioeconomic grievances and demand for social justice. Violent conflicts 
have the tendency of affecting the entire geographical area; therefore, even if 
the conflict is termed an internal affair, its effect can never be an internal 
affair. The nature of conflicts in West Africa is complex and multifaceted, 
involving several actors and cannot be easily limited to a single cause. The 
cause of some of the conflicts in West Africa may be traced to sources which 
are local, national, regional and international factors (Rugumamu, 2002:10).  
 
The regional perspective of  intra-state conflicts is now undeniable.  The cause 
of a conflict may be traced to a local or national dimension but the fact that it 
will certainly have cross-border linkages is not questionable. Intra-state 
conflicts produce refugee flows, flow of arms in the entire region, cross border 
rebel activities, illegal mining activities and several other activities affecting 
neighboring countries  (Hussein and Gnisci, 2003: 6).  
 
Therefore, the so called internal conflict may as well be described as regional 
conflicts as its impact and consequences are felt in most parts of the region. 
Regarding the nature of conflicts in West Africa and its impact on the sub-
region, it may be difficult to classify these conflicts as mere internal affairs of 
the concerned countries. The situation is particularly worsened by the porous 
nature of the inter-state borders. It is becoming clear that the old perception of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not tenable in the analysis of 
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conflicts in West Africa and the consequent humanitarian disasters, which 
affects neighboring states. The Cold War concept of non-interference has 
changed because of the realization that regional stability is essential for the 
stability of each state in the region. This has necessitated the intervention of 
regional organizations like ECOWAS in these intrastate conflicts or the so 
called ‘new wars’ or ‘internationalized internal conflicts’ (Frempong 2003:7)  
 
Non-intervention has been the accepted doctrine of ECOWAS member states 
right from its creation and was enshrined in its Treaty of 1975 while it was a 
generally accepted principle for the OAU member states. Nationalism is a 
well enshrined ideology in most West Africa countries; this had previously 
been a major constraint to security cooperation and the possibility for any 
intervention in internal conflicts. ECOWAS’s members had gone through a 
bitter decolonization period and were quick to jealously safeguard their 
independence. Therefore, nationalism and sovereignty were issues of vital 
importance to most member states and any form of intervention was 
considered unacceptable.  In addition,  non-intervention was the ideal in the 
sub-region due to the high level of mistrust and rivalry amongst the states.  
According to Berman and Sams (2000:75), the 16 ECOWAS member states, 
comprising of five  anglophone, nine francophone and two lusophone states 
have always experienced  sub-regional rivalries that threatened to undermine 
the organization's potential. The position of Nigeria in the sub-region with 
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ninety per cent of the sub-region's population and a significant market share, 
was viewed as an unequal terrain for effective cooperation. Other members 
were always suspicious of Nigeria and saw any possibilities of intervention in 
internal affairs of member states as part of a scheme by Nigeria to exercise 
control over other states in the sub-region.  
 
This suspicion contributed to the initial objection to the Nigerian-led 
operations in Liberia, especially by the francophone countries. Therefore, the 
deployment to Liberia comprised almost entirely of anglophone countries. The 
initial objections were due to two main reasons: firstly, both ECOWAS and 
the OAU members were at that time guided by the principle of non-
interference; secondly, the existing rivalry and mutual suspicion was not 
conducive for such operations (Berman and Sams 2000:89). 
 
The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) provided for the 
collective action of the community to deal with external aggression, conflict 
between member-states and internal conflict in a member-state to prevent 
certain humanitarian consequences.  This protocol draws the Community 
away from the historic position of sovereignty and non-interference.  A clear 
shift from this previous principle was attained with the Revised ECOWAS 
Treaty (1993) which included a Defence Council and a Defence Commission. 
The Protocol therefore provided justification for ECOWAS’s first intervention 
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in internal conflicts (i.e. Liberia) while the Revised Treaty (1993) provided 
the mandate for future interventions (Frempong 2003:6-7). 
 
During the Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions, ECOWAS was not 
expected to be able to provide such a level of cooperation. However, the post-
Cold War changes were felt in the sub-regional and a sense of a responsibility 
to deal with internal conflicts was beginning to dawn on the Community. 
Therefore the Liberian conflict provided a major change in the thought of sub-
regional leaders on the question of sovereignty and the responsibility to 
protect.  
 
6.4 The principle of the Responsibility to Protect. 
The concept of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) was unanimously adopted 
by the UN General Assembly at a World Summit in 2005. According to 
former Secretary General Kofi Annan, it is a political commitment to act if 
another Rwanda looms (Annan, 2010). The principle calls for the protection 
of people who are at risk of mass atrocities. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
document of the 2005 World Summit indicate that states have an obligation to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, the international community should assist 
states in upholding this responsibility and that the international community 
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has a responsibility to act if states are unable or unwilling to protect 
vulnerable populations (Kikoler 2010, website).  
 
As a matter of legal interpretation, because it is not explicitly stated, it is 
possible to assume that the United Nations is empowered under Chapters VI, 
VII and VIII of its Charter to provide necessary protection against genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing as well as crimes against humanity. In this 
context, a regional body like ECOWAS which draws its mandate for conflict 
resolution from the United Nations and the AU’s Constitutive Act is able to 
adopt collective action and to prevent humanitarian crises in its sub-region. 
The concept of the responsibility to protect comprises the responsibility to 
prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.  
 
According to Bellamy (2008: 135), the responsibility to react has recently 
dominated the focus of scholars and political actors following the adoption of 
the responsibility to protect principle by the 2005 World Summit of the UN 
General Assembly. The responsibility to rebuild, according to him, has seen a 
renewed interest regarding post-war justice and was institutionalized by the 
World Summit through creation of the UN's Peace-building Commission. He 
lamented that the responsibility to prevent has suffered neglect despite its 
importance and general role in the concept of the responsibility to protect. “In 
the World Summit's Outcome Document, the UN's commitment to conflict 
prevention was kept separate from its commitment to the responsibility to 
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protect, and states committed only to help establish an "early warning" 
capability for the UN and to support the Secretary General's Special Advisor 
on the prevention of genocide” (Bellamy, 2008: 135). 
 
The AU’s Constitutive Act (2001) includes both the principles of state 
sovereignty [article 4(g)] and the responsibility to protect [article 4(h)]. The 
latter is restricted to only “grave” circumstances, and according to article 4(h) 
as amended in 2003, these are the following circumstances: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and a serious challenge to the legal order in a 
state. Application of the R2P principle is therefore circumscribed and can be 
used only collectively and not by individual states, because otherwise it can be 
exploited in problematic bilateral relations. ECOWAS is in the first instance 
bound by the Constitutive Act, because no ECOWAS policies should be in 
conflict with the AU principles or at least not substantially deviate from them. 
 
There are two forms of  the concept  ”interventionism” or  actions by another 
state in pursuit of policy objectives and actions taken to uphold internationally 
accepted values or laws. The first form entails an unprovoked interference by 
a state in the internal affairs of another state in a manner that is unilateral and 
coercive, including military force and covert operations, dissemination of 
propaganda, or cultural domination. These actions are unacceptable in terms 
of the principle of non-intervention and are thus considered as illegitimate and 
provocative action. Interventionism, secondly, may also come in the form of 
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humanitarian intervention, which entails the involvement of an external party 
in the alleviation of the suffering of people within a nation-state, geographic 
area, or region.  
 
Some advocates of the principle of non-intervention partly accept the 
responsibility to protect in regards to humanitarian intervention because such 
intervention may overshadow other factors considered under the principle of 
non-intervention. Humanitarian intervention is usually acceptable when it is 
aimed solely at mitigating human suffering, especially when the state 
concerned is either the perpetrator or is unable to respond or to address the 
situation.  
 
Generally, most scholars and political actors argue that such humanitarian 
intervention is better done by a regional organization or multilateral 
organization and not the unilateral action of a single state. This argument 
supports ECOWAS’s intervention and military missions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. However, some opposing views against intervention do not 
compromise on any form of intervention. Despite the fact that humanitarian 
interventions in a war zone may require the use of a military mission to 
facilitate the entry of humanitarian and emergency assistance to the affected 
people, strict adherence to the principles of non-interference argue that such 
interventions are unjustifiable (Wheeler, 2000:135).  
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In the 1990s, there emerged the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention as well 
as the right to intervene. This was immediately rejected by many Third World 
countries that held firmly to the principle of non-intervention arguing that 
interventionism was promoted by the developed countries who intend to use 
their military might to intervene in the domestic affairs of weaker states. Also, 
some humanitarian actors disagreed with the attempt to link humanitarianism 
with military intervention. They argued that such a link compromised their 
neutrality and ability to work with vulnerable populations.  Kofi Annan 
queried the objection to the deployment of military intervention for 
humanitarian reasons, arguing that without humanitarian intervention, it will 
be difficult to respond to a humanitarian situation like Rwanda or Srebrenica 
(Kikoler, 2010).  
 
The expediency of military intervention for humanitarian reasons as well as 
the prevention of genocide, war crimes and catastrophic loss of lives has 
questioned the principle of non-interference and validated the principle of the 
responsibility to protect. For example, ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia 
was justified by the argument of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security 
Council that Liberia was degenerating into a state of anarchy with vast 
humanitarian consequences.   
 
However, the aftermath of the 1993 UN intervention in Somali and the severe 
casualties of peacekeepers raised questions about interventionism. However, 
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this was soon followed by the failure of the international community to 
prevent the Rwanda genocide in 1994, which led to guilt and raised the issue 
of the responsibility of the international community to have prevented the 
genocide. The imperative to do something to save lives became a major 
principle acceptable to both humanitarian actors, regional and multilateral 
organizations. This imperativeness was extended to Kosovo in 1999 (Berger, 
2006:8).   
 
The transformation of the OAU to the AU came with several changes that 
meant its principle of non-interference had to be balanced with intervention in 
very specific circumstances. Member states are still today very jealous of their 
sovereignty and have not yet devolved it to the AU. But ECOWAS has 
benefited from the OAU transformation and has received some level of 
cooperation in its sub-regional conflict management scheme. ECOWAS’s 
intervention in Liberia, which was an experimental mission, was severely 
opposed by most francophone countries that referred to the doctrine of non-
intervention. However, Nigeria played a leading role, emphasizing that 
humanitarian intervention was imperative in the prevention of further 
destruction of lives and property. ECOWAS’s mission in Liberia seems to 
have put to an end to any adherence to the principle of non-interference in the 
West African sub-region (New African, 2002). 
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 ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia was ordered by the ECOWAS Standing 
Mediation Committee (SMC) to prevent further loss of lives and to rescue 
trapped civilians (Vogt, 1996: 166).   Interesting for the purpose of this study, 
Charles Taylor who intended to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe, 
argued that ECOWAS was deviating from its economic objectives.  President 
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso also objected to ECOWAS’s military 
mission in Liberia. The African Concord of September 28, 1990 reported that 
Compaore had argued ECOWAS is an economic integration and should not 
deviate into security issues (Vogt, 1996:167).   
 
In his attempt to sell the need for military intervention, the Nigerian former 
President, Ibrahim Babangida said it is not possible to attain economic 
integration in an environment with severe security problems. He stressed the 
fact that security is essential in the facilitation of economic interaction. He 
stressed that economic integration is better facilitated when there is effective 
security of life and property as well as freedom of movement (Vogt, 
1996:167).     
 
The Liberian crisis was instrumental in the growth of an institutionalized 
structure for collective security in West Africa. One of the positive 
consequences of the Liberian conflict was adoption of the Protocol Relating to 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security on 10 December 1999, which was a major step 
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towards ECOWAS’s security initiative. This mechanism provided for a 
collective security arrangement in West Africa because it created the first 
deviation from the principle of non-interference by empowering ECOWAS to 
intervene in intrastate conflicts (Abass, 2000:40). 
 
The 1999 mechanism differed from the 1981 Protocol relating to Mutual 
Assistance on Defense (PMAD), which provided for the principle of state 
sovereignty and forbid intervention in the internal affairs of member states. 
For the first time, ECOWAS accepted military intervention to save lives and 
prevent humanitarian disaster. Article 40 of the 1999 Mechanism states that 
ECOWAS shall utilize military intervention to relieve the suffering of the 
populations and ensure the restoration of normalcy in the event of crises, 
conflict and disaster.   
 
6.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes that sub-regional economic development is an 
essential component in sub-regional security, because there is a relationship 
between economic development and peace building. Therefore, regional 
integration cannot be examined as a mere economic issue - it is a 
multidimensional issue which cannot be seen as merely regional trade. The 
revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) provides for sub-regional cooperation in 
economic, political and security issues based on the assumption that there is a 
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vital relationship between security and economic cooperation and therefore 
regional integration.  
 
The transformation of ECOWAS from an economic cooperation to be also a 
political and security body may be traced to the  Non-Recourse to Aggression 
Treaty (1976), which was followed by the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 
and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 1981. ECOWAS’s 
transformation was further heightened by the revision of the ECOWAS 
conflict management system in 1993 and the establishment of various 
institutional mechanisms and administrative processes to deal with sub-
regional conflicts. However, the transformation of ECOWAS is not totally 
surprising, because this trend is not limited to ECOWAS but is a nascent 
phenomenon observed in several other regional and sub-regional 
organizations.  
 
Regarding the nature of conflicts in West Africa and its impact on the sub-
region, it may be difficult to classify these conflicts as mere internal affairs of 
the countries concerned. The situation is particularly worsened by the porous 
nature of the interstate borders. It is becoming clear that the old perception of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states is not tenable in the analysis of 
the recent conflicts in West Africa. The consequences of these conflicts as 
well as the humanitarian disasters affect the neighboring states too. The Cold 
War concept of non-interference has changed because of the realization that 
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regional stability is essential for the stability of each state in the region. This 
has necessitated the intervention of regional organizations like ECOWAS in 
these intrastate conflicts, which have been described as ‘new wars’ or 
‘internationalized internal conflicts’. 
 
A development that influenced ECOWAS’s understanding of its responsibility 
for peace and security in its region was when the concept of the responsibility 
to protect was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly and it 
called for the protection of people who are at risk of mass atrocities. It states 
that states have an obligation to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. However, in cases 
where a state is unable or unwilling to do so, it becomes the responsibility of 
multilateral and regional organizations to act.  
 
Even some advocates of the principle of non-intervention partly accept the 
responsibility to protect in regards to humanitarian intervention, because such 
intervention may overshadow other factors considered under the principle of 
non-intervention.  Humanitarian intervention is usually acceptable when it is 
aimed solely at mitigating human suffering, especially when the state 
concerned is either the perpetrator or is unable to respond or to address the 
situation.  However, some opposing views against intervention do not 
compromise on any form of intervention. Despite the fact that humanitarian 
interventions in a war zone may require the use of a military mission to 
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facilitate the entry of humanitarian and emergency assistance to the affected 
people, strict adherence to the principles of non-interference argue that such 
interventions are unjustifiable. It appears as if ECOWAS does not adhere to 
such a strict interpretation and accepts that it has a responsibility to act 
quickly in political crises. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Appraisal of ECOWAS and regional integration in West 
Africa  
An examination of the integration process in West Africa shows that the Pan-
African ideology generally provided a vital foundation for regional integration 
in West Africa. Also, it has been one of the major impacts on regionalism in 
the entire African continent. Pan-Africanism was dominated by the reformist 
Du Boisianism and the radical Garveyism. In terms of ideological impact on 
African regionalism, the Du-Boisian Pan-African ideology has had more of an 
impact than Garveyism.    
 
The emergence of ECOWAS indicates that security communities in Africa 
cannot be fully explained by the traditional paradigms of international 
institutional politics. Unlike the African Union, the emergence of ECOWAS 
as a security community is better analyzed under the Realist school of thought 
than liberalism. ECOWAS proved the possibility of the emergence of a 
security community from realpolitik. The argument of the liberal school of 
thought that security communities emerged out of shared democratic values 
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does not adequately support the case of ECOWAS which was created at a 
time when most of its members did not share democratic principles.  
 
Regionalism in West Africa was initially geared towards mere economic 
cooperation; however, the emergence of ECOWAS on the scene and its 
subsequent transformation witnessed several changes towards the path of 
security cooperation. Despite its involvement with the gigantic political and 
security related activities, a general evaluation of economic integration in 
West Africa depicts a slow level of progression.  
 
Most countries in the sub-region lack national development plans, which 
include regional economic considerations. Also, most West African countries 
have not initiated adequate incentives for cross-border investments and 
transactions. Another challenge is the role of nationalism in West Africa, 
which had historically been an inspiration for the struggle against colonialism. 
Nationalism has remained a strong force for national identity and the exercise 
of national sovereignty and has limited the level of sub-regional cooperation.  
 
The poor state of sub-regional economic integration shows that ECOWAS did 
not complete its regional economic integration agenda before diverting to 
other sectors of sub-regional integration. However, it has become a common 
trend for regional and sub-regional organizations that commenced as regional 
economic bodies to transform to political and security cooperation forums.  
The European Union first developed into an economic body called the 
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European Economic Community (EEC) before it later transformed into the 
European Union as a political and security organization after the Maastricht 
treaty of 1993. Other regional bodies in Africa like the AU and SADC have 
also witnessed a similar trend of transformation. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that despite the slow pace of economic growth among West African countries, 
ECOWAS has gradually added the gigantic task of sub-regional conflict 
resolution to its core activities. 
 
A thorough examination of policy formation in ECOWAS reveals a greater 
yearning towards intergovernmentalism with a domineering role by the 
governments of member states in its structure. Therefore, the theory of 
intergovermentalism provides a vital framework for the study of regional 
integration in West Africa. However, neo-functionalism has also provided 
some vital tools for the study.  Most scholars have avoided the possibility of 
using neo-functional thought to analyse nascent regional bodies like 
ECOWAS, not only because of the Eurocentric nature of the theory but 
because some scholars believe neo-functionalism is anachronistic.  
 
However, neo-functionalism identifies basic building blocks for any valid 
theory of regional integration. Therefore, rather than discard the theory, it is 
essential to examine how it helps in the analysis of the integration process in 
the sub-region. Also, it is almost impossible to analyse other regional 
integration processes without drawing reference from the European 
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integration. European integration is the archetype of regional integration 
studies. Regional integration in Europe has greatly influenced both theory and 
practice of regionalism and remains a vital reference to regionalism in other 
parts of the world. 
 
As observed above, the transformation seen in ECOWAS is a general post-
Cold War trend observed in other regional bodies too. These changes are 
better analyzed as one looks at what has necessitated the retheorization and 
assessment of the new trend called New Regionalism. The major differences 
between the old and new regionalism are highlighted bySöderbaum (2003:23-
24). The old phase of regionalism was specific regarding its objectives: 
regional bodies did not focus on security and the economic agenda at the same 
time. However, the new phase is characterized by a more comprehensive and 
multidimensional societal process. Old regionalism existed in a bipolar Cold 
War context while new regionalism relates to a multipolar world order, and in 
a context of globalization.  
  
7.2 Appraisal of the ECOWAS initiative in conflict resolution. 
ECOWAS peacekeeping operations have been the dominant topic in sub-
regional conflict resolution in West Africa. However, other forms of conflict 
resolution, including mediation, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration have 
been severally utilized as was evident in the ECOWAS negotiations in the 
recent Malian military coup. In some of the cases peacekeeping operations 
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have been deployed only after other peaceful efforts have failed. ECOWAS 
peacekeeping operations are divergent operations with different forms and 
mandates. Therefore, they are better analysed under the framework of 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-making theories. 
 
The authority of ECOWAS to intervene in sub-regional conflicts may be 
inferred from various foundations and legal documents of ECOWAS, the 
African Union and the United Nations. The ECOWAS Treaty of 28 May 
1975, which declared the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance and 
non-aggression, provided the general framework for ECOWAS’s activities. 
Based upon these principles, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-
Aggression (1978) which was followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defense. These documents provided the background upon 
which the organization evolved its mechanism for conflict resolution in 1999. 
However, ECOWAS’s conflict resolution initiative was boosted and energized 
mainly by the revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24th July, 1993. 
 
The revised treaty focused on the promotion of co-operation and integration in 
furtherance of its objective of creating an economic union in West Africa. 
Therefore, the justification for ECOWAS’s intervention in sub-regional 
conflicts may be derived mainly from its revised treaty and not its original 
treaty.  
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This study indicates that ECOWAS member states have undertaken to work 
together to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance 
of peace, stability and security within the region. It indicates that ECOWAS 
member states have undertaken to establish and strengthen appropriate 
mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-
state conflicts. Also, ECOWAS intervention in sub-regional conflicts is 
justifiable by Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54 of the United Nations Charter 
which provides a role for regional organizations in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.    
However, there are a series of literature questioning the authority, legitimacy 
and legality of such intervention in intra-state conflicts. Some of these 
arguments insist that ECOWAS lacks the capacity to do what could have been 
accomplished more easily by multilateral peacekeeping forces of the United 
Nations. Also, there is the school of thought that says ECOWAS should 
concentrate on sub-regional economic integration, which it has not yet 
accomplished successfully. Military intervention is seen as a violation of the 
sovereignty of member states, an unnecessary and wasteful venture as well as 
digression from the path of sub-regional economic integration.  
 
However, it is affirmed by some scholars that despite the challenges of such 
interventions, they are justifiable because ECOWAS is more acquainted with 
the problems, characteristics and nature of the conflicts in its sub-region. 
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Therefore, it is more prone to understanding the parties to the conflict and 
their conflicting demands. This study therefore also concludes that ECOWAS 
is better positioned than other international institutions to proffer a lasting 
solution to the conflicts in its sub-region.   
This study accepts the argument that the emergence of ECOWAS as a major 
peacekeeper in West Africa was necessitated by several factors, including the 
over stretched effort of the UN in Africa.  UN operations in Africa have been 
involved in several of the intra-state conflicts in Africa such as Somalia, 
Rwanda, Namibia, Western Sahara, Angola, Darfur, the DRC and 
Mozambique. However, the UN’s experience and in particular the American 
experience in Somalia in 1993 had the result that it became reluctant about 
additional UN military intervention in Africa.  For example, the UN Security 
Council did not respond a year later with more assistance for the urgently 
required military intervention in the Rwandan genocide.   Therefore, 
ECOWAS needed to ensure the security of its sub-region by dealing with 
violent intra-state conflicts, instead of waiting for the UN to do so. 
 
The old perception of multilateral and regional relationships in security 
matters assumed the UN’s dominance, but that it can delegate responsibilities 
to subordinate regional institutions like ECOWAS.  This puts the regional 
body as a mere intermediate actor that undertakes tasks following decisions of 
a multilateral organization like the UN.  
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This study supports the views of Thakur (2005) and Hettne and Söderbaum 
(2006) that such an interpretation is no longer tenable in present reality, 
because of its erroneous assumption of a hierarchy in which the UN has 
monopoly over peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Regional bodies have 
brought new ideas into multilateralism and are able to fill some of the gaps 
left by the UN. Therefore, the UN should not see these organizations as 
merely depending on it for guidance and direction, but as new entrants 
capable of dealing with issues the UN may have failed to deal with or delayed 
to tackle.   
The intervention of ECOWAS in sub-regional conflicts should thus be seen as 
facilitation of global security and not a confrontation against multilateralism. 
Multilateral peacekeeping is not always available during violent conflicts and 
even when available, the deployment takes a long time. ECOWAS’s initiative 
in its sub-region is more relevant than a UN-led approach in the emerging 
global security context.  Many scholars of conflict resolution have affirmed 
that domestic conflicts require regional solutions; therefore, ECOWAS’s 
initiative in the sub-region is  clear evidence of this fact.   
Generally, there is no doubt that a regional approach in a post-Cold War world 
has proved to be more efficient than multilateral mechanisms.  However, it is 
not proper for ECOWAS to see itself as a rival to the UN, therefore, the 
ECOWAS conflict management mechanism has recognized the importance of 
its relationship with the UN. ECOWAS and the UN need each other and must 
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assume shared responsibility for resolving security problems in West Africa; 
as evident in the UN-ECOWAS’s effort in Côte d’Ivoire.   
 
7.3 Review of non-interference and the responsibility to 
protect. 
The study affirms that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in 
internal affairs had previously been the acceptable norm in ECOWAS; 
especially when the organization was created during the Cold War period.  It 
was enshrined in the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) and was the generally accepted 
norm in the OAU. Acceptance of the principle of sovereignty and the non-
intervention principle was rooted in the historic experience of ECOWAS 
member states during colonialism, decolonization and neo-colonialism.  
 
This experience, particularly the struggle for independence, created a high 
level of nationalism that was completely opposed to all forms of external 
intervention. The recently acquired independence was guarded jealously and 
any likelihood of an intervention was seen as a violation of sovereignty.  Also, 
the Cord War era rivalries and mistrust between the member states, especially 
between the anglophone and francophone states and the fear of Nigerian 
dominance contributed to the acceptance of the non-intervention principle as 
the norm in the sub-region. 
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The study accepts the argument that the ECOMOG experiment in Liberia, the 
end of the Cold War and the impact of intra-state conflicts necessitated a shift 
of the sub-region from the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to 
the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P). The end of the Cold War 
witnessed vital changes in the sub-region, including increased intra-state 
conflicts. However, the superpowers became less interested in African 
conflicts. The responsibility to deal with these conflicts and the resulting 
humanitarian catastrophe rested on the geographic neighbours.  ECOWAS 
was quick to realize this challenge and became the first regional organization 
in African to engage in peacekeeping operations to deal with its internal 
conflicts.  
The ECOMOG mission in Liberian became the first practical deviation by a 
regional organisation from the non-intervention principle to that of the R2P. 
The experiment in Liberia was soon followed by similar missions in Sierra 
Leone and Guinea-Bissau. 
The study accepts the suggestion that internal conflicts had vicious socio-
economic, political and security consequences on the entire sub-region and 
needed to be dealt with collectively. Therefore, there was the need to put in 
place the appropriate mechanisms to deal with the situation. One of the major 
steps taken towards the R2P was the replacement of the ECOWAS Treaty 
(1975) with the Revised Treaty (1993) which provided for collective security.  
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The study concludes that ECOWAS’s authority to intervene or its R2P is also 
affirmed by statues of both the AU and the UN. The need for sub-regional 
security and conflict resolution is also in consonance with ECOWAS’s 
objective for sub-regional economic integration. In this regards, the study is 
based on the assumption that there cannot be effective economic development 
without security and as well as that there cannot be security without effective 
economic development.  Therefore, the study concludes that ECOWAS’s 
combination of sub-regional economic integration with conflict resolution 
provides substantial evidence in support of the assumption.   
 
The study observed that ECOWAS had several challenges and deficiencies in 
its peacekeeping operations and mistakes made in Liberia were repeated in 
Sierra Leone, while those made in Sierra Leone were again repeated in Guinea 
Bissau. Also, the study observed that ECOWAS had not attained an 
appreciable level of sub-regional economic integration before delving into 
conflict resolution. Regarding its military operations, we recommend for 
ECOWAS to look more at facilitating conflict prevention, preventive 
diplomacy and peace building; the use of the military in peace keeping and 
peace enforcement should be the last resort (not the primary option). 
 
 
 
271 
 
Bibliography  
 
8.1 Presentations and Speeches:  
 
Alaba,  Olumuyiwa B.(2006), EU-ECOWAS EPA:  Regional Integration, 
Trade Facilitation and Development in West Africa, A paper presented at the 
GTAP conference, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May, 2006. 
 
Anderson, Kym and Norheim, Hege (1993); Cited in Kim, Jihyun, (2007), 
The New Regionalism: Road to Peace or Prelude to Conflict, presentation at 
the SPSA Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 
 
Araia,  Ghelawdewos (2006), A paper presented at the annual conference of 
Reemergence of Pan-Africanism in the 21
st
 Century: Implications for 
Empowerments of Black Educators and Students in the African Diaspora, 
Friday, November 3, 2006, Central Connecticut State University      
 
Frazier, Derrick V. and Stewart-Ingersoll, Robert (2008), Regional Powers 
and Security: A Framework for Understanding Order within Regional 
Security Complexes, Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26-29, 2008. 
 
African Union Commission / Economic Commission for Africa (2005), 
Report on Meeting of Experts on the Rationalisation of the Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), EX.CC/220(VIII).   
 
Frempong, Alexander (2003),  Trajectories of sub-regional conflict 
management: an assessment of ECOWAS, A paper presented at the Codesria 
30
th
 anniversary celebrations Grand Conference, Dakar, 8-11 December.        
 
Kim, Jihyun, (2007), The New Regionalism: Road to Peace or Prelude to 
Conflict, presentation at the SPSA Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 
January 3-7. 
 
Nkrumah, Kwame (1963), We Must Unite Now or Perish, (Kwame 
Nkrumah's Historic Speech Delivered on 24 May 1963 at the Founding 
Conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia); in the New African. Issue: 
448. 
     
 
Ojo, O. (1992), The role of pressure groups in the growth and development of 
ECOWAS. Paper presented at the international conference on regional 
integration in West Africa, 11–15 January, Dakar. Economic Commission for 
Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
 
272 
 
Olomola, A. (1993), A framework for regional cooperation to enhance 
African fisheries research and development.  Presented at the international 
conference on regional integration in West Africa, 11–15 January,  
International Development Research Centre, Dakar, Senegal. 
 
 
Thiam, Thierno (2009),  The Emergence of ECOWAS and the Limits of the 
Paradigms of International Politics, A paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the Midwest Political Science Association, 67th Annual National 
Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 02, 2009 
 
 
 
8.2 Books and Journals: 
  
Abass, Ademola. 2000. The New Collective Security Mechanism of 
ECOWAS: Innovations and Process. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
Vol 5 (2), pp.211-229. 
 
Abew,  Francis Kofi (1997), Evolution of the doctrine and practice of 
humanitarian intervention, an unpublished, Unpuplished Thesis submitted to 
the faculty of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy, Department of Political 
Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta. 
 
Adebajo, Adekeye (2002a), Building Peace in West Africa, London, Boulder. 
 
Adebajo, Adekeye (2002b), Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and 
Regional Security in West Africa, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 
 
Adebajo, Adekeye (2002c), Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in 
West Africa, London, Lynne Riennier.  
 
Adebajo, Adekeye and Rashid, Ismail (2004), West Africa's Security 
Challenges; Building Peace in a Troubled Region, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.  
 
Adedeji, Adebayo (1997), Economic Co-operation and integration: available 
options for West Africa, in Asante SKB et al (ed), Challenges of Regionalism 
in Africa, Accra, University of Ghana.  
 
Adewoye,  Ominiyi (1997); In Lavergne, Réal, Regional integration and 
cooperation in West Africa, a multidimensional perspective, Ottawa, Africa 
World Press. 
 
Ajala, Adenkule (1974), Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress, and Prospect, 
Andre Deutsch. 
273 
 
 
Amoo, S.G. (1993), Role of the OAU: Past, present and Future, In Smock 
David R ed, Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, 
Washington D. C., USIP. 
 
Anderson, Kym and Norheim, Hege  (1993), Is World Trade Becoming More 
Regionalized, International Economics, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp.91-109. 
 
Ankomah,  Baffour and Asante Ben (2005), West Africa: ECOWAS Targets 
Deeper Economic Integration, New African. Issue: 437, p.24.  
 
Apter, David E and Coleman, James S (1962), Pan-Africanism Reconsidered, 
American Society of African Culture, Califonia, University of California 
Press.  
 
Asante, R.D (1997), Regional integration in West Africa, In Asante, SKB et al 
Challenges of Regionalism in Africa, Accra, University of Ghana. 
 
Assefa,  Hizkias (1987), Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and 
Strategies, the Sudan Conflict, Boulder, Colorado Westview Press. 
 
Avruch, Kevin and Black, Peter (1987), A Generic Theory of Conflict 
Resolution: A Critique, Negotiation Journal, Vol 3, Issue 1, pp. 87-100. 
 
Bartos, Otomar J and Wehr, Paul (2002), Using Conflict Theory, Cambridge, 
University Press.  
 
Bellamy, Alex J. Conflict (2008), Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect. Journal of Global Governance, Volume: 14, Issue 2, pp.135-156  
 
Belmakki,  Mohamed (2005), African sub-regional organizations in 
peacekeeping and peacemaking: the Economic Community of West African 
state an unpublished Thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School,  
Monterey, California. 
 
Berger, Rose Marie (2006), Responsibility to Protect: is Military Intervention 
the Only Way. Sojourners Magazine. Volume: 35. Issue 1,  p8. 
 
Berman, E.G. and Sams K. E (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: culpabilities 
and Culpabilities, Geneva, UNIDIR/ISS. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1993), Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview in 
De Melo, Jaime and Panagariya, Arvind, eds. New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration, New York, Cambridge University Press.  
 
274 
 
Bhalla, A.S. and Bhalla P (1997), Regional Blocs: Building Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Bilder, Richard B. (1997), Adjudication: international arbitral tribunals and 
courts; in Zartman, William and Rasmussen, Lewis J eds. (1997), 
Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques, 
Washington, D.C., Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Bundu,  Abass (1997), ECOWAS and the Future of Regional Integration in 
West Africa; in Lavergne,  Réal (1997), Regional integration and cooperation 
in West Africa a multidimensional perspective,  Ottawa, IDRC/Africa World 
Press. 
 
Burton, John ed (1990), Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London, Macmillan. 
 
Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole (2003), Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security.  Cambridge, University Press.  
 
Campbell, J. (1976), Successful Negotiation: Triest, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Carey, Henry F and Richmond, Oliver (2003), Mitigating Conflict: The Role 
of NGOs, Frank Cass, London.  
 
Carment,  David and  Schnabel, Albrecht  eds. (2003), Conflict Prevention: 
Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?,  New York, United Nations University 
Press.  
 
Chabal, Patrick (1983), Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and 
People’s War, London, Hurst. 
 
Chimelu, Chime (1977), Integration and Politics among African States, 
Uppsala,  Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.  
 
Christiansen, Thomas et al (2001), The Social Construction of Europe, 
London, Sage. 
 
Christopher, W. et al. (1985), American Hostages in Iran, New Haven, Yale 
University Press.  
 
Connor, Walker (1994), Ethnonationalism, The Quest for Understanding, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Conteh-Morgan, Earl (2004), Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to 
the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts, New York,  Routledge.  
 
275 
 
Coe, D.T and R. Moghadam (1993), Capital and Trade as Engines of Growth 
in France, IMF staff papers, Vol.  40 issue 3. 
 
Collier, P; Elliot V; Havard H; Hoeffler, A (2003), Breaking the conflict trap: 
civil wars and development policy, Oxford: World Bank / Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, CEC, (1991), Regional 
cooperation and integration in sub-Saharan Africa: basic issues for an action 
programme, Brussels, CEC. 
 
Crocker, Chester and Hampson; Fen O., eds. (1999), Herding Cats: 
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, Washing D.C, USIP Press. 
 
Crocker, Chester and Hampson, Fen O. (2001), Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washing D.C, USIP Press. 
 
Cunningham, W.G, (1998) Framework for Conflict Resolution, unpublished 
Thesis submitted at the University of Auckland. 
 
Davidson, Basil (1981), No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky: The 
Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, London, Zed Press. 
 
De Melo, J. and Panagariya, A. (1992), The New Regionalism, Finance and 
Development, December 1992 pp. 37–40. 
 
Deng, Francis (1993), Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the 
International Community, Washington, D.C.,  Brookings Institution. 
 
Deng, Francis and Zartman,  William (1991),  Conflict Resolution in Africa,  
Washington DC, Brookings Institution. 
 
Dennis, Peter M. and Brown,  Leann (2003), ECOWAS: from regional 
economic organization to regional peacekeeper; in Laursen, Finn, ed (2003), 
Comparative regional integration: Theoretical perspective, Hampshire, 
Ashgate.  
 
Deutsch Karl, Cited in Laursen,  Finn (2008), Theory and Practice of 
Regional Integration, Jean Monnet / Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 8 No. 
3, pp.1-22. 
 
Devos, Serge (1995), Regional Integration, OECD Observer. Volume: A. 
Issue: 192.  
 
Druckman, Daniel (2001), Turning points in international negotiation, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 45, Issue:4, pp.519–544. 
276 
 
Duyvesteyn,  Isabelle (2004), Clausewitz and African War: Politics and 
Strategy in Liberia and Somalia,  New York,  Routledge. 
 
Ekiyor, Thelma (2008), ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF): A 
new approach to an old challenge, WACSI Op-Ed, Vol. 01 / 06 /08, pp.1-13. 
 
Ero, Comfort (2000), ECOMOG: A Model for Africa. ISS Monograph, Series 
No.46 of February, pp.97-120. 
 
Esedebe, Olisanwuche (1994), Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 
1776-1991, Washington,  Howard University Press. 
 
Fanon, Frantz (1963), The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove 
Weidenfeld.  
 
Fisher Roger and William Ury (1983), Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving, New York, Penguin Books. 
 
Fishlow, Albert and Haggard, Stephan (1992), The United States and 
Regionalism of the World Economy, Paris, OECD Development Center.  
 
Gambari, I. (1991), Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional 
Integration: The Case of ECOWAS.  Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press 
International.  
 
George, Alexander L (2000),  Strategies for Preventive Diplomacy and 
Conflict Resolution: Scholarship for Policymaking, PS: Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 15-19. 
 
Grieco Joseph M. (1990), Cooperation among Nations London, Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. (1958), The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic 
Forces 1950-57, London, Stevens and Sons.  
 
Haas, Ernest B (1961), International Integration: the European and the 
Universal; Process, International Organization, No 15, pp.366-92. 
 
Haas, Ernst B (1964), Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and 
International Organization, Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
Hamilton, Keith and Longhorne, Richard (1995), The practice of Diplomacy: 
Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, London, Routledge. 
 
277 
 
Hampson, Fen Osler and Malone David M. eds. (2002), From Reaction to 
Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Hanink, M, and Owusu, J. Henry (1998), Has ECOWAS Promoted Trade 
Among Its Members?, Journal of African Economies, Volume: 7. Issue 3,  
pp. 363-83 
 
Helge, Hveem (2003), The Regional Project in Global Governance; in 
Söderbaum, Fredrik and Shaw, Timothy M. eds. (2003), Theories of New 
Regionalism, New York, Palgrave.  
 
Hettne, Bjorn and Söderbaum, Fredrik S (2006), The UN and Regional 
Organizations in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics, 
Journal on Global Governance. Volume: 12. Issue 3,  pp. 227-232. 
 
Horowitz, Donald (1994), Conflict and the incentives to political 
accommodation; in Keogh, Dermot and Haltzel, Michael H eds Northern 
Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Horowitz, Donald (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of 
California Press.  
 
Institute of International Studies, (1975), Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-
functionalism?, Research Series, No. 25. 
  
Jentleson, Bruce W. (1999), Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: 
Preventive Diplomacy in post-Cold War World, New York, Rowman and 
Little Field Publishers. 
  
Kaufman, Chaim (1996), Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, 
International Security, Vol 20, No. 4, pp. 136–175. 
 
Kerman, C (1974), Creative Tensions: The Life and thought of Kenneth 
Boulding,  Michigan,  Ann Arbor. 
 
Khobe,  M. M.(2000), The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG in West 
Africa , ISS Monograph,  Series No. 46, pp.97 -120. 
 
King, Mary E. and Miller, Christopher A (2006), Nonviolent Transformation 
of Conflict,  Geneva, University for Peace. 
 
Klay Kieh, George Jr, (2002), Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and 
Cases, Westport,  Praeger. 
 
278 
 
Kragh, Helge (1989), An Introduction to the Historiography of Science, 
Cambridge, University Press. 
 
Kufuor, Kofi (2006) The institutional transformation of Economic Community 
of West African States, Hampshire, Ashgate. 
 
Lake, David A. and Morgan, Patrick M. (1997), Regional orders : Building 
Security in a New World, Pennsylvania, State University Press.  
 
Landsberg, Christopher (2004), The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism, in 
Adebajo, Adekeye and Rashid, Ismail eds, (2004), West Africa's Security 
Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region, Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 
 
Laursen, Finn (2003), Comparative Regional Integration, Hampshire, 
Ashgate. 
 
Laursen, Finn (2008), Theory and Practice of Regional Integration, Jean 
Monnet / Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp.1-22. 
 
Lavergne,  Réal (1997), Regional integration and cooperation in West Africa  
a multidimensional perspective,  Ottawa, IDRC/Africa World Press. 
 
Lord Gore-Booth ed. (1979), Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice, London, 
Longman.  
 
Lund, Michael  (1999) in Jentleson,  Bruce W., (1999), Oportunities Missed , 
Oportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in Post Cold War World, New 
York, Rowman and Little Field Publishers. 
 
Luttwak, Edward N. (1996), Give War a Chance, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, 
No.4, pp. 36–44. 
 
Mack, John E. (1990), The Enemy System; in Vamik Volkan, et al eds. (1990), 
The Psychodynamics of International Relationships,  Lexington, Lexington 
Books.  
 
Malam-Kandin, Adam (1997), in Lavergne, Réal (1997), ed. Regional 
integration and cooperation in West Africa, a multidimensional perspective, 
Ottawa, IDRC/Africa World Press. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D and Milner, Helen V (1999), The New Wave of 
Regionalism, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 589–627. 
 
Mbaku, J. ( 1995 ), Emerging Global Trade Blocs and the Future of African 
Participation in the World Economy, Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 
10, Issue 2, pp.141-177. 
279 
 
Meyers., David B (1974),  Intra-regional Conflict Management by the OAU. 
International Organization, No.3, Summer,  pp.345-373. 
 
Mills, Stewart, (2003), Empathizing with the enemy, Unpublished Thesis 
submitted at the Faculty of Arts, University of Syndney. 
 
Milner, Helen (1991), The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations 
Theory: A Critique, Review of Iinternational Studies, No. 17, pp.67-85. 
  
Mistry, Percy S. (2003), New Regionalism and economic development, in 
Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), (2003) Theories of New 
Regionalism Palgrave, Macmillan.  
 
Mittelman, James H (1999), Rethinking the new regionalism in the context of 
globalization; in Hettne, Bjorn et al eds. (1999), Globalism and the new 
regionalism, Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Power from Messina to Maastricht, New York, Cornell University Press. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew, (2008), The Choice for Europe; in Laursen, Finn (2008), 
Theory and Practice of Regional Integration, Jean Monnet / Robert Schuman 
Paper Series, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp1-22. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew and Schimmelfenning, Frank (2009), Liberal 
intergovernmentalism; in Diez, Thomas and Wiener, Antje eds (2009), 
European Integration Theory, Oxford, Oxford Press. 
 
Moses, Rafael (1990), Self, Self-view, and Identity; in Vamik Volkan, et al 
eds. (1990), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Concepts 
and Theories. Lexington, Lexington Books.  
 
Murith, Tim (2007, The responsibility to protect, as enshrined in article 4 of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Security Review Vol 16, 
No 3, pp.14-24. 
 
New African (2002), The OAU in African Conflicts July-August 2002, p.26.  
 
Nkrumah, Kwame (1973), Revolutionary Path, London, Panaf Books.  
 
Northedge, F. S. and N. D. Donelan, (1971), International Disputes: the 
Political Aspects, London,  Europa Publications. 
 
Nye, J.S. (1971), Peace in parts: integration and conflict in regional 
organizations, Boston,  Brown and Company.  
 
280 
 
Nyong’o, Anyang P. ed., (1990), Regional integration in Africa: unfinished 
agenda, Nairobi, African Academy of Science. 
 
O'Connell, Robert L (1989). Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, 
and Aggression, New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
O’Neill, Michael (1996), The Politics of European Integration, New York,. 
Routledge,  
 
Obodozie, Onuorah (2004), Security Concerns: Nigeria’s peacekeeping 
efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone 1990 – 1999, an unpublished Doctorate 
Thesis submitted to the University of South Africa. 
 
Olonisakin, Funmi (2004), African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An 
Assessment of the Continent's Evolving Peace and Security Architecture, New 
York, United Nations. 
 
Page, Sheila and Bilal,  Sanoussi (2001), Regional Integration in West Africa, 
London, Overseas Development Institute.  
 
Poe, Zizwe (2003), Kwame Nkrumah's Contribution to Pan-Africanism: An 
Afrocentric Analysis, New York, Routledge.  
 
Powell, Kristiana (2005) The African Union's emerging peace and security 
regime: opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to 
protect, ISS Monograph Series, No. 119. 
 
Rabow,  Gerald (1990), Replacing War with Non-Violent Dispute Resolution 
Methods, New York,  Praeger Publishers. 
 
Reno, William (1999), Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.  
 
Richmond, Oliver P. (2001), A Genealogy of Peacemaking: The Creation and 
Re-creation of Order, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. Volume: 26. 
Issue: 3, p.317. 
 
Rubin, Jeffrey Z.; Dean G. Pruitt; and Sung, Hee Kim (1994), Social Conflict: 
Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Rugumamu, Severine M. (2002), Conflict Management in Africa: Diagnosis 
of Current Practices and Future Prospects, Addis Abba, Ethiopian. 
 
Russett, Bruce (1967), International Regions and the International System: A 
Study in Political Ecology, Chicago, Rand McNally.  
 
281 
 
Sahnoun, Mohamed (1996), Managing Conflicts in the Post Cold War Era, in 
Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: the Role of Intervention, 
Report of Aspen Institute Conference August 2-6 1995, Aspen Colorado: 
Aspen Institute, pp.89-96. 
 
Salim, Salim A. (1990), Preventive Diplomacy among African States, 
Disarmament, Vol. XIII, No 3, pp. 175-190. 
 
Sall, Alioune ed. (1999), The future of competitiveness of African economies, 
African Futures, Paris, Karthala. 
 
Samuels, Kirsti (2007), Political Violence and the International 
Community, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Sarkesian, Sam C (1993), Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Westport, Greenwood Press.  
Schelling, Thomas (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Schmitter, Philippe C (2003), Neo-neo-functionalism; in Wiener, Antje and 
Diez, Thomas (2003), European Integration Theory, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Schneider, Gerald;   Weitsman, Patricia A and Bernauer, Thomas eds. (1995), 
Towards a New Europe: Stops and Starts in Regional Integration, Westport, 
Praeger Publishers.  
 
Schulz, Michael and Lombaerde, Philippe (1999) The EU and World 
Regionalism, London, Ashgate. 
Söderbaum, Fredrik and Shaw, Timothy (eds.) (2003), Theories of new 
regionalism, New York, Palgrave Macmilan.  
 
Sommers, L. and Mehretu, A. ( 1992 ), Trade Patterns and Trends in the 
African-European Trading Area: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa from the Era 
of the Lome Accords 1975-1988, Africa Development, Vol. 18, issue 2, pp. 5-
26.  
 
Sonko, Bruno (2004), The Casamance Conflict: A Forgotten Civil War?, 
CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos. 3 and 4, pp.30-33. 
 
Sorenson , David S and Wood,  Pia Christina  eds. (2004), The Politics of 
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, New York, Routledge..  
 
282 
 
Thakur, Ramesh (2006), The United Nations, Peace and Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Thakur, Ramesh and Schnabe, Albrecht eds. (2001), United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, New 
York, United Nations University Press.  
 
Tive, Charles (2001), 419 Scam: Exploits of the Nigerian Con Man, 
Bloomington, Iuniverse. 
 
Tive, Charles (2003), United Nations and Preventive Diplomacy, Unpublished 
Master’s Degree Dissertation, submitted to the Lagos State University. 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (2004), Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa, Addis Ababa, ECA. 
 
Urrell, Andrew (1995), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional  
Organization and International Order, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Ury, W; Brett, J. and Goldberg, S. (1988), Getting Disputes Resolved, San 
Francisco, Jossey Bass. 
 
Volkan, Vamik et al eds. (1990), The Psychodynamics of International 
Relationships: concepts and Theories, Lexington, Lexington Books.  
 
Wallace, William (1994), Regional Integration: The West European 
Experience, Washington DC, Brookings Institution. 
 
Wallensteen, Peter (2002), Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, 
Peace and the Global System, London, Sage Publications. 
 
Walraven, Klaas van (1999), Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization 
of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993, Aldershot, Ashgate.  
 
Walraven, Klaas van (1999), Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization 
of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Wilson, Gary (2003), UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organizations 
versus Coalitions of the willing, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, issue 2, 
pp.89-106. 
 
Woronoff, Jon (1970), Organizing African Unity, New Jersey, Scarecrow 
Press.  
283 
 
Yoh, John Gay Nout (2008), The Institutional role of the OAU in conflict 
resolution in Africa, Unpublished Doctorate Thesis submitted to the 
University of South Africa. 
 
Zartman, I. William (1995), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War, 
Washington D. C,  Brookings Institute. 
 
Zartman, William (2001), The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates 
and Ripe Moments, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8-
18. 
 
 
8.3 Internet Materials 
 
African Union, (accessed on 25 Jan 2010) http://www.africa-union.org   
 
Aning,  Emmanuel Kwesi (2000), Towards the new millennium: ECOWAS's 
evolving conflict management system; African Security Review Vol 9 No 5/6, 
2000. Available at http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/9No5And6/Aning.html 
 
Bamba, Lambert, ECOWAS Regional Integration: position of common 
investment market, (accessed on January 4, 2010) 
http://www.privatesector.ecowas.int/en/III/ECOWAS.pdf 
 
Brahimi Report (2000), United Nations Peace Operations, available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ 
 
CPJ Africa, Guinea -Bissau Country Report 2000 (accessed on February 10 
2010),  
 
CSCAP, The Council For Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, Workshop on 
Preventive Diplomacy, Bangkok, Thailand, 28 February–2 March, 1999. 
(accessed on 23 October 2009). Available at 
http://www.cscap.org/documents/csbms/csbms-10.rtf 
 
Cunningham, William G., Theoretical Framework for Conflict Resolution, 
(Accessed 20 Sept 2009) Available at 
http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict/cunningham.htm 
 
Defence Association Institute, Second Annual Student Symposium, 12-
13November 1999, ( accessed on 5
th
 March 2010) Available at 
http://www.cdacdai.cdsymposia/1999/quat99.htm 
 
ECOWAS formation and structure; (accessed on 15 May 2008) Available at 
http://www.ecowas.int 
 
284 
 
Eme O I (2011), Preventive Diplomacy in Africa (1999 – 2008). Available at 
www.ajol.info index.php naujilj article download 82412 72566 
 
Ero Comfort, ECOMOG: A model for Africa? (accessed on 12 Feb 2010) 
Available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html 
 
Franke, Benedikt F.(2007),  Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the 
Continent's Emerging Security Architecture.  Journal of African Studies 
Quarterly, Volume: 9. Issue: 3. Available at http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v9/ 
 
Frempong, Alexander, The internal and regional dynamics of the cycle of war 
and peace in Guinea-Bissau (accessed on 4 October 2008) Available at 
http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:http://www.codesria.org/Links/Researc
h/luso/frempong.pdf 
 
Ghali, Boutros Boutros, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping (accessed on 21
st
 October 2009). Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 
 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary, The neo-functionalists were (almost) right: 
politicization and European Integration; (accessed on 20 March 2009),  
Available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/assets/docs/books/neofunctionalists%20were%2
0almost%20right.may2006.pdf 
 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2002) Guinea-Bissau Fact File, (accessed 
on 27 January 2010), Available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/GuineaBissau/guineabis1 .html 
 
Khobe, Mitikishe Maxwell, (2000), Monograph No. 44: Boundary of Peace 
Support Operations, February 2000, (accessed on 24 September 2008). 
Available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html 
 
 
Kikoler, Naomi, Responsibility to protect, (accessed on 24 Feb 2010) 
Available at 
http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Responsibility%20to%20Protect,%20Keynote
%20Paper,%20Oxford%20University.pdf. 
 
 
 
King, Mary E. and Miller, Christopher A. Nonviolent, transformation of 
Conflict, (accessed on 21 September 2009), Available at 
http://www.steinergraphics.com/pdf/nv_struggle_screen.pdf 
 
285 
 
Kofi Annan’s Address of 14 September 2005, available at: 
www.un.org/summit2005/. 
 
Lehtinen, Terhi, The Military-Civilian Crisis in Guinea Bissau, (accessed on 
January 9 2010).  available at http://www.conflicttransform.net.pdf, pp.120-
131 
 
Lund, Michael S., Underrating Preventive Diplomacy, (accessed on 22 
October 2009), Available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950701faresponse5059/michael-s-
lund/underrating-preventive-diplomacy.html 
 
Lundin, Lars-Erik (Ambassador), Theoretical aspects of Preventive 
Diplomacy, (accessed 23 October 2009), Available at 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/iheid/shared/iheid/514/1-1996.pdf  
 
Malu, Linus, Collective peace-keeping in West Africa (accessed on 
7/02/2010), Available at 
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=61  
 
Massey, Simon; Multi-faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau War (accessed 
on 30 February 2010) Available at 
http://academic.sun.ac.za/mil/scientia_militaria/Internet%20vol%2032(1)mass
ey-2004.pdf 
 
Mekenkamp, Monique, Giunea-Bissau: Democracy Restored by a Military 
Coup? Searching for Peace in Africa, (accessed on January 10 2010), 
Available at 
http://www.enconflict.org/dev/ECCP/ELCPSurveys_v0_10.nsf/0/DB470-
c3EFE6DC1256B2700317DE2?opendocument. 
 
Naraghi, Sanam Anderlini and Stanski, Victoria  (accessed on October 19, 
2009)  Available at 
http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/28_conflict_prevention.pdf 
 
Nathan, Laurie (1997), A South African policy framework on peace initiatives 
in Africa.’ (accessed on 10 November 2009). Available at 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/staff_papers/laurie_dfa.html. 
 
Ousmane, Hon. Mahamane, The ECOWAS parliament, (accessed on 28
th
 
December 2009). Available at http://www.parl.ecowas.int/ 
 
Prodi Report (2008), The African Union-United Nations  
modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, Available at 
http://effectivepeacekeeping.org/sites/effectivepeacekeeping.org/files/05/Prodi
286 
 
%20Report,%20Joint%20AU-
UN%20on%20AU%20Peacekeeping%20Operations.pdf 
 
Rubenstein, Richard E. (2001), Basic Human Needs: the next steps in theory 
development, International Journal of peace studies, Volume 6, Number 1 
available http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Rubenstein.htm 
 
Schmitter, Philippe (2002), Neo-functionalism; Available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/Ne
oNeoFunctionalismRev.pdf 
 
Samuels, Kirsti (2007), Political Violence and the International Community, 
(accessed on 16 July 2009). Available at http://www.review.upeace.org 
 
Toure, Mahamane and Okae, C.A. Okae (2010), ECOWAS Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security, Available at 
http://aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/ECOWAS_Mechanism_for_Conflict_Pre
vention,_Management_and_Resolution,_Peace-Keeping_and_Security 
 
Tuck, Christopher, The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia African Studies 
Quarterly, Vol 4, Issue 1 2000 Available at 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm 
 
United Nations; (Accessed on 20 January 2008), Available at www.un.org 
 
United Nations; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of 
the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(New York, UN, 2004), (accessed on 21 December 2009), Available at 
www.un.org/secureworld.  
 
United Nations; An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy and 
Peacemaking and peacekeeping, Report of the UN Secretary General, 
Boutros- Ghali, Boutros,  A/47/277-S/24111-June 1992. Available at 
http://unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf 
 
University of Maryland Library, (accessed on 5 January 2010) Available at 
http://www.lib.umd.edu/guides/primary-sources.html.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
APPENDIX  
Map and flags of ECOWAS 
(Source: www.ecowas.int) 
 
The Republic of BENIN 
BURKINA FASO 
The Republic of CABO VERDE 
The Republic of COTE D'IVOIRE 
The Republic of GAMBIA 
The Republic of GHANA 
The Republic of GUINEE 
The Republic of GUINEE BISSAU 
The Republic of LIBERIA 
The Republic of MALI 
 
The Republic of NIGER 
The Federal Republic of NIGERIA 
The Republic of SENEGAL 
The Republic of SIERRA LEONE 
TOGOLESE Republic 
 
